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In this project I examine how we, as film spectators, build an understanding of characters in fiction film 
narratives and how this could be said to relate to the way in which we build a sense of selfhood in the real 
world. I conduct detailed case studies of six films, which in different ways engage with issues of self-
identity in a way that can be said to highlight the inherent fragility of our sense of self. I bring together 
contributions from theoretical film studies, cognitive psychology, and philosophy in order to both link 
ideas from these different areas of research as well as linking seemingly disparate films through their 
respective approaches to character portrayal. My aim is to build on the existing discourse that 
predominantly falls under the banner of cognitive film theory, with particular emphasis on audience affect 
and character portrayal. I offer alternative readings and approaches to certain films which feature 
unconventional character development and which, to varying degrees, deviate from established cinematic 
storytelling norms.  
The idea I wish to advance is that there is an inherent aversion to imagery and / or cinematic storytelling 
styles which highlight (either implicitly or explicitly) the artificiality of what we are seeing, particularly 
if the example involves a breakdown in the clarity of character identity. The view I offer is that an aversion 
to or frustration with such instances is not solely rstricted to our sense of confusion stemming from a 
perceived lack of clear storytelling. Behind this lies the potentially discomfiting sense that the fabricated 
nature of characters points towards something similarly fragile about our own ‘real world’ identities, 
which can be the case particularly if the subject matter complements the avant-garde style of the film in 
question. When character identity dissolves it may impair our ability to comprehend a film narrative, but 
a negative viewer response may also be generated by thesugg stion that our sense of self might be more 
vulnerable that we care to admit. I argue that our appreciation of certain kinds of ‘difficult’ films require 
a revision of not only how we approach films more generally but how we understand selfhood itself.  
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Works of fiction offer seemingly infinite freedom to construct, mould, and alter character identities within 
a given narrative, and this capacity provides a rich source of material for those in the business of creating 
fiction films. In this project I will consider the foll wing question: what is the nature of the relationship 
between how we relate to fictional characters in film and how we define and understand our own 
identities? If we pause to consider the fundamentals of constructing characters and assembling a film 
narrative, the process and end product is, on a certain level, a violation of assumptions that surround us 
in our daily lives. However, because we are immensely familiar with film narratives of a certain style we 
do not tend to routinely question or reflect upon the basic act of rearranging space and time in the way 
that filmmakers do; our understanding of the capabilities of the moving image is ingrained. However, 
when films work against or break entirely from the conventions of narrative storytelling, it can often make 
us pause and reconsider the basic processes we employ when comprehending films and the narrative 
conventions – of editing, continuity, sound, plot development - that we have essentially internalised. From 
this consideration comes a second question; what can unconventional portrayals of characters in film tell 
us about both our viewing tendencies as well as the broader assumptions we make about our own sense 
of self in the real world? Viewers respond in a multitude of ways to narratives which choose to manipulate 
character identities in one way or another, but, as with all works of fiction, it is the creative decisions and 
diegetic content in conjunction with our real world experiences and knowledge that will, for the most 
part, guide and influence our responses.  Depending on what someone has read, experienced, or perhaps 
been raised to believe, personal identity may seem to some as something dependable, clearly defined and 
distinct while to others it may appear to be a fractured an  ill-defined phenomenon. I will explore the 
various ways a film can frustrate our expectations of how characters should develop during a narrative as 
means of highlighting the fragility of one’s own personal identity, and the associated fear or fascination 
that this idea holds. 
It is imperative at this point that I establish what I am referring to when I use the t rm ‘identity,’ 
since the word can be used to describe a huge variety of phenomena. Even if we reduce the scope to ‘self-
identity’ or ‘personal identity,’ which are the areas I am most concerned with, we are still confronted with 







a wide and varied array of definitions and meanings, and as such greater specificity is required. As I will 
be referring to real selves as well as cinematic ones, a major part of my efforts will involve defining these 
two types of identity and highlighting the similarities and differences between them. Existential debates 
about self-identity are as old as humanity itself so it is with a mixture of caution and enthusiasm that I 
have chosen to wade into what is a long-established and contentious topic, albeit from the perspective of 
theoretical film studies. There are areas of crossover between how we define and understand characters 
and how we form a sense of our own personal identity, and equally there are many areas in which this 
crossover does not occur. Traditional debates about personal ide tity gravitate towards the mind-body 
question in which much of the discussion attempts to determin  which part(s) of a person could be said 
to constitute one’s self. I have laid out my project in line with this dichotomy so that sections I and II 
consider portrayals of physical and psychological identity respectively, though I should emphasise that 
this is primarily for practical and organisational reasons rather than an endorsement of taking a dualistic 
approach to theories of self-identity. I will in fact fall in line with more recent theories from the philosophy 
of mind and cognitive psychology to show that the mind-boy distinction is helpful simply for the purpose 
of opening up the initial discussion, but only in order to show  the identity of individuals is much 
more complex than a dualistic approach allows. As regards characters, there is obviously common ground 
between real selves and fictional ones in terms of physical and psychological identity and the crossover 
in these areas will form the backbone of my analyses. As such, when using terms like ‘self-identity’ or 
‘personal identity’ I will for the most part be referring to the bodily and psychological aspects of selfhood, 
be it real or fictional. In this respect I am distinguishing from other ‘types’ of self-identity, such as gender, 
race, nationality and so on. That is not to say that these aspects of a person or character’s identity do not 
contribute to their psychological or physical makeup or distinctiveness (gender, for example, has a hugely 
significant bearing on both), but for my purposes they ar better regarded as sub-categories under the 
broader headings of physical or psychological identity. Whenever a sub-category of this sort becomes 
relevant - the gender of a character; the national identity of a director; the racial background of an actor, 
for example – then I will focus in on that aspect of identity as applicable.  
As my title suggests, I will be exploring character identity and self-identity with a particular 
focus on the fault lines that exist within our understanding of how and why an individual can be 







considered a cohesive, discrete entity who is wholly distinct from other phenomena. But what do I mean 
by terms like ‘fracturing’ or ‘fault lines’? It is a simple enough exercise to consider how a human body is 
formed, where its physical limits are, what it is comprised of, and then to consider the multitude of ways 
in which it can be damaged, destroyed, or undergo change and degradation of one sort or another. We 
can also appreciate the fluid and vulnerable nature of our subjective self with its rapidly changing moods 
and tastes, and the way in which non-physical trauma can sh pe our psychology. It is easy to imagine 
certain kinds frailties in our identity; the contest beween a human body and the blades of a combine 
harvester can have only one winner, just as witnessing a murder will inevitably inflict deep psychological 
damage of some sort. Fracturing of one’s identity in these ways form part of my analysis when I look at 
storylines depicting physical and mental damage, but beyond this are more existential ways of regarding 
fault lines in our self of self. Consider the exchange of dialogue below, which is taken from a scene in 
Mike Leigh’s Naked (1993) in which the protagonist, Johnny (David Thewlis), is having a bizarre 
existential argument with a security guard:   
Brian: But the present does exist. We’re in it now.  
Johnny: You were just then when you said it. But you’re not in it now! You’re not in it now! 
You’re not in it now! You’re forever being kicked up the arse by the future! 
Johnny’s words articulate what certain schools of thought would highlight as another kind of 
fault line; a tendency to get lost in one’s memories of the past and plans for the future at the exp nse of 
having a real sense one’s self in the present moment. Johnny’s point is that the person we think we are is 
not necessarily who we actually are because we cannot prevent out minds drifting forwards or backwards 
in time for long enough to be truly aware of our existence i  the present moment. The inability to ‘catch 
oneself’ in the present moment represents a temporal fracturing in the sense that our self-awareness is out 
of synch with the actual flow of time. There is a disconnect between the moment of experience and the 
moment we are focusing on, which can be construed as a les  empirical and more experiential, existential 
fault line in our self-identity.  







This example represents the nature of the debate that will follow when I look at a selection of 
film narratives which, in different ways, highlight and engage with the complex issues common to debates 
about self-identity. In particular, I will consider how films which foreground the inherent artificiality of 
fictional characters can reveal our tendencies and expectations as viewers while also highlighting certain 
physical and psychological frailties in our own personal identity. In mainstream film narratives there is a 
tendency to mask rather than highlight the fictionality of what we are watching so that the emphasis on 
storytelling can be maximised. Conversely, in arthouse or avant-garde works we sometimes have our role 
as viewers addressed more directly and this is often achieved in tandem with the filmmakers drawing 
attention to the film’s constructed nature and the artificiality of the story being told. In this project I will 
be investigating the parallels that can be drawn between the cognitive dissonance that sometimes 
accompanies a jarring representation of fictional characters and the broader debates about personal 
identity.  
This study is made up of six chapters gathered into three sections with each chapter devoted to 
the close analysis of a relevant work of film supplemented by pertinent secondary examples. The existing 
discourse on films that engage with personal identity in one way or another tends to focus heavily on 
narrative content and storylines with considerably less attention afforded to the significance of narrative 
structure and film style, particularly when it comes to examples outside the mainstream. With this in 
mind, it is my intention here to adopt a different approach which will highlight how films drawn from a 
variety of genres and historical periods can be linked to one another thematically despite contrasting 
sharply from one another in terms of style, tone, and overall delivery. It is quite easy to find films that are 
explicitly ‘about’ identity but my aim here is to draw links and parallels between seemingly disparate 
examples. I will draw a distinction between films which engage with issues of personal identity primarily 
through their storylines and those whose styles and structures behave demonstratively or illustratively. 
The latter group employ formal devices in order to compleent the narrative content and create an 
immersive experience that takes the film beyond what it has to say about personal identity solely on the 
level of its diegetic content. Furthermore, I will look at how this group of films ‘tug away’ at the question 
of how relatively solid or fluid personal identity can be, particularly in cases where this is not necessarily 
explored solely through the explicit use of diegetic content, as is often the case in mainstream narratives. 







My specific aim is not only to highlight a commonality between seemingly disparate films but 
also to bring together arguments from film studies, traditional philosophy, and cognitive psychology 
which in my view share some common ground within the self-id ntity discussion. The film-as-philosophy 
debate is an area of theoretical film studies that considers issues such as those I will be looking at and I 
will of course draw on works in this field while adding to the existing arguments. Much of the recent 
work in this area has focused on the question of whether or not films can be considered capable of 
advancing philosophical arguments in their own right, as distinct from merely articulating or enacting 
existing ideas or arguments through their storylines. The scope of my project prevents me from delving 
into the finer details of the debate but where necessary I will refer to key theoretical positions and 
contributors whose work is applicable to my analysis.  
The phenomenon of altering or problematising characters by portraying them with unstable or 
malleable identities is present in numerous storylines and has been used to achieve a broad range of 
responses. Some recognise and exploit the potential for inducing terror or revulsion, such as The Fly 
(David Cronenberg, 1986) in which the protagonist fears his very existence is under threat from a genetic 
mutation growing within him, and which may very well erase his subjective self after the physical 
transformation is complete. Invasion of the Body Snatchers (Don Siegel, 1956) isolates a similar fear of 
the loss of individuality but in this case the self is in dager of being consumed by and incorporated into 
a collective whole or group consciousness. Like horror, the science-fiction genre very often explores the 
similar themes and storylines featuring mutation of identity, with films like Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 
1982) and Robocop (Paul Verhoeven, 1987) blurring the distinction between artificial and organic in 
order to engage with existentialist questions about what it means to be human. Elsewhere, films like Vice-
Versa (Brian Gilbert, 1988), Freaky Friday (Gary Nelson, 1976), and All of Me (Carl Reiner, 1984) 
exploit the body/mind swap premise for comedic effect, while others focus on identity in a purely 
psychological sense through characters whose own self-awareness is in some way fractured. This may 
involve a crisis of gender-identity, such as in Ma Vie En Rose (Alain Berliner, 1997), and Boys Don't Cry 
(Kimberley Peirce, 1999) or it may be in the form of psychosis or schizophrenia as in Raising Cain (Brian 
de Palma, 1992) and Fight Club (David Fincher, 1999). However, despite featuring characters whose 
identities are split or confused in some way, these examples are fairly conventional in their style and 







narrative structures and do not exhibit a corresponding disruption or ‘fracturing’ on a narrative level; this 
is a key aspect that distinguishes them from some of the films that will be the main focus of this project.  
Section I features detailed analyses of The Thing (John Carpenter, 1982) and Lost Highway 
(David Lynch, 1997), narratives whose storylines foreground the human body and physical identity and 
explore how an individual exists and endures through space and time. Much of my analysis will be framed 
by a number of salient arguments and theories put forward by Noël Carroll in The Philosophy of Horror; 
Or Paradoxes of the Heart. By dissecting the diegetic and stylistic elements of these films in the context 
of Carroll’s theory of horror, I will illustrate how texts which have much in common as regards theme 
and subject matter can contrast sharply in terms of their delivery and formal approach. The storylines of 
both films engage with issues of physical mutation, interstitial identty, and monstrousness, and share 
affective similarities through their pervading moods of uncanniness and paranoia. However, in terms of 
style, genre, and narrative resolution they diverge very noticeably from one another. My analysis of The 
Thing will be used to explore how, through situating the diegetic events within a mainstream narrative 
framework, horror and science-fiction tropes can be used to raise salient issues about bodily identity. 
Carroll’s analysis of viewer responses to horror films and his ideas on repulsion generated by interstitial 
monsters provide the ideal opportunity to consider whether certain types of imagery pertain to an inherent 
discomfort surrounding the fragility of human identity and a fear of infection and physical violation. 
Carroll considers potential audience responses to horror naratives and in the context of how he defines 
this affect, I will look at how mutation and assimilation are portrayed in The Thing. From this point I will 
mount a broader consideration of the potential link between s lf-identity, self-preservation and how we 
respond to horror films. Specifically, I will look at interstitiality in relation to Carroll’s definition of 
monstrousness and the link between an entity which straddles and confuses boundaries across distinct 
physical entities and the way in which we view and organise our perception of the world.  
Carroll’s focus is almost entirely on viewer responses to narratives in the horror genre, a reaction 
he calls ‘art-horror’; a response which is distinct from reactions to actual or natural horro , such as 
genocide or nuclear war. My analysis takes Carroll’s points beyond this genre by way of science-fiction 
and art cinema examples in order to consider his points about ‘interstitiality’ in the context of 







philosophical theories of self-identity; particularly those put forward by Murray Smith and Deborah 
Knight, amongst others, who see film narratives as a viable vehicle for mobilising existential discussions. 
I will open the discussion through a brief analysis of Cronenberg’s 1986 remake of The Fly in order to 
show how the distress and repulsion associated with Carroll’s ‘art-horror’ response has affective 
similarities with narratives outside the horror genre. Carroll makes a distinction between horror and what 
he calls ‘tales of dread,1’and suggests a related term, ‘art-dread,’ as an area of film theory which needs to 
be developed. He writes that ‘[a]rt-dread probably deserves a theory of its own, though I do not have one 
ready-to-hand,’2 and this invitation is taken up by Cynthia Freeland3 who introduces the phrase ‘uncanny 
horror,’4 to explain a nuanced sense of unease combining aspects of Freud’s well-known concept with 
Carroll’s art-horror response. Within the context of these ideas and arguments I will expand my analysis 
beyond horror and science-fiction and embark on a close analysis of Lost Highway (David Lynch, 1997) 
to try and arrive at a clearer understanding of where Lynch’s film could be positioned or categorised in 
relation to a film like Carpenter’s. 
Lost Highway displays tropes from different genres and contains moments of uncanniness and 
grotesqueness in order to create a more challenging, unconventional portrayal of characters who undergo 
apparent physical alterations. My analysis will be further refined to consider not simply the strategies 
employed by Lynch to generate a mood or atmosphere t at may be classed as ‘art-dread’ or ‘uncanny 
horror’, but the extent to which such effects are directly linked to the way in which of individual character 
are portrayed. Lost Highway is notable for the way in which it establishes characters whose physical 
continuity is problematised at least as far as mainstream cinematic conventions are concerned. In a variety 
of ways the film frustrates viewer understanding of how fictional characters are expected to operate and 
develop within a narrative, and by highlighting the likely effects on narrative comprehension I will 
examine the extent to which establishing ‘stable’ characters within a narrative is inextricably linked to 
our ability to access films more generally. My analysis w ll in turn show how similar issues and ideas to 
those raised in films like The Thing can be explored in a very different way through a vastly different 
style, tone, setting, genre, and structure. Lost Highway, for example, shares common ground with 
Carpenter’s film in terms of its portrayal of disturbing, unsettling events centred around mutation, 
uncanniness and monstrosity. However, unlike The Thing, Lost Highway delves deeply into the 







subjectivity of its protagonist in order to generate a degree of ambiguity about the precise nature of the 
character changes and mutations we are shown. Although there is a lack of closure at the end of each 
film, The Thing simply leaves the viewer wondering which of the remaining characters is still human but 
it is unambiguous about the fact that certain characters have undergone literal transformations.  Lost 
Highway, on the other hand, raises questions over whether or not the central character has indeed been 
altered in a literal, physical sense or has merely suffered from a type of psychological rift or breakdown. 
Lynch states how part of his inspiration for the storyline for Lost Highway came from learning about a 
psychological condition called a ‘psychogenic fugue,’5 a form of trauma-induced memory suppression, 
and my analysis will serve as an opportunity to introduce certain scientific theories and arguments by 
way of Lynch’s own writing. Looking at the film from this perspective will open up Section II in which 
I will focus on a selection of films whose themes and storylines highlight and foreground the 
psychological dimension of characters and the relationship between memory and self-identity.  
My principal case studies in Section II are M mento (Christopher Nolan, 2000) and Last Year at 
Marienbad (Alain Resnais, 1961), and I will explore how their respective narrative styles and structures 
are tightly bound to the subject matter of their respectiv  storylines. Marienbad is the more avant-garde 
of the two and is highly experimental in its formal design, while Memento belongs more obviously to the 
mainstream but contains significant deviations from a classic paradigm. Although the two films contrast 
in terms of style and genre they both combine structure with storyline as a means of creating a degree of 
subjective congruence for the viewer with what the characters are experiencing and / or describing. Both 
films place great emphasis on memory, recollection, and the construction of self-identity based on 
psychological theories of ‘autobiographical memory’, and I will consider key theories from philosophy 
and neuropsychology to look at how their narratives engage with the representation of memory on both 
thematic and structural levels. In addition, I will consider how unconventional narrative structures, such 
as the reverse chronology in Memento, also help foreground typical viewing strategies for consuming and 
comprehending film narratives. We rely on our memories to build our sense of our narrative past, our 
documented history, in much the same way as we do when obsrving scenes in a film narrative to form 
conclusions and ideas about the nature of fictional characters. We continually bring these witnessed 
events to bear on whatever the current scene depicts in order to further shore up or perhaps help us revise 







our current understanding about a character’s identity. The narrative past of the fiction film accrues 
significance as it progresses, and we bring certain expectations to bear about the laws governing 
the diegetic world of the film. Key signifiers and stylistic tropes, in addition to actual events in the 
narrative, help guide our understanding of what rules are in operation in a particular film. However, if 
there is a deficit in this area then we may be required to revise our comprehension, make an educated 
guess or, at other times, accept the existence of ambiguity and the fact that the narrative will not supply 
us with plausible answers to all of our questions. The collection of essays in Andrew Kania’s companion6 
to Nolan’s film considers the narrative from a variety of philosophical perspectives, and I will consider 
these alongside selected chapters from The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film.7 I will also 
draw on relevant findings on the storage and recall of memory fr m cognitive psychology and 
neuropsychology in order to put forward variations on established interpretations of each film. In 
particular, theories and findings surrounding reconstructive memory theory will provide a number of 
insights as well as serving as the bridge to the final section, which will consider the significance and 
function of central or leading characters within film narratives. 
Section III considers the saliency of the protagonist in film narratives and I will look at whether 
or not it is a narrative ingredient upon which fiction films ust be established, with a principal focus on 
Mirror (Andrei Tarkovsky, 1975) and Inland Empire (David Lynch, 2006) as examples which eschew 
traditional portrayals of central characters. I will consider the potential impact on viewer comprehensio  
as well as the likely motivations the filmmakers had for structuring their respective narratives in the way 
they did. I will examine how the identity of a protagonist can be corrupted and co fused through a 
combination of psychological and physical identifiers, with reference to what has been laid out in the first 
two sections of the thesis. By bringing these elements together I will assess how the role of the 
protagonist, who tends to lead the diegesis by acting as the narrative's internal 'guide', can be manipulated 
to reveal viewer expectations about how a protagonist should develop within a narrative. A key 
consideration will be whether or not a protagonist is a fundamental narrative component or simply a 
habitual preference born out of the unavoidable fact that we can only ever experience the world from a 
self-oriented perspective. I will consider alternatives examples which suggest that there is perhaps simply 
a need for a continual organising centre or focal point throughout t e narrative but not necessarily one 







that takes the form of a traditional protagonist. Films such as Slacker (Richard Linklater, 1991) and 
Identity (James Mangold, 2003), for instance, feature clearly established characters while also ensuring 
that no single one stands out as a leading, central figure.  
Mirror omits any clear protagonist save for the implied author whose death-bed recollections 
guide the narrative through a meandering collection of episodes, while the film also features the use of 
single actors in more than one role. On one reading, the guiding character in Tarkovsky’s film is all but 
absent and exists purely in the form of a narrator; a figure who only appears once in a brief shot with only 
his hand and forearm visible. Furthermore, additional layers of meaning are conveyed through the fact 
that the narrator’s words alternate between moments drawn from the director’s own life experiences and 
poetry written by his father, Arsenii Tarkovsky. This raises the question about whether or not we are 
watching a work of fiction or simply a re-enactment of childhood events, in which case one may argue 
that Tarkovsky sets himself up as the protagonist with the actors simply behaving as conduits through 
which his recollections are told. The film uses single actors for multiple roles as a means of conflating 
character identities to represent the way in which the narrator’s recollections of certain family members 
have become compounded over time. The similarities he sees between his mother and his wife, or himself 
and his son, are rendered in a literal way by using the same actors to play these separate characters. 
Overriding these details is the clear and direct link to Tarkovsky’s life, and the personal inspiration for 
the way in which the narrator looks back on certain moments in his life. The semi-autobiographical 
subject matter is presented through an episodic, dream-logic structure and my analysis will consider the 
relative distinctions one can draw between the identity of he unseen narrator, Tarkovsky as the director, 
and Tarkovsky the individual himself. I will look at how the competing voices and perspectives, which 
reside both within and outside the diegesis, pull the narrative in unusual ways and raise salient questions 
about how accustomed we are to having storylines carried by a protagonist of some kind.  
In contrast, Inland Empire skews the identity of its principal character to such an extent that the 
resulting narrative defies any straightforward or unambiguous explanation. The events of the film are 
ostensibly set in modern-day Los Angeles but in truth there are a number of narrative realms – some 
realist, others purely magical and fantastical – and the physical and temporal links between them is 







unclear. There is little evidence in the narrative to suggest the existence of typical causes of or 
explanations for supernatural events; nevertheless, characters mutating, appearing to switch identities, 
being transported through time and appearing to exist in more than one place are all in evidence. Inland 
Empire features a film-within-a-film storyline but this only serves to clarify a certain amount of the film’s 
spatio-temporal paradoxes and ambiguities. Furthermore, although Laura Dern dominates the running 
time, a fact which would seemingly qualify her as the protag nist, the film paradoxically manages to 
make it increasingly difficult to distinguish between thedifferent roles that she is playing in any given 
scene. A lack of reliable reference points as regards the depiction of real, imagined, or filmed events is a 
key feature of the narrative, with a significant proportion of the unreliability connected to how characters 
are established and developed. As a result, the film foregr unds the extent to which viewers normally rely 
upon unambiguous character identities for engaging with a narrative and elucidating its events.  
Daniel C. Dennett’s essay ‘Self as the Center of Narrative Gravity’8 provides a useful starting 
point for considering these issues and I will use his essay to open up my analysis into the nature of the 
relationship between fictional protagonists, characters in general and how the consumption of fiction film 
narratives relates to our sense of self beyond the context of cinema. The essay introduces a number of 
salient points and puts forward a particular theoretical perspective combining aesthetics, philosophy of 
the self, and scientific findings on autobiographical memory. Dennett sketches a theory which combines 
analyses of how we use protagonists to consume and comprehend narratives with neuroscientific 
discoveries involving split-brain patients. He equates the ways in which we form a sense of self with the 
cognitive strategies and processes we use to follow storylines. In the case of Mirror , one may find its 
narrative challenging due to the fact that it does not establish or distinguish its characters in a traditional, 
mainstream way. Its ambiguity in this respect, however, clearly pertains more to the art-cinema’s 
tendency for communicating subjective states such as memory, and in this instance can account for 
fluidity of identity once characters are accepted as being more removed from real world individuals. I 
will therefore consider the film in the context of some of Dennett’s ideas to evaluate its phenomenological 
properties, with a particular focus on self-narrativizing and storytelling.     







Across all three sections I will continue to keep sight of and make reference to the wider 
philosophical debates on self-identity, such as the issue of whether an individual’s identity can be said to 
reside predominantly in the body, the mind, some combinatio  of the two, or none of these. Within the 
critical discourse in this area, it is difficult to find complete agreement on a set of criteria detailing exactly 
what constitutes an individual self, although there is sufficient overlap among theorists’ models and ideas 
to provide a useful enough starting point. In E gaging Characters: Fiction, Emotion, and the Cinema, 
Murray Smith provides model for approaching film narratives that dr ws on the work of anthropologists 
Marcel Mauss and Clifford Geertz. Smith outlines the 'person schema', which he describes as the 
narrowest category of the human agent. Its component parts are:  
1. a discrete human body, individuated and continuous throug time and space; 
2. perceptual activity, including self-awareness; 
3. intentional states, such as beliefs and desires; 
4. emotions; 
5. the ability to use and understand a natural language; 
6. the capacity for self-impelled actions and self-interpretation; 
7. the potential for traits, or persisting attributes. 9 
Taking this as our working definition, to what extent are th se criteria applicable to the 
individuals we encounter in fiction films? Smith argues that we use the person schema not only to relate 
to people in the real world but also to evaluate and understand fictional characters. Since we are restricted 
to interacting with the world from the perspective of our wn subjective self we necessarily engage with 
narratives through our ‘fictive counterparts’10, since we recognise in them a more or less identical person 
schema to the one to which we are bound. In his essay ‘Understanding Characters’ Jens Eder asks us to 
consider the following questions:  







What are characters and how do they originate? What kinds of features and structures do they 
possess? In what relations do they stand with other elements and structures of films? How are 
they grasped and experienced by the viewers? What are their relationships with culture and 
society? And what types of characters can be distinguished?11 
To this list we might add the one which constitutes the aim of this project; what is the nature of 
the relationship between how we relate to fictional characters and how we define and understand 
ourselves? Although the individuals that inhabit film narratives are, for the most part, simplified versions 
of the individuals we encounter in real life, this does not necessarily mean that such characters are lacking 
in depth. In the context of the seminal work of David Bordwell on film history and style, the majority of 
the narratives I have chosen to look at deviate from classi al Hollywood norms in a multitude of ways. 
Against the backdrop of Bordwell’s account of narrative forms, I will consider philosophical debates 
around the continuity of personal identity through time and how this relates to the way in which we 
respond to narratives with unstable character identities. For instance, if we accept that a spectator has a 
certain need for a character that he or she can relate to s a human subject, and who is capable of sustaining 
a storyline, it is reasonable to suggest that a viewer may struggle to comprehend a narrative which lacks 
such a vital component, and thus reject it. This would go some way to explaining the dominance of 
storylines which contain protagonists whose identities ar  mostly stable and consistently recognisable. It 
may also go some way to explaining some of the negative responses to films like Inland Empire since 
ambiguity of any sort, not simply that which relates to character identities, can often be a divisive narrative 
element. When examining the connection between character identity and viewer comprehension of film 
narratives, however, it is of limited value to focus solely on texts where character identities remain 
continuous and unproblematic throughout. Rather, it is storylines in which the perceived unity of 
character identity is deliberately ‘problematised’ and fractured where one can perhaps isolate and study 
this relationship more fully. The level of emotional response that fictional narratives can evoke - a 
phenomenon giving rise to the so-called paradox of fiction 12 - is in the majority of cases due to the 
presence of characters within a given narrative. Furthermore, while such pared-down representations of 
people might on one level appear to reveal a lack of congruence with real people, less conventional and 
more challenging portrayals can in fact reflect and reveal corresponding ‘problems’ in their real world 







counterparts. I will illustrate how unconventional character portrayals are useful for revealing the more 
established means of creating and developing ‘ordinary’ characters, while also showing how characters 
in general can help us reflect on the nature of selfhood. 
In the wider context of philosophical debates over self-identity, thecontributions of John Locke 
and David Hume are of particular relevance to my project as they each built successively on the arguments 
and theories that had previously been put forward on this particular issue. Locke took up the position that 
the mind, and specifically memory, provided continuity through time and as such there was no need to 
reach for an immaterial entity such as the soul, by way of explanation: 
as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far 
reaches the Identity of that Person13  
Hume in turn posited the theory that the search for a truly unchanging self-identity is an 
erroneous exercise asthere are no elements of a person that endure through time; everything is subject to 
flux or decay and our experience of selfhood is a by-product of our ever-changing thoughts and 
sensations: 
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some 
particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I 
never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the 
perception.14 
Notable thought experiments often arise within this area of debate, such as Locke’s cobbler and 
prince body-swap scenario (or mind-swap, depending on your viewpoint), and the ensuing questions over 
whether one’s self resides (primarily) in the body or in the mind have repeatedly provided inspiration f r 
fiction film storylines. As we will see in the analyses that follow, these historic debates and the complex 
and engaging issues that they raise about one of the things we hold most dear – our sense of self – have 
lost none of their potency when it comes to telling stories through the medium of the moving image.  
 







I Body Issues 
 
Althea Flynt: I want him alive! I don’t care if his head’s in a fishbowl!  
(The People vs. Larry Flynt, Milos Forman, 1996.) 
 
What is revealing about these lines, as screamed by Courtney Love, is that they demonstrate not just a 
desire that a loved-one survive in any condition rather than not at all, but also the preference or assumption 
that that survival will take a physical form of some sort. In a medium such as film, more often than not 
we rely on a physical representation to establish character identities, onto which the filmmakers can 
ascribe details such as a name, subjective and objective history, personality, occupation, family details, 
and so on. There are exceptions of course, such as films in which characters are embodied but never seen 
(Rebecca, 1940, Alfred Hitchcock) or in which the character is invisible or formless and we see only the 
effects of their actions (The Haunting, 1963, Robert Wise). However, even in examples like these we are 
able to determine or infer the existence of a character from the narrative context and by virtue of the 
behaviour of other (embodied) characters. Even though the malevolent spirit in The Haunting does not 
possess a physical form, it nevertheless interacts with the physical reality of the diegesis, while Rebecca 
never appears in Hitchcock’s film but her presence is manifest in the narrative through her belongings, 
and through the memories and anecdotes of the other characters.  
Recognition, as defined by Murray Smith, is the act of identifying the p ysical form of a person 
through ‘individuation’ and ‘re-identification.’15 The former denotes the moment when the viewer 
identifies a character as distinct from others and not simply a background blur or an indistinguishable 
member of a larger group. The latter refers to any moment in a narrative which 'allows us to say that a 
certain figure is continuous with a figure apprehended at an earlier or later point in the narrative, by virtue 
of certain bonds of similarity and causality, whether these be psychological or physical'.16 The crucial 







aspects we use to individuate and recognise characters in a film are 'dependent upon exterior, perceptible 
traits - the body, the face, and the voice'.17  
 As outlined in my introduction, the potential for manipulating physical identity has been 
exploited across a wide range of film genres to provoke a multitude of responses. Furthermore, the shock 
or surprise that can be generated by a sudden alteration of an individual’s appearance has an immediacy 
in film that is comparable to real life, as we experience the unfolding of a narrative and the depiction of 
new events in something resembling real time. The jarring effect achieved through a sudden and 
unmotivated change of actor in a single role, such as in That Obscure Object of Desire (Luis Buñuel, 
1977), could not be replicated in prose, painting, sculpture, or even photography. The visual immediacy 
combined with the temporal character of moving images, however, gives the filmmaker this option.  
In the two chapters that make up this section I will be looking at how storylines involving 
physical mutation, and often featuring gruesome depictions and visceral imagery, can help raise salient 
issues and questions within discussions of character portrayal and self-identity. Quite naturally, we attach 
significance to our physical self, the tangible, materi l element of who we are. As Smith points out in his 
definition of 'recognition,' we place a corresponding level of importance on our ability to discern physical 
properties of characters when watching films so that we can identify them with enough precision to 
recognise them at a later stage.18 It therefore follows that as part of the viewing experience we will be 
sensitive to alterations to a character's physical distinctiveness and will direct the requisite mental energy 
towards ensuring we are able to keep track of who is who in a given narrative. By the same token, 
filmmakers are sensitive to the creative potential afforded to them by the fact that viewers will try and 
keep track of characters in this way, just as a magician toys with his audience using the ball and cups 
trick. In these chapters I will look in detail at a number of films which help raise and engage with salient 
issues relating to self-identity and physicality, with close analyses of The Thing (John Carpenter, 1982) 
and Lost Highway (David Lynch, 1997) forming the principal studies for chapters one and two 
respectively. The types of characters we might encounter in fiction are almost unlimited in terms of how 
their appearance and traits can be conceptualised, but Smith poin s out that there is an obvious preference 
for a familiar physical entity, even in examples where characters are considered to be allegorical symbols 







conveying a more abstract meaning. He argues that even if one were to reduce every action of a character 
within a narrative to the level of allegory and symbolic higher meaning, these meanings would still need 
to come together at a single location, which in the majority f cases is a physically discrete human body. 
Smith emphasizes the almost unavoidable tendency to gravitate towards a physical self, a human body, 
as an organizing centre of agency, and the way in which this convention can be used to motivate 
subversive storylines which work against this assumption.19 This observation is particularly relevant to 
the analysis I will present in the two chapters that make up this section since, as we will see, The Thing 
and Lost Highway present characters in a way that forces us to question the very essence of their physical 
identities. On the idea of challenging the ‘one body: one person’ assumption that we routinely make about 
characters Smith writes that:  
Philosophers are fond of defamiliarizing this assumption with bizarre cases of multiple 
personality and brain division…but these cases can only be as troubling as they are because they 
assumption they challenge is so firm and taken for granted.20 
As we will see in the two chapters that follow, The Thing and Lost Highway, in different ways, 
present just such a challenge to the assumption outlined by Smith. Although the tone and style of each 
film contrast considerably, both narratives draw on the way in which surface appearances (lik  a human 
body) can be potentially misleading and can provide an ideal route to challenging viewer expectations 
















The Thing in its Self 
Tawnee: Are you a bodybuilder or something? 
Brundle: Yeah, I build bodies. I take them apart and put them back together again.  
(The Fly, David Cronenberg, 1986) 
On the subject of still photography and the way in which the medium disrupts how physical selves endure 
through time, André Bazin the following: ‘To preserve, artificially, [one’s] bodily appearance is to snatch 
it from the flow of time, to stow it away neatly, so to speak, in the hold of life.’21 These lines are equally 
applicable to the moving image, and we can conceive of the medium in a way that echoes the dialogue 
above taken from Cronenberg’s The Fly. A still image, as Bazin describes, upsets the natural flow of time 
by preserving an instant in the form of a photograph, just as a series of moments or actions or events are 
captured when recording a moving image. Furthermore, the proc ss of assembling a film requires - in a 
non-literal sense of course – that these chunks of time (and the representations of physical elements 
within, such as human characters) are taken apart and rearranged in a new order. Editing – along with 
dialogue, acting performance, costume, direction – are the tools filmmakers use to mould and ascribe a 
character with the fictional equivalents of the ‘person schema’, which I outlined in my introduction. A 
character is given a particular appearance, name, mannerisms, characteristics, and so on, and from that 
point we may see these elements develop in particular ways during the course of the storyline in which 
they feature. Switching or corrupting an individual’s identity in extreme and unnatural ways provides 
particularly fertile ground for horror and science fiction storylines and concepts, and examples such as 
the David Cronenberg’s 1986 version of The Fly isolate and focus on a particular fear associated with 
threats to an individual’s bodily identity. Cronenberg’s remake of the original B-movie The Fly (Kurt 
Neumann, 1958) helped contribute to the canon of what would cometo be known as body horror, a sub-







genre of horror films notable for their emphasis on gruesom, visceral imagery often relating to the 
infection, destruction or mutation of the human body. Cronenberg, a principal figure in establishing body 
horror, echoes Murray Smith’s earlier point about how an embodied agent is a fundamental expectation 
viewers have when engaging with film narratives through their characters. He writes:  
For me, the first fact of human existence is the human body. That is the most real fact 
we have…But if you embrace the reality of the human body, you are embracing your 
own mortality.22 
Cronenberg is of course referring to real selves as opposed t  fictional ones, but it is self-evident 
in The Fly and other examples of his work that he sees horror as a tool for raising and exploring salient 
issues regarding mortality, physicality, and our sense of self. The film tells the story of Seth Brundle, a 
brilliant, reclusive scientist who inadvertently fuses hi genetic coding with that of a housefly while 
working on a teleportation device. As the narrative progresses we see Brundle go through a gradual 
metamorphosis into a new kind of creature, neither wholly human nor wholly fly, which he calls 
‘Brundlefly.’ The abomination that results from the catastrophic error in his experiment is depicted with 
an explicit focus on physical mutation, and the gradual meta orphosis of Brundle raises fundamental 
questions about the relative frailty or solidity of human existence. The film is just one of many such 
examples found in horror and science fiction scenarios which foreground the physicality of characters by 
exploring ideas around mutation and assimilation. From this rich vein of storylines I have selected The 
Thing (John Carpenter, 1982) as my principal focus for this chapter nd I will start out by analysing the 
way in which the film establishes the physical capabilities of the alien life-form (The Thing of the title) 
that features in the narrative. I will contextualise the cr ature within the framework of Noël Carroll’s 
theory of horror as expounded in The Philosophy of Horror: Or Paradoxes of the Heart; in particular his 
definitions of monsters and monstrosity. I will consider how and why a disruption of physical identity 
within horror narratives can be a particularly potent combination before moving on to look at depictions 
of the sort of grotesque imagery common to the horror genre alongside Freud’s description of the uncanny 
as it relates to personal identity. I will illustrate how alterations to a character’s appearance and bodily 







identity can unsettle and disturb the viewer but also how the means of doing so and the source of unease 
that is generated can contrast in significant ways between superficially similar films.  
The wordplay inherent in the use of the word ‘bodybuilder’ in the quotation above points towards 
not just an elasticity of language but also to the fact tha he storyline of The Fly focuses on bodily 
alterations. The Thing shares narrative ground with Cronenberg’s version of The Fly by engaging with 
issues of bodily identity through its focus on physical mutation and the fusion of disparate individual life-
forms into single entities. Although technically classed as science fiction, The Thing straddles the 
boundary between horror and sci-fi and is particularly notable for its graphic depictions of mutation and 
physical trauma. The story involves a group of US scientists who are conducting research in the Antarctic 
and are confined to their base for the winter months. El ewhere on the continent, scientists from a 
neighbouring Norwegian base inadvertently revive a frozen alien organism that is capable of imitating 
and assimilating other life forms, and this creature decimates the Norwegian team before infiltrating the 
American one. The narrative charts the gradual discovery of what happened at the Norwegian base, the 
process of understanding the physical makeup and behaviour of the creature, and the depiction of the 
creature systematically annihilating the group while paranoia and fear simultaneously cause the 
community’s social order to disintegrate. By the end of the film the research base has been destroy d and 
as far as we can tell only two characters remain alive. The narrative concludes with a degree of ambiguity 
over whether or not one of the surviving characters may actually be The Thing rather than the person they 
outwardly appear to be.  
As one might expect, a certain amount of screen time and exposition is required for a backstory 
that establishes the narrative’s internal logic. Audience and character knowledge are more or less 
congruent since the exposition is dependent on and linked to the scientists’ own gradual discoveries and 
theories about the creature they have encountered. In addition to expository dialogue, supplementary 
information is provided in the form of video footage discovered in the Norwegian camp, which explains 
how the alien came to be unearthed. A principal focus for the scientists is learning the exact physical and 
behavioural features of the alien creature, which in tur establishes the diegetic logic for the audience. 
Models, prosthetics, and other visual effects are used to create some of the film’s most memorable and 







arresting images and they are essential for illustrating the ways in which the alien creature behaves and 
survives, particularly regarding its physical makeup. One sequence features a host of protean displays as 
the creature attempts to assimilate some of the scientists while simultaneously defending itself and trying 
to flee (Fig. 1). While one of the team is being resuscitated with a defibrillator, his chest suddenly morphs 
into a set of gaping jaws which gnaws the doctor’s arms off at the elbows. As the others try and kill the 
creature the head detaches itself from the rest of the body and it lands on the floor. It then sprouts insect-
like legs and antennae before attempting to shuffle out of the room undetected, while the legs, arms and 
torso of the assimilated scientist continue writhing on the operating table. 
 
Fig. 1. The alien creature demonstrates a multitude of metamorphic capabilities as it tries to defend itself. 
This is a pivotal moment in the story as it vividly illustrates the physical capabilities of the alien. 
The key discovery the scientists make is that the creature survives by assimilating and imitating other 
life-forms, a process which both kills the original being and results in an imitation which appears 
outwardly identical to the assimilated organism. The nature of the creature’s assimilation seems to involve 
moulding an appropriated physical form and combining it with The Thing’s own organic matter, rather 
than simply inhabiting an existing body in the way that narratives about demonic possession suggest. This 







method distinguishes the creature from an alien such as that in Under The Skin (Jonathan Glazer, 2013), 
or its cartoonish equivalent from Men In Black (Barry Sonnenfeld, 1997), in which a human exterior is 
nothing more than a hollow shell worn like a suit by the ali n. The Thing is also able to mutate and change 
shape at will as part of its survival mechanism, a process which seems to involve an ability to recall and
assume previously assimilated life-forms. Observing howthe head was able to separate and survive 
independently gives the helicopter pilot MacReady (Kurt Russell) the idea of conducting an experiment 
on blood samples taken from each scientist in order to determine who is still human. His theory, which is 
proven to be correct, is that the constituent parts of he alien can be as small as an individual particle or 
as large as an entire person, or even – as is explicitly demonstrated on more than one occasion – a  
amorphous creature comprised of numerous limbs and other shapeless, assimilated organic matter (Fig. 
2). 
 
Fig. 2. The Thing is interrupted during the process of assimilating the sleigh dogs. 
The portrayal of such a fantastical creature’s physical responses is a useful example for analysing 
how ‘monstrousness’ is frequently exploited in horror storylines. Fear of infection s intrinsically linked 
to an individual’s survival instinct and the film explores this by developing the idea of an infection that 
is not only capable of taking over the bodies of individuals but is also able to adopt and assume a person’s 
physical form. A threat of this sort can be distinguished from something like a fatal disease or parasite 
since the infected individual will continue operating as a living thing, albeit in an assimilated state and 
more akin to a zombie; dead and yet still animate.  







Through a combination of detailed, visceral special effects and prosthetics, deepening paranoia 
amongst the scientists, and a threat that has the potential to consume and eradicate each character’s 
individual sense of self, the film assembles narrative ingredients that are ideally suited to provoke strong 
feelings of terror. Carroll unpicks the elements of monsters in horror fiction in order to isolate the specific 
features of monstrosity that are responsible for evoking feelings of repulsion, dread and fear in the viewer. 
On a very basic level, he argues that a monster must be threatening and dangerous since without mortal 
fear of death or injury there can be no fear or negative emotional disturbance – emotional states and 
reactions that are integral to the genre.23 While investigating the potential reasons behind our respon e 
with what feels like genuine emotions to that which we know is not real, the so-called paradox of fiction, 
Carroll introduces the term ‘art-horror’.24 He uses this term to describe the reaction a viewer has tow rds 
horror films as distinct from other things we might find horrifying or horrific, such as the prospect of 
nuclear war, which he terms ‘natural horror’. Art-horror, in contrast to natural horror, can only be evoked 
by beings or phenomena that exist outside of the natural order established in the fictional world in 
question. That is to say, according to Carroll’s definition, a creature such as the talking wolf in L ttle Red 
Riding Hood, although threatening, is not capable of art-horrifying the viewer or reader since the creature, 
while appearing fantastical to us, is in keeping with the natural order of its own fictional world. Carroll 
then expands his definition by arguing that in order to ‘qualify’ as a monster that can provoke an art-
horror response, the being must be more than simply threatening or dangerous. Building on the influential 
work Purity and Danger by Mary Douglas,25 he argues that ‘[h]orrific monsters often involve the mixture 
of what is normally distinct.’26 Douglas’s arguments advance notions of purity and impurity in terms of 
how human beings regard phenomena in order to function effectively and safely in our surroundings. The 
ability to differentiate between phenomena that are either clean or dirty, dead or alive, nourishing or 
poisonous, comforting or threatening have obvious benefits to our safety and survival. Using the same 
terminology, Carroll argues that, in addition to being physically repellent and threatening, horrific 
monsters are very often portrayed as ‘impure‘ in some way, where an entity is ‘impure if it is categorically 
interstitial, categorically contradictory, incomplete, or formless.’27 His conclusion is that in order for a 
monster to be capable of provoking the art-horror response it must exhibit a disruption of the diegetic 
natural order as well as posing a mortal threat of some srt. He writes:  







If the monster were only evaluated as potentially threatening, the emotion would be fear; if only 
potentially impure the emotion would be disgust. Art-horror requires evaluation both in terms 
of threat and disgust.28 
He cites the example of Norman Bates in Psycho (Alfred Hitchcock, 1960), who by Carroll’s definition, 
cannot qualify as art-horrific because his condition of psychosis is a recognised phenomenon in the world 
of psychology. Although his actions could be considered monstr us he is not outside the natural order of 
the diegesis (which in this instance is mostly congruent with ‘real world’ order), therefore he would be 
regarded as a source of fear only. Conversely, a physicall  grotesque creature that poses no threat, also 
does not qualify as a monster since it would only provoke disgust but not fear. Stephen Mulhall puts 
forward a similar but more nuanced argument in On Film when he analyses the physical threat posed by 
the Xenomorph in Alien (Ridley Scott, 1979):  
As well as threatening to inflict a peculiarly intimate, distorting or rending violence upon 
vulnerable human flesh and blood…these creatures are themselves mutations or distortions of 
the human.’29  
Mulhall, by way of Stanley Cavell, argues that the source of t rror and revulsion can always be 
traced back to the human element or aspect that is observa l  within a horrific storyline or the portrayal 
of something monstrous. Without a human element or origin that gives rise to something monstrous, the 
creature is merely fantastical or dangerous but cannot i duce horror. As indicated, Carroll argues that a 
monster must violate the natural order, but for Mulhall and Cavell this violation must be of the sort that 
specifically relates to human beings in order to horrify us. Clearly the creature in The Thing satisfies all 
these sets of criteria and therefore stands up to Carroll’s definition of a monster capable of provoking his 
‘art-horror’ response. If we investigate the precise makeup of The Thing and compare it against the 
differentiations of monstrosity outlined by Carroll it produces some worthwhile insights. 
Carroll groups different types of monsters according to certain traits that they have in common, 
one of which he calls ‘fusion figures’. This category describes fictional beings whose nature and identity 
are dependent on ‘conflating, combining, or condensing distinct and / or opposed categorical elements in 







a spatio-temporally continuous monster.30 Brundlefly from Carpenter’s version of The Fly would be one 
such example since the DNA of Brundle and the fly have been literally fused together. Another of his 
categories he calls ‘fission figures’, to describe entities whose existence is distributed across two or more 
beings, within which he proposes two sub-categories: ‘spatial fission’ and ‘temporal fission’. Examples 
of the former would be doppelgängers, clones, and other kinds of ‘multiple characters in space’31. The 
latter would include shapeshifting beings such as werewolves, with a key distinction being that the 
different identities do not co-exist but rather they manifest at temporally distinct moments. Therefore, 
apart from the moment of mutation a werewolf is at times a man and at others a wolf, but not a 
simultaneous fusion of wolf and man.  
 In the context of these categories, where could we most accurately position the creature in The 
Thing? In direct contrast to Brundle, who emerges from his telepod as a fusion figure in the most literal 
sense, the creature in Carpenter’s film appears to be a single entity capable of inhabiting more than one 
physical location. As such, the logical choice seems to be t  label it, in Carroll’s terms, as a fission figure 
of the spatial variety since its existence is distributed simultaneously across multiple individual objects. 
On another reading, one could argue that the creature does not suit this label since it is difficult to say if 
The Thing should be classified as a single entity, albeit one that exists across physically discrete 
individuals. What is obvious is that the other life-forms it has imitated are physically distinct from one 
another since they continue to exist within the confines of discrete human (and canine) bodies. However, 
these discrete units are also linked to one another through shared biological and behavioural traits, such 
as the ability to mutate and metamorphosize, and an instict to remain hidden which suggests an ability 
to differentiate human from non-human based on outward appearance. On this point, one might speculate 
that there is a telepathic connection, something which is never established in the film but is explicitly laid 
out in the source material, John W. Campbell Jr.’s novella Who Goes There? The experiment that 
MacReady (the Kurt Russell character) sets up to try and weed out those individuals who are actually 
imposters involves petrie dishes with blood samples taken from each member of the team. MacReady 
stabs a hot wire into the sample and gets the predicted response when the blood from one assimilated 
scientist screams and leaps out of the dish. This allows us to see how each discrete part of the creature 
(let us call them ‘Thing-units’), has an autonomous desire for survival and is capable of acting 







independently from the other Thing-units. Additionally, when a member of the team is exposed as an 
imposter the other Thing-units do not reveal themselves in an attempt to save one of its own constituent 
parts. If we compare this type of life form to clones or doppelgängers (another example cited by Carroll 
as belonging to the spatial fission figure group) we might argue that there is a stronger bond between the 
Thing-units than there would be between one clone or doppelgänger and another. A clone, for instance, 
is the product of an original entity but is not bound to its source in any literal way, nor would we ordinarily 
assume it would be capable of rejoining this source throug absorption or some other such fantastical 
process. The Thing, in contrast, demonstrates an ability to separate from and reabsorb its constituent units 
at will, suggesting it is simultaneously distinct from and connected to its constituent parts. This could be 
seen as evidence of an ‘egoistic’ element that exists in each Thing-unit, not necessarily implying 
selfishness but rather an indication of semi-autonomous entities that keep their own segment hidden for 
the benefit of the collective.  
When The Thing is in the actual process of assimilation it more readily resembles Carroll’s 
fusion figures, since on the literal, physical level it is fusing two or more separate elements into a single 
mass. In one scene we are shown how the creature opeates on a cellular level, and the assimilation 
involves a form of absorption rather than destruction and imitation. During a scene in which the sleigh 
dogs are being assimilated, the creature (imitating one of the dogs) attempts to fuse itself with all the 
others with the intended result being a numerically identical group of dogs as there had been previously, 
since they are absorbed rather than displaced or discarded. In this sense, the creature at times seems to 
satisfy the criteria of Carroll’s fusion figure, yet at others does not because its process of assimilation has 
the end result of more than one ‘spatio-temporally discrete entity.’ It is hard to say for sure, however, as 
Carroll goes on to argue that ‘as long as they are composite beings, locatable in an unbroken spatio-
temporal continuum with a single identity, we shall count them as fusion figures.’32 ‘Single identity’ 
seems an appropriate description of the creature but ‘unbroken continuum’ does not. Perhaps one has to 
conclude that the creature apparently satisfies conditions fr m both of Carroll’s categories, appearing at 
times like a ‘fusion figure’ and at others more like a ‘fission figure.’ Consideration of a detail such as this 
also helps to illustrate one of the principles of Carroll’s investigation, which is that certain films that may 







otherwise be dismissed as formulaic ‘genre films’ contain formal innovations, different levels of meaning 
and communicate complex ideas that are worthy of deeper analysis.  
More than Gore? 
 
It is worth looking in more detail at the ways in which the sort of monstrous imagery common 
to horror films contrive to provoke feelings of unease, repulsion and terror in the viewer. Is there perhaps 
more to it than simply an aversion to imagery of blood, gore, and slime? The philosopher Derek Parfit is 
of the opinion that fantastical storylines and scenarios common to science fiction can be a useful tool for 
raising and investigating certain philosophical problems:   
By considering these cases, we discover what we believe to b involved in our own continued 
existence, or what it is that makes us now and ourselves next year the same people… Though 
our beliefs are revealed most clearly when we consider imaginary cases, these beliefs also cover 
actual cases, and our own lives.33 
In Reasons and Persons he ponders questions about the continuity of personal identity by 
working through increasingly complex thought experiments. Daniel C. Dennett echoes Parfit’s point, but 
from a cognitive psychology perspective, when he writes in Consciousness Explained how:  
if we could see what it would be like for two (or more) slves to vie for control of a single body, 
we could see better what a single self really is.34
He states that while it would of course be unethical to experiment on people to try and bring 
about such a circumstance, the study of tragic and unfortunate sufferers of conditions such as Multiple 
Personality Disorder (MPD) can serve the purpose of ‘varying the initial conditions’ (i.e. single body, 
single self) to theorise about how selfhood develops. Although he is referring to the psychological 
dimension of selfhood, Dennet’s observation is that individuals suffering from this condition (and other 
closely related ones) overturn the basic assumption about one body being equivalent to one self, which 
sets them up as something akin to a living thought-experiment. In my introduction to this section I referred 
to a point made by Murray Smith about the corresponding assumption viewers make about characters in 







film narratives; and filmmakers, like philosophers, often see potential in challenging the single body : 
single character convention. One scenario offered by Parfit involves a fictional Teletransporter, much like 
the devices in ‘Star Trek’ and The Fly, which disintegrates and re-integrates an individual as a way of 
travelling between Earth and Mars.35 In his scenario, the transported individual is replicated in every 
precise detail and the ‘original’ person on Earth is destroyed. He develops the idea further and imagines 
a point in the future when the machine malfunctions and begins creating a replica as before but the 
individual on Earth survives for a few days before dying of cardiac failure caused by the malfunctioning 
machine. He uses this scenario as a means of considering the extent to which the person on Earth and the 
person on Mars could or should be considered the same person or, f r the duration of the time they co-
exist, which could have the stronger claim of being the ‘real’ person. In ‘Personal Identity’, Deborah 
Knight writes that ‘[t]he “body swap” has become something of a genre in the repertoire of philosophical 
thought experiments’36 and one can identify a multitude of films which choose to explore the same 
scenarios through the use of malleable, unstable character identities as part of their storylines. As part of 
Knight’s analysis she considers the well-known transportation devices in the ‘Star Trek’ franchise in 
order to explore the question over whether being disintegratd nd reintegrated constitutes a break in 
one’s physical continuity, and therefore an interruption to one’s identity. In The Fly, Brundle’s ‘telepods’ 
perform the same function as the transporters in ‘Star Trek’; however neither of these narratives focus in 
any meaningful way on the question of how, or whether, personal identity is affected or interrupted by 
the process of teleportation. The Fly places much more emphasis on the product of the teleportation 
process and the resulting individual that emerges from the destination telepod after the source pod has 
been contaminated, while in the Star Trek storyworld the transporters are simply another form of travel 
hardly worthy of deeper consideration. The brief intervening t me when teleportation is in process and 
the person is in transit is not highlighted as a question worth c nsidering, which is in contrast to films 
like The Prestige (Christopher Nolan, 2006) and Moon (Duncan Jones, 2009), which explore ideas about 
teleportation and replication similar to those that features in the writings of Parfit.  What, then, could The 
Thing’s premise and its portrayal of such a creature maybe tell us about personal identity and the body? 
The film’s fantastical creature and scenario are well suited to Parfit’s criteria of being a useful test case 
for just these sorts of considerations, and it is helpful if we analyse some of the details I have outlined 







earlier so we can consider what they imply or allude to more broadly. When working through his 
teletransporter thought-experiment, Parfit makes a useful distinct on about identity when he writes of 
‘qualitative’ versus ‘numerical’ sameness:  
There are two kinds of sameness, or identity. I and my Replica are qualitatively identical, or 
exactly alike. But we may not be numerically identical, or one and the same person. Similarly, 
two white billiard balls are not numerically but may be qualitatively identical. If I paint one of 
these balls red, it will cease to be qualitatively identical with itself as it was. But the red ball that 
I later see and the white ball that I painted red are numerically identical. They are one and the 
same ball.37  
By this description it is tempting to say that the creature in The Thing is ‘numerically identical’ 
since it absorbs rather than discards the victim, but the resulting individual could also be seen as 
qualitatively identical on the outside but qualitatively different inside. Since Parfit’s example only covers 
the surface appearance of the ball it is of limited use in this case, so perhaps all that we can reasonably 
conclude is that there is nothing that can be unequivocally defined as ‘the whole’ when trying to 
understand the physical boundaries of the creature. It is both separate from and linked to its other 
constituent parts simultaneously, with each part capable of operating independently of the others while 
also maintaining a connection despite any apparent physical sep ration. Its constituent Thing-units, 
regardless of their scale, are autonomous and physically discrete while also remaining part of a larger, 
single organism called The Thing. I have (playfully) corrupted Immanuel Kant’s phrase, ‘the thing in 
itself,’38 for the title of this chapter and, by splitting ‘itself’ into ‘its self’, I have of course altered the 
meaning of the phrase, although the resultant meaning seems quite apt. The creature exists as a literal 
embodiment of A Thing inhabiting multiple Selves, individuals which it takes over and possesses. At any 
given moment, therefore, The Thing is in each of Its selves. The creature straddles the boundary of self 
and non-self and its ability to destroy and duplicate its victims means that the characters’ individual 
identities are under threat of annihilation. In all of these scenarios, the process would seem to equate to 
death for the being that has been imitated, although strictly speaking the individual could be regarded as 







surviving in some sense since their physical and psychological distinctiveness continue to function, albeit 
as a type of puppet manipulated by the alien creature.  
Such a concession would of course be scant consolation for the victim but philosophically-
speaking the assimilated scientists in The Thing could be regarded as having survived in a very narrow 
sense of the word. It might appear that The Thing, in order to add tension and urgency to the narrative, 
does not concern itself with this level of inquiry, instead focusing on the everyday, empirical type of 
survival rather than any abstract variety. However, this raises a key area of discussion in the ongoing 
film-as-philosophy debate in terms of whether or why certain films should be considered more or less 
philosophical – or worthy of philosophical analysis – than others. As regards The Thing, we might argue 
that the motivation of the filmmakers was to create a story that would satisfy viewers looking for a fast-
paced adventure involving science-fiction tropes and scares and imagery common to body-horror. That 
being said, even if pertinent questions in the philosophy of self-identity were not of primary importance 
to the filmmakers, we can still find much in the storyline which can mobilise a discussion in this area. In 
his summary of the key positions in this debate, Carroll outlines the distinction drawn by those who are 
sceptical of the possibility of film’s capacity for ‘doing’ philosophy:  
Such skeptics may concede that movies can illustrate philosophical ideas, motivate philosophical 
problems, suggest philosophical solutions, reframe problems, and possibly even present 
counterexamples to extant philosophical views…[but reject the possibility] of movies acting as 
vehicles for the creation and substantiation of original, positive philosophical these.’39  
As I indicated previously, it is beyond the scope of my thesis to go into the finer detail of the 
film-as-philosophy debate, but Carroll’s summary is highly pertinent and of great use at this stage so that 
I can, as a minimum, outline where the films I am focusing o  can be placed within the context of this 
debate and in relation to one another. For instance, let us consider the example I have highlighted here 
regarding the fate of the scientists in The Thing and the extent to which the assimilated members of the 
group could be considered to be the same person after the creature has absorbed them into its collective 
whole. We could invoke Parfit’s theory of personal identity in which he argues that psychological 
connectedness and continuity are essential for being able to argue that an individual has endured 







(survived) through time and space. For Parfit, the question of whether their personal identity can or even 
should be considered the same is subordinate to whether or not they can be regarded as having survived 
in some sense. The scenario we encounter in The Thing presents us with an interesting case for 
consideration in the context of Parfit’s theory but this is primarily because it echoes the host of thought 
experiments about duplication and switched identities found througout his work. As such, we might 
conclude that to perceive some relevance of Parfit’s theory in the plot of The Thing is simply a projection 
of existing ideas, and would be an example of doing what Carroll describes when he highlights how 
‘[a]nthologies abound in which rank-and-file philosophers attempt to distill the philosophical message to 
be found in this or that movie.’40 The Thing might be thus categorised, on the sceptical account, as an 
example of a narrative that is framing or articulating existing philosophical ideas – either explicitly or 
implicitly – but falls short of mobilising its own philosophical position through cinematic means. In 
Section II I will return to this area of discussion, and Parfit in particular, when considering film narratives 
which not only engage with philosophical ideas about self-id ntity but which also present a challenge to 
mainstream cinematic conventions. At this point I simply wish to acknowledge the wider debate before 
considering the broader implications that The Thing presents us with, albeit on a strictly diegetic level. 
Having considered some of the reasons behind emotional responses to horror and the questions that can 
be raised about self-identity through science-fiction storylines, I will now turn my attention to identifying 
a particular kind of fear that the creature’s behaviour and capabilities tap into, which revolves around 
physical borders and a sense of separateness.   
Threats and Thresholds 
 
As we have seen, Carroll goes into great detail in his analysis of horror films in order to try and 
isolate a viewer’s typical responses and the potential reasons for these. In ‘Judge Dread: What We Are 
Afraid of When We Are Scared at the Movies,’ Julian Hanich builds on the work of Carroll as he explores 
the body of theory surrounding emotional responses to ficti n films with the aim of complementing and 
building on what he terms the ‘standard account’ of emotional responses to fiction films. He points out 
the different types of fearful responses we can experience when atching horror films and draws 







distinctions such as dread, horror, terror, and shock, and argues that a major factor behind a fearful 
response comes from our familiarity with certain genres and that ‘[s]ince we know from our encounter 
with previous horror films and thrillers…how these scenes usually end.’41 As such, part of our fearful 
response stems from our sense of anticipation and the semi-pl asurable experience of a film narrative 
confirming our expectations about how a scene might play out. In addition to this type of fearfulness, as 
we have seen through Carroll’s analysis, is the essence of the imagery itself and the potential threat it 
might convey regardless of narrative context and our familiarity with genre tropes. 
The prospect of having one’s body invaded and / or assimilated by another entity is of course 
likely to provoke feelings of fear and terror, and the loss of one’s individuality into a collective whole is 
a potentially unsettling concept to consider. It is exactly such a scenario, compounded by the paranoia 
and claustrophobia experienced by the characters, which T e Thing has as its underlying source of unease 
and fear. One of the principal survival strategies for the creature is its ability to remain hidden and 
undetected by appearing to onlookers as identical to the life-form(s) it has invaded and successfully 
imitated. Through the discoveries of the scientists, most n tably Blair (Wilford Brimley) - who is the first 
to reach an understanding of how the alien behaves - we learn that the assimilation of other life-forms 
extends beyond just that of physical likeness. In order for the creature to produce a wholly convincing 
imitation it needs to effectively kill  and apprehend all aspects of its victim. The fact that the characters 
are unable to identify who in their company is the alien solely through observation of each other’s 
behaviour suggests that the subjective identity of the assimilated life-form, which would include 
personality traits, behaviour and memories, has been appropriated by the alien. The film does not establish 
exactly what becomes of the host’s subjectivity and therefore leaves open the possibility that the 
individual may continue to exist as a suppressed and imprisoned passenger in his/her own body, such as 
with the black characters in Get Out (Jordan Peele, 2017) or the succession of characters in Being John 
Malkovich (Spike Jonze, 1999). The spread of paranoia and distrust throughout the group of scientists is 
paralleled by the physical spread of the infectious organism, and just as the boundaries between the human 
and non-human become less distinct, so does the social order and harmony break down and dissolve into 
chaos. Merging and blending distinctiveness into formlessn ss can also be observed in other stylistic 
aspects of the film, such as the whiteout expanse of the Antarctic which reveals little in the way of 







distinctive features making it difficult in certain scenes to eparate the sky from the land. Furthermore, 
Carpenter himself commented on how, as a result of his inexperience at this stage in his career, the film 
ended up with a cast that was perhaps too large for the running time to sufficiently distinguish the 
scientists from one another (Fig. 3). In Murray Smith’s terms, we could say that the narrative shows a 
slight deficit as regards ‘recognition’ and ‘re-identification’42 of characters, however, a slight blending in 
how we perceive the scientists and an apparent lack of depth in how their characters are developed is 
strangely appropriate for the storyline.  
 
Fig. 3. Although clearly distinguishable when placed alongside one another, the large cast means that 
the narrative cannot devote a great deal of time to ‘flesh out’ each scientist. As such, on a first viewing 
particularly, they may blend into each other slightly in the viewer’s perception. 
The prospect of assimilation on a planetary scale is explicitly dealt with in the film when we see 
Blair analysing the behaviour of the alien cells under a microscope. Concerned by the potential threat to 
the human race posed by the alien reaching civilisation beyond the Antarctic continent, Blair quizzes their 
central computer about the likely outcome of such a scenario. The hypothetical response is that the entire 
human race would be assimilated in a little over three years, which prompts Blair to sabotage the base 
vehicles in an attempt to isolate and contain the creatu . The conflation of many individuals into a single 
entity necessitates the loss of that which an individual regards as essential to making them who they are, 
that is, their distinctiveness. The formlessness and transgression of certain phenomena and representations 
in film narratives, such as horror monsters, perhaps act on a fundamental dread we all have about the loss 







of self, so I would argue that it is not nly impurity that unsettles us about the interstitial state. Cl arly, a 
prospect such as the total loss of one’s individuality is an almost impossible concept to rationalise and 
understand but it could be equated with death since it theoretically renders one’s personal identity 
obsolete.  
Both the original version of Invasion of the Body Snatchers (Don Siegel, 1956) and its first 
remake (Philip Kaufman, 1978) explore the idea of the group versus the individual and present a 
pessimistic future which points to humanity’s end as a result of annihilation-by-assimilation from a 
similar type of alien foe as the one in The Thing. The premise is variously read as a metaphor for 
communism (hive mind/negative) versus capitalism (individual freedom/positive) or as a warning about 
cold war paranoia and McCarthy witch hunts. The threat of collective intelligence and loss of 
individuality can also be observed in the form of The Borg from the ‘Star Trek: The Next Generation’ 
TV series. Tapping into similar fears, The Borg are a ne r-unstoppable race of semi-organic cybernetic 
organisms who assimilate individual beings but operate as ahive mind in which the concept of 
individuality is obsolete. Their makeup represents both a fusion of the organic and the mechanical (impure 
and repellent according to Carroll’s definition), as well as a fusion of distinct individuals into a collective 
whole. Significantly, however, the second feature film of the ‘Next Generation’ franchise, Star Trek: 
First Contact (Jonathan Frakes, 1996) contradicts the story-world’s established understanding about how 
The Borg functions by recasting the hive mind along the lines of an ant colony that is subordinate to a 
queen. The decision to alter The Borg’s structure in this way suggests it was perhaps considered 
unworkable to have a mainstream narrative that had a group rather than an individual as its principal 
antagonist.  
There are other notable storylines which explore concepts and ideas similar to those in The 
Thing, such as Society (Brian Yuzna, 1989) whose gory, orgiastic finale depicts the coll ctive upper class 
swallowing its lower class victims. Shivers (David Cronenberg, 1975) provides a variation on the same 
idea with its portrayal of an impending apocalypse in the guise of parasites which transform their hosts 
them into sex-crazed zombies. District 9 (Neill Blomkamp, 2009), charts a similar narrative arc to The 
Fly as we see the hapless protagonist, Wickus, gradually transfom fr m a human into one of the alien 







‘prawns’ he is responsible for policing. Elsewhere, the Facehugger from the Ali n franchise acts 
parasitically and after a brief incubation period and metamorphosis it kills its host by bursting 
spectacularly through the chest cavity, a process that is an inversion of The Thing’s behaviour, which 
operates covertly and absorbs its host rather than erupting from within it.  
In addition to provoking disgust through the high level of gory detail, such as in the resuscitation 
scene described earlier, the imagery in The Thing also unsettles because it defies our assumptions about 
physical limitations and biological coherence and unity. Carroll writes that ‘monsters are not only 
physically threatening; they are cognitively threatening,’ 43 and in The Thing we see the creature 
demonstrate its status as ‘formless’ and ‘interstitial’ as part of its survival mechanism. Drawing on its 
previously assimilated life-forms, it invokes whatever shapes and structures it requires to escape, 
regardless of how this may violate the natural laws of biology as the characters understand them. By 
‘cognitively threatening’ Carroll is describing the dissonance generated by an entity that deviates from 
what he calls the ‘natural order’ of the diegesis, and this natural order may or may not be fully or partially 
congruent with our own. A common feature in these and many other examples is how their storylines, in 
Smith’s words:  
exploit the distinction between human and non-human by blurring it…The premisses [sic] of 
such narratives puncture our normal confidence in making such dis riminations; that is one 
reason that they are horrific.44  
In order to generate tension and fear, The Thing draws upon on the everyday understanding that 
human beings have an inherent sense of their own discrete separateness from other individuals as well as 
other phenomena in the world generally. Dennett writes that ‘the boundaries of a biological self are porous 
and indefinite,’45 which is a slightly unsettling idea to consider as it seems to contradict our sense of being 
unambiguously distinct from other individuals and with a clearly defined limit to our physical self. This 
idea represents a contrast or conflict between an everyday, ‘folk’ understanding of our own separateness 
and a scientific perspective which may emphasise more readily the interconnectedness of seemingly 
distinct entities. We conduct ourselves by taking numerous fact and details for granted, such as bodily 
unity and physical and psychological separateness, and it is these sorts of assumptions which the creature 







in The Thing problematizes through its blurring of fundamental boundaries. If we consider the storyline 
in the context of theories of personal identity such as Dennett’s we can see how the film’s premise 
foregrounds basic assumptions about how human beings establish nd understand their sense of 
individuality. Ian Conrich and David Woods argue that The Thing’s ‘mimetic horrors arise from its being 
an undifferentiated body,’46 and from the inability of the characters to determine the physical limits of an 
individual entity. In line with this observation, Carroll explores at length thephenomenon of 
‘interstitiality’ as a key ingredient for horror narratives and for monstrosity. Without binary opposites and 
distinctions between the most fundamental aspects of what e see and experience, such as being able to 
distinguish between self and other, friend or foe, danger or safety, the ability to thrive and function 
successfully in the world is greatly impaired. The life-form in The Thing operates according to different 
physical laws, straddling multiple individual entities that re simultaneously distinct from and 
intrinsically linked to one another - a concept that is alien and threatening. Fig. 4 shows a particular 
‘segment’ of the creature which was killed before it could complete the process of assimilation and 
imitation. The interrupted process helpfully illustrates the straddling of two separate entities, in this case 
the creature and its victim, and provides a physical ex mple of an interstitial state. It is both repellent in 
terms of its disturbing appearance but also because of what it represents; an ability to transgress the 
boundaries and categories we rely upon to keep ourselves safe. A  I outlined earlier, the creature even 
exhibits an additional and more abstract layer of transgression through how it straddles Carroll’s horror 
categories of ‘fusion’ and ‘fission’ monsters.  
    
Fig. 4. The terrifying middle-ground of interstitiality 







Intersitiality exists as a key ingredient i  The Thing and is prevalent in horror narratives more 
generally, especially those involving monsters or monstru  imagery of some kind. Looking at the image 
taken from Hellraiser (Clive Barker, 1987) (Fig. 5) we see the villainous Frank occupying the region 
between life and death (or hell and earth to be more specific) and the visceral images themselves might 
be seen as repellent in their own right purely through the depiction of blood and severed flesh. Conversely, 
it is the implication behind the imagery that is repllent, namely the destruction of the self’s integrity and, 
it must be said, the fact that the destruction relates to a human body. The ‘messiness’ of bodily rupturing 
alone is not what causes the sense of disgust; the sight of someone beheading a chicken would most likely 
provoke less alarm or aversion than the same act being carried out on a human being. As Paul Rozin et 
al. argue, this is due to a combination of how such imagery both reminds us of human mortality while 
also reducing our sense of individuality by suggesting a shared makeup with animals:  
Only human animals know they are to die, and only humans need to repress this 
threat….Anything that reminds us we are animals elicits disgust…humans are like animals in 
having fragile body envelopes that, when breached, reveal blood and soft viscera that display 
our commonalities with animals.47  
 
Fig. 5. The unscrupulous but doomed Frank, literally suspended in purgatory. 
Beyond this primordial sense of disgust, however, is there something peculiarly unsettling about 
interstitial states or phenomena that seem to exist on the cusp of boundaries that we use to categorise and 
understand the world around us? Thresholds of all sorts generat  a morbid fascination and curiosity and 







can generate a sense of comfort and reassurance as well as one of frustration and insecurity. Even the 
word itself seems to beautifully enact the very thing thatit denotes; the ‘h’ both standing alone and 
combining with the ‘s’ to create a threshold within its own pronunciation. In Consciousness Explained, 
Dennett writes the following about the evolution of self-awareness:  
As soon as something gets into the business of self-preservation, boundaries become important, 
for if you are setting out to preserve yourself, you don't want to squander effort trying to preserve 
the whole world: you draw the line. You become, in a word, selfish.48 
We can identify barriers and points of delineation all around us, with huge variations in scale, 
importance, and makeup; from the fence dividing our garden from our neighbour’s to the fortified border 
on the Korean peninsula, from the perceived genre distinctions between categories of films, to the 
physical limits of our bodies. As part of his study into body horror and the work of David Cronenberg, 
Colin McGinn explores the reasons behind our loathing of flies, and writes that ‘they are enmeshed in 
our human lives, surviving on what we reject and then bringing it back to us.’49 The fact that flies thrive 
on faecal matter but also habitually land on us and our belongings arouses a fundamental revulsion, 
something which Dennett also articulates when he considers why certain activities disgust us more than 
others. He compares the thought of swallowing saliva in our mouths with doing the same after having 
spat the saliva into a clean glass and asks why the latter probably fills us with more disgust than the 
former. He suggests that:  
It seems to have to do with our perception that once something is outside of our bodies it is no 
longer quite part of us anymore – it becomes alien and suspicious – it has renounced its 
citizenship and becomes something to be rejected.50 
Such ‘border crossings,’ as Dennett calls them, ‘are either moments of anxiety or…something 
to be especially enjoyed,’51 and in the case of flies and their behavioural trait of wallowing in human 
waste and ‘bringing it back to us,’ our response would almost certainly be the former. The creature in The 
Thing is also capable of performing such ‘border crossings’ to the extent that the characters (and at times 
the viewer) cannot determine if or when a particular transgres ion has occurred or even whether the 







process could ever be said to be complete. The creature cn erupt from one individual, enter another, and 
bridge the physical separation between the two so that it exists in multiple places simultaneously. As 
such, it epitomises an extreme form of ‘border crossing’ because of the fact that it can be said to have 
exited a physically discrete entity while also still remaining part of that same individual. Stephen Prince 
echoes this argument but also widens his analysis to consider the alien threat of assimilation from a social 
perspective, arguing that boundaries and distinctions and a clearly-d lineated way of ordering the world 
and its phenomena are what allow us to function successfully as sentient beings. In line with Carroll’s 
approach, Prince cites the research of the anthropologists Mary Douglas and Edmund Leach when he 
examines the film in the context of how we organise the world using a classifying grid. He refers to this 
grid as ‘the symbolic system,’ 52 and is quick to point out one of the inherent drawbacks of this instinctive 
impulse we all have:  
The symbolic system operates to construct differences [in what we observe in the world], but, 
inevitably, the process of classifying will generate intermediate categories, items that mediate 
between binary distinctions to the extent that they exhibit both sets of characteristics.53 
The ‘symbolic system’ sets up something of a paradox in the way that our natural tendency to 
create categories and perceive limits, such as physical boundaries, is also what gives rise to the fascinating 
and perhaps disturbing occurrences when such boundaries and categories are transgressed or eroded. 
From a storyteller’s point of view, the foregrounding of an interstitial state and the perhaps unwelcome 
occurrence of beings and phenomena that do not fit neatly into the categories we have assigned provide 
a rich source of material since. As Prince puts it:  
the categories that arouse the greatest fear, interest, and sense of mystery are the ambiguous 
ones…Such ambiguous terms are the stuff of horror films...54 
Like Carroll, Prince highlights the way in which the creature, and horror monsters in general, 
stands for something impure and indistinct when he makes the following observation about the scene in 
which the alien corpse is recovered from the Norwegian camp to be analysed:  







The creature is neither human nor non-human, but occupies a disturbing, unclear, intermediate 
place. As such, it cannot be classified, but can only be identified as a “thing”. 55  
Or as the dog handler, Clark, puts it when he discovers the creature attacking the sleigh dogs: “I 
dunno what the hell’s in there but it’s weird and pissed off, whatever it is!” Clark’s aversion speaks 
volumes about the way in which we are repelled by otherness, particularly of the sort that appears 
physically repellent or biologically threatening while also defying our efforts to organise and categorise 
phenomena in the world around us.  
While certainly being ‘the stuff of horror films,’ ambiguity can be generated and exploited for 
multiple purposes and I would argue interstitiality as a phenomenon in its own right carries its own source 
of terror by virtue of its inherent ambiguity and indeterminacy. Such ambiguity and indeterminacy may 
involve grotesque imagery but this is certainly not a prerequisite, and Carroll signals an alternative 
consideration that stands as an offshoot or flipside to his art-horror concept. He suggests the term ‘art-
dread’ to describe viewer responses to storylines such as those common to certain episodes in The 
Twilight Zone series,56 which he distinguishes from horror storylines by describing them as ‘tales of 
dread’, the emotional response to which he describes in the following way:  
The uncanny event which tops off such stories causes a snse of unease and awe, perhaps of 
momentary anxiety and foreboding. These events are constructed to move the audience 
rhetorically to the point that one entertains the idea that un vowed, unknown, and perhaps 
concealed and inexplicable forces rule the universe.57 
As we can see, in order to expand on his ‘art-dread’ concept, the alternative term that Carroll 
reaches for most readily is ‘uncanny’. He states that since his concern is with responses to horr r fiction 
he therefore does not have a working theory for such a type of audience affect but suggests that the 
phenomenon itself probably deserves one. Cynthia Freeland takes up the invitation to fill this apparent 
gap and turns her attention to certain films that may be likely to evoke Carroll’s art-dread response, and 
introduces the term 'uncanny horror.’ She conducts an analysis of The Shining (Stanley Kubrick, 1980) 
and Eraserhead (David Lynch, 1977) in order to illustrate the type of film and accompanying audience 







response to which she believes this term could be applied.58 In a similar fashion, Marie Mulvey-Roberts 
also makes reference to the uncanny, directly connecting it to The Thing:  
The Thing, by voraciously consuming living beings and then imitating them, may be associated 
with Sigmund Freud’s notion of the uncanny.59  
The obvious reason for invoking Freud’s ideas on uncanniness in the context of The Thing stems 
from how the characters who are successfully assimilated exist in their new form as something familiar 
and unfamiliar; or ‘homely’ and ‘unhomely’ to use Freud’s terminology. Freud’s description of 
uncanniness as applied to identity is something that is simultaneously repellent and attractive, which is 
fundamental to the way the characters in The Thing react to each other. The situation of the characters 
generates paranoia fuelled by a desire to believe that familiar faces are genuine conflicting with a fear 
that they may not be. Despite the link that can be made with Freud’s ideas, as Mulvey-Roberts does, a 
fi lm like The Thing is possibly not the best case study for considering arguments on uncanniness, other 
than serving as a useful starting point to begin such a consideration. The creature’s ability to imitate other 
life forms, and the fear that this produces, stand as a convenient illustration of Freud’s homely / unhomely 
sensation in the way that I have described, however beyond this superficial detail the overall tone of the 
film is not especially uncanny. Carroll writes in relation to Douglas’s work how a viewer’s sense of 
unease and disgust caused by the impure and / or interstitial nature of a horror monster may arise ‘without 
our necessarily being aware precisely what causes that sense.’60 While this may be true for certain ‘art-
horror’ responses, the events in The Thing are comparatively lucid as regards the characters’ (and by 
extension the viewer’s) source of fear and repulsion. Uncanniness in The Thing is less pronounced than 
is its foregrounding of physical danger and a fear of annihilation through assimilation and as such the 
film is better situated within Carroll’s ‘art-horror’ category than his ‘art-dread’ response, or Freeland’s 
‘uncanny horror.’ In the chapter that follows I will consider an example which in a way stands as an 
inverted counter-example to the more grotesque, ‘art-horrific’ imagery that is prevalent in The Thing. 
Freud’s uncanny is helpful for considering malleable identities and unconventional charater portrayal in 
films, especially those which aim to provoke feelings of unease, disquiet or aversion, and a key element 
of uncanniness is in its subtlety and elusiveness. Although ‘elusiveness’ features prominently in The 







Thing, it is only on the level of theme and storyline, and however else one could describe the film, ‘subtle’ 
would probably not be top of the list of adjectives. Just as Smith refers to fictional characters as a major 
“entry point” into our engagement with narratives,’61 The Thing, for my purposes, can be seen as the entry 
point for a deeper discussion of a kind of horror relating to a loss or corruption of identity that is more 
subtly communicated. As such, I will turn my attention in the next chapter to examples that are perhaps 

























 Ambiguous Identities and Uncanny Selves in David Lynch’s Lost Highway 
Fred: You were in the house, calling my name, but I couldn't find you. Then there you were, lying in bed... 
but it wasn't you. It looked like you, but it wasn't.  
(Lost Highway, 1997, David Lynch).  
I mentioned in Chapter One how the closing scene of The Thing is overshadowed by ambiguity over 
whether or not one of the two surviving characters mayactually be an assimilated imitation of who they 
appear to be. That scene notwithstanding however, it is fair to say that the film is a mainstream product, 
which happens to engage with (or at least suggest) intriguing questions about personal identity but does 
not noticeably deviate from a classical Hollywood paradigm. In the preceding chapter I outlined certain 
aspects of the film-as-philosophy debate in order to categorise Th  Thing as an example that can be used 
to read or mobilise certain philosophical ideas but only i  terms of its subject matter rather than its 
cinematic features and narrative design. As we shall see during my analysis in this chapter, The Thing is 
a film with quite different primary goals from Lost Highway, and this has consequences for how a film 
theorist may choose to approach the latter in the context of such a discussion. The Thing establishes a 
clear protagonist / antagonist dichotomy in the form of Kurt Russell’s character versus the alien creature, 
there is a clear goal driving the narrative forwards, and in terms of its formal features the action plays out 
using established cinematic norms. Although it explores fantastical and thought-provoking ideas, the fact 
that it does so within the confines of an accessible narrative framework is one point which makes it 
distinctly unlike Lost Highway, the film that will be the main focus of this chapter. While Lynch’s film 
also contains characters whose identities exhibit physical disunity and instances of physical mutation, it 
displays a relative lack of narrative motivation and diegetic logic behind its identity shifts, which could 
be regarded as a fundamental barrier to comprehension. A significant amount of the narrative ambiguity 







in Lost Highway is closely related to the identities of its characters but it is of a profoundly different sort 
to the kind we are asked to decipher in a film like Th  Thing. This is primarily because of a fundamental 
difference in the level of diegetic clarity and narrative information regarding alterations to character 
identities, which in itself highlights the fundamental differences between the underlying aims of each 
film. The Thing strives to keep its events moving forward with a gradually increasing pace and, even 
though its characters’ identities are at times unclear, the narrative maintains the nature of the peril that 
exists and that survival of the characters and / or destruction of the creature are the ultimate goals. As 
such, the questions it explores about personal identity are kept at an abstract distance and operate on the 
level of story only, whereas Lost Highway deviates from established conventions of character port ayal 
and diegetic continuity in order to explore issues of personal identity in an altogether different way. In
this chapter I will begin by looking at how Lost Highway motivates and depicts character changes before 
considering how the film’s emphasis on defamiliarising everyday events and phenomena allows it to 
create a more unsettling, uncanny tone. I will develop my analysis in the context of the ideas I considered 
in Chapter One to show how Lost Highway better suits the ‘art-dread’ or ‘uncanny horror’ labels put 
forward respectively by Noël Carroll and Cynthia Freeland. I will finish by looking at how, in the broader 
considerations of film and self-identity, the recurrent ambiguity in Lost Highway’s narrative represents a 
confluence of salient physical and psychological traits that commonly relate to the development of 
characters.  
Critical responses to the film at the time of its release were mixed, and some of the more negative 
reviews are worth mentioning as a way of starting my analysis. Edward Guthmann wrote that Lynch’s 
film ‘often feels like a stunt -- like an arcane, deliberately perverse game that Lynch knew would never 
make sense,’62 while Roger Ebert claimed that the film is: 
made with a certain breezy contempt for audiences…There is no sense to be made of it…Is the 
joke on us? Is it our error to try to make sense of the film, to try to figure out why protagonists 
change in midstream?’63  
It is not insignificant that a film which problematises character identity might evoke a negative 
response, not simply because it frustrates our expectations of how a film should behave but perhaps also 







because it taps into an anxiety about the fragility of one’s own personal identity. On one reading, 
portraying changes to character identities in a way that appears unexplained and unmotivated might serve 
to highlight that a belief in a permanent, unchanging self,i  flawed and that personal identity is actually 
more dynamic and fluid than physical appearances suggest. As Ebert’s review reveals, a principal source 
of confusion or annoyance stems from the way in which the lead character (if Fred can be considered as 
such) ‘gives way’ to another character, Pete, roughly halfway through the film. I use the term ‘gives way’ 
rather than ‘mutate’ or ‘transform’ because, as we will see, it is precisely the ambiguous p rtrayal of this 
identity switch that may create a particular sort of challenge for the viewer.  
Lost Highway tells the story of a musician, Fred (Bill Pullman) and his wife, Renee (Patricia 
Arquette) who have a strained relationship in which Fred suspects his wife of infidelity. On successive 
days the couple, whose life together seems to consist of tense, vacuous exchanges of sparse conversation, 
receive three unmarked videotapes. The first is a very brief shot of their home from the outside, while the 
second shows both the exterior and interior, including a shot of the couple asleep in their bed. This 
prompts them to call the police but after a cursory inspection the detectives leave after offering some 
generic advice about securing their home. During the intervening time between the delivery of the second 
and third tapes, Fred and Renee attend a party where Fr d meets the Mystery Man (Robert Blake) who 
claims to be inside Fred's house even though he is also directly in front of Fred speaking to him. Thinking 
he is on the end of a prank, Fred calls his house and to his horror the Mystery Man answers, seemingly 
inhabiting two different places at once.  
When the third video arrives, Fred puts it on and calls to Renee to come and watch it with him, 
but he is shocked at the footage which apparently shows him having murdered and dismembered his wife. 
The footage is grainy and we only get a brief glimpse of what Fred sees (Fig. 6) but the shot is long 
enough for us to witness a horrifically bloody scene involving a dismembered corpse, which resembles 
Renee. Fred’s reaction to what he sees is one of disbelief and he calls to Renee in a desperate, panicked 
voice before we abruptly cut to a scene of Fred being punched in the face by one of the detectives from 
the earlier scene, screaming “Sit down, killer!” 








Fig. 6. We see a brief glimpse of Fred, seemingly fo lowing the act of murdering Renee and sobbing 
amongst her strewn remains. 
The implication seems to be that Fred does not remember the scene in the tape but is nonetheless 
promptly convicted of murder and sentenced to death. When in prison, Fred complains of headaches 
before he apparently transforms into a different person Pete (Balthazar Getty) who has no memory of 
how he came to be in Fred’s cell. The prison officers have no idea how he came to be ther  either and 
since he can no longer be identified by the authorities as Fred but can be positively identified as Pete, he 
is returned to his parents' care. The storyline then takes a tangential turn as we learn about Pete’s life as 
a mechanic who also does work for a local gangster, Mr Eddy/Dick Laurent (Robert Loggia). Mr Eddy 
shows up at Pete's workplace one day with a girl, Alice (also played by Patricia Arquette), and shortly 
after she and Pete start an affair. Mr Eddy becomes suspicious so Alice and Pete plan to rob Andy, one 
of Mr Eddy's henchmen, and escape with the loot. During the robbery they accidentally kill Andy, before 
travelling to a shack in the desert where they wait to meet a potential buyer. After Alice walks off into 
the shack, Pete seemingly transforms back into Fred who then follows her inside and finds nobody but 
the Mystery Man, with a video camera aimed at him. Unnerved, Fred drives off to the Lost Highway hotel 
where he glimpses Renee in one of the rooms, seemingly e aged in an affair with Mr Eddy. Fred kidnaps 
and kills Mr Eddy in the desert with the assistance of the Mystery Man before driving back to his house 
and saying “Dick Laurent is dead” into the intercom. The film concludes with him driving into the desert, 
pursued by police and screaming in pain as his face begins to cont rt and mutate.  









If we look more closely at the moments when characters appear to change their identities we can 
gain some insight into how and why the film presents a very different challenge to that of more 
mainstream portrayals of mutation, such as those I examined in The Thing. The first instance of apparent 
physical transformation occurs during the scene when Fred is in his prison cell complaining of headaches. 
After requesting and being refused help from the guards, we see him turn to look at his cell door, which 
dissolves into the image of a shack in the desert exploding in reverse-motion. After the shack has reformed 
we see the Mystery Man standing outside and then entering it, i tercut with shots of Fred in his cell 
looking scared and confused. The cell is suddenly illuminated with a bright overhead light before cutting 
to a moving shot travelling along a desert road at night which veers off to the right and focuses in on an 
unknown man standing by the roadside. Flashing lights and mist accompany intercut close-ups of this 
man and Fred’s eyes. We then see the latter writhing in pain in his cell, clutching his head, while the 
image and soundtrack become distorted. Hissing and screaming ccompany a sound like tearing cloth as 
we see Fred's head, shrouded in steam, begin to pulsate and change shape, however the scene concludes 
without clearly establishing the outcome of whatever is happening to him. (Fig. 7). Mist fills the frame 
and the shot alternates between flashes of light and otal darkness before we see a very brief shot of what 
looks like an open wound, accompanied by a roar of pain, then an abrupt cut to black. There is a brief 
intervening shot showing what appears to be a human figure rocking backwards and forwards but the 
image is never brought into focus, so it is not possible to conclusively identify the person we are seeing.  
 
Fig. 7 - Fred in his death row cell, seemingly in the process of a painful, violent and literal transformation. 







In the scene that immediately follows, the guards find a different person in Fred's cell, a man who they 
subsequently identify as Pete Dayton and who the viewer will ecognise as the individual seen by the 
roadside in the previous sequence. He has cuts and swellings on hi  forehead and has no memory of how 
he came to be in Fred's cell. Other than one prison guard describing this strange occurrence as “some 
spooky shit,” no narrative explanations for Pete’s appearance, or Fred's disappearance, are offered. Pete 
is subsequently released into his parents' care and is kept under surveillance by the police. The film then 
enters into what exists as an almost entirely separate narrative thread, during which the viewer is provided 
with information about Pete's life: where he works, his girlfriend, his parents, and his relationship with 
the gangster, Mr Eddy, who seems to like Pete for his expertise as a car mechanic. This tangential storyline 
effectively constitutes the entire middle section of the film before we see the second instance of physical 
transformation. It takes place towards the end of the film immediately after the sex scene in the desert, 
when Alice has gone into the shack leaving Pete lying on the ground. This time round the nature of the 
identity switch is noticeably different to the mutation which took place in Fred’s cell, with violent noises 
and grotesque imagery being replaced by a simple elliptical edit as Pete gets to his feet and is ‘replaced’ 
by Fred (Fig. 8). The initial shot is potentially ambiguous due to the use of a long shot and the physical 
similarity of both actors when seen from behind. However, the cut to a medium shot followed by the 
subsequent reveal as the individual turns round confirms that Fred is once more present in the narrative 
and, by that same token, Pete is now absent.  
 








Fig. 8. The portrayal of Pete changing back to Fred is noticeably understated compared to the scene 
showing the reverse process in Fred’s cell.  
The third and final transformation takes place during the film’s closing sequence when Fred is 
making his escape by car and is being pursued by the police (Fig. 9.) The images are very similar to those 
in the prison cell scene and as before the sequence ends b fore the result is shown, however given what 
we have seen already it is reasonable to infer that Fred is about to mutate once more, perhaps into Pete, 
perhaps not.  
 
Fig. 9. The film’s closing scene sees Fred seemingly on the verge of another transformation. 
Notably, the mutations are violent in nature when the change is from Fred into Pete, while the 
transformation that occurs in the opposite direction is understated and instantaneous. Quite why this 
should be the case is unclear, which serves to underline how the diegetic logic relating to physical 
mutation in Lost Highway differs considerably from a film like The Thing. Although both narratives 







employ grotesque imagery to depict physical mutation, the laws governing how and why such events take 
place are more clearly established, through dialogue and other forms of exposition, in Carpenter’s film. 
All that one can say with any certainty is that on the occasions Fred mutates (regardless of whether we 
deem this to be a literal or metaphorical transformation), it seems to be a painful and violent event, which 
does not seem to be the case when the reverse process occurs. These examples are distinct from the kind 
of physical rupturing that occurs in The Thing insofar as they are understated and are accompanied by a 
relative paucity of diegetic information that may serve as a plausible explanation for what we see. Lost 
Highway does not display the sort of horror/science-fiction tropes such as those we are presented with in 
The Thing, which Murray Smith points out when he summarises the film’s various impediments to viewer 
comprehension: 
Lost Highway…refrains from establishing any explicit supernatural framework…Appearance 
and reality are dislocated; motivations are obscure; cognitive dissonance disturbs the very 
foundations of narrative coherence; temporal and causal sequences become paradoxical.64 
With such a concentration of ‘cognitive dissonance’ generated by the narrative’s unexpected 
deviations from mainstream norms, numerous questions and challenges are created for the viewer. If we 
look closely at some of these then we can assess the extent to which we can either draw conclusions from 
the narrative events or must acknowledge paradoxes and ambiguity as an inherent and deliberate design 
feature of the film.  
Tangled Selves  
 
The events in Fred’s prison cell are pivotal and the way in which one interprets Pete’s entry into 
the narrative will determine to a large extent how one classifies and reconciles a multitude of other details 
in the scenes that follow. The question the film invites is whether to regard Fred’s mutation as a literal 
event within the diegesis or a transformation on an entirely psychological level. In his review of the film 
Kim Newman articulates one of the key questions the viewer will most likely raise:   







[have] Fred and Pete exchanged bodies, with Pete coming out of some limbo to usurp Fred's 
place in the world...Or has Fred transformed only into a physical ikeness of Pete, retaining his 
own memories and personality? 65  
His question is rhetorical of course since the short answer is: we cannot know for sure. For one 
thing, we do not actually witness a physical transformation but rather see the beginning of what might be 
a metamorphosis of some sort. It is only through the inexplicable appearance of Pete in the cell, and 
Fred’s corresponding absence, that we are encouraged to draw such a conclusion. The moments when 
Fred seems to shapeshift point towards an actual physical morphing of some kind that is perhaps on a par 
with the alteration or absorption of individuals common t  the horror and sci-fi examples I looked at 
previously. However, Lynch really only alludes to generic tropes such as these, seemingly as a means of 
inviting a similar interpretation only to leave the diegetic explanation incomplete and obscure. The 
creature in The Thing can transcend spatial boundaries by virtue of its ability to live simultaneously as 
both a single organism and a collection of discrete units. As we saw in Chapter One, Carpenter goes to 
great lengths to ensure that viewer and character knowledge about the alien’s capabilities are closely 
aligned, which means that even though there may be uncertainty over who has been assimilated, we are 
at least clear on how the process works. Our knowledge is further bolstered by extended sequences which 
explicitly demonstrate how the creature operates and survives. By contrast, Lost Highway features a 
similar disruption of what Carroll calls the ‘natural order’ of the narrative but does not provide 
accompanying explanatory information. Lynch could be seen as alluding to the horror and science-fiction 
tropes, and we might venture that the Fred/Pete relationship qualifies him/them as one of Carroll’s 
‘temporal fission’ characters, alongside other shapeshifting beings like werewolves. However, Lost 
Highway does not deliver an explicit portrayal like the agonising (and fully-lit) metamorphosis in An 
American Werewolf in London (John Landis, 1981). David Bordwell puts forward the concept of 
redundancy to describe the way in which filmmakers rely on salient narrative details being repeatedly 
shown or referenced in order to firmly establish them as pertinent elements for the viewer. In relation to 
Lost Highway he writes: 







If complex storytelling demands high redundancy, Lynch has been derelict in his duty...the 
absence of definite reference points allows Lynch to rehearse a few obsessive scenarios […] 
without settling on which are real and which are imagined. 66 
The tangential storyline involving Pete is difficult to reconcile with what we have seen so far 
since Fred’s mutation into Pete apparently declares that unity and continuity of physical elves are 
unstable elements. The apparent transformation directly conflicts with Smith’s ‘person schema’, since the 
film overturns the basic assumption that, ‘unless otherwise indicated, a character will have one body, 
individuated by a particular set of physical features, and which w ll be continuous through space and time. 
‘67  ‘Otherwise indicated’ is the key phrase here since as we have seen with The Thing, its narration 
carefully establishes an internal logic presented through a pseudo-scientific lens with a premise and 
backstory that provides sufficient explanation for mutating characters and malleable identities. With 
Lynch’s film we are forced to query whether Fred has ceased to exist entirely or perhaps now exists in a 
form different to that which we have so far associated with him. By not providing plausible or wholly 
satisfactory explanations for what happens to Fred in his cell and what his connection to Pete is raises 
obvious questions for the viewer. Schuy R. Weisshar notes how our first sight of Pete shows im with a 
‘protuberance on his forehead’68 which gradually disappears in the scenes following his releas  from 
prison (Fig. 10.) The presence of a detail such this increases mbiguity and exacerbates the lack of 














Fig. 10. Pete’s face is noticeably misshapen and swollen, suggesting an actual physical mutation has 
taken place. As his storyline develops, the wound o his forehead can be seen healing in a way that is 
consistent with recovery from physical trauma.   
Walter Benjamin wrote that ‘ o live is to leave traces’69 and this notion seems to take on a literal 
manifestation in the sense that traces of Fred’s existence seem to be literally etched into Pete’s face, with 
subsequent scenes showing a gradual erasure by way of his skin healing. Whether or not Pete exists in 
Fred’s psyche or whether the instances of mutation are to be taken literal y remains unresolved, which is 
one way in which the film is distinct from narratives which present straightforward scenarios involving 
identity confusion framed in mainstream structures.  
If we are to interpret this apparently literal transformation as a purely symbolic one, and regard 
the sequences involving Pete’s activities as an escapist fantasy taking place in Fred’s psyche, then a detail 
such as a healing wound creates a discord. Portraying a purely s bjective, psychological transformation, 
such as a fugue state or a form of mental retreat or breakdown, would seem to preclude any suggestion 
of physical alteration or mutation, unless of course the int ntion is to create ambiguity. The fact that 
scarring is evident on Pete’s face lends weight to the viewer’s hypothesis that a literal transformation has 







occurred but this is in conflict with the diegetic laws that seem to have been established earlier in the 
narrative. The intercut shots of each character’s eyes during the transformation scene in the prison cell 
establish a connection of sorts between the two figures although the exact nature of this connection is 
never unequivocally established.  
One reading of the film that may allow these apparent paradoxes to be reconciled would be to 
regard Fred and Pete as distinct from one another only in terms of their representation. We could regard 
them (him) as a single character who appears in two different guises or manifestations at certain points 
in the narrative and hypothesise that the changes in appearance are tied to or guided by Fred’s emotional 
and mental states. Just as Bruce Banner transforms into The Hulk whenever he feels angry, perhaps Fred’s 
feelings of jealousy or inadequacy towards his wife ‘transform’ him into Pete. If this transformation is 
psychological rather than physical then of course the healing wound on Pete’s face will appear jarring to 
the viewer. However, regarding Pete’s existence as an escapist fantasy in which Fred is convinced that 
he has made an actual physical transformation then it is easier to accept a detail such as this, provided 
that we regard the moment of mutation as a descent into Fred’s subjectivity and not a literal 
transformation. If Fred’s fantasy is total then it may quite readily include a detail such as a healing wound 
following a metamorphosis into a different individual, such is the freedom of dream states and fantasies. 
A point that goes further to support this interpretation is that Pete certainly displays the features one might 
associate with an alter ego in that he is popular and virilein ways that Fred is not. Upon discovering that 
Tyler Durden (Brad Pitt) in Fight Club is actually the same person as Edward Norton’s character, Durden 
declares that “I look like you wanna look, I fuck like you wanna fuck, I am smart, capable…I am free in 
all the ways that you are not.”70 A narrative explanation such as this could also be applied here, since 
Pete’s life is in many respects superior and more fulfilling than Fred’s, therefore regarding him as an 
alter-ego makes sense. A key difference, however, is the clarity with which Fight Club’s narrative cues 
work to distinguish moments of delusion from moments of dieget c objectivity. Details such as Pete’s 
healing wound make it less easy (but not impossible) for the viewer to make such a distinction and as the 
film progresses this level of ambiguity is compounded by similar examples. In addition to the identity 
confusion that surrounds Fred and Pete are the collection of supporting characters who are similarly tinged 







with ambiguity; the principal one being the dual roles of Renee and Alice played by Patricia Arquette 
(Fig. 11).   
 
Fig. 11. Patricia Arquette in the dual roles of Alice and Renee 
In Pete’s storyline the brunette Renee reappears as the blonde Alice. Despite cosmetic alterations 
such as a different name and a change in hairstyle and colour the viewer will be in no doubt that it is the 
same actress, although whether or not these are indeed two separate characters is never satisfactorily 
established. The ambiguity over whether Renee and Alice are indeed two distinct people is compounded 
during the botched robbery at Andy’s home when Pete notices a photograph in which both Alice and 
Renee are present. In a later scene, however, the investigators look at the same photograph and only Renee 
is present (Figs. 12 and 13). Perhaps echoing the viewer’s own thoughts, Pete asks Alice ‘Is that you? 
Are both of them you?’ to which she replies ‘That’s me’ and points to the blonde. Her answer does little 
to clarify the matter and her behaviour does not suggest that her (apparent) double appearance in the same 
photograph is in any way remarkable. Pete essentially vocalises a question that will undoubtedly arise in 
the mind of the viewer, however the answer and subsequent shots of the photograph clarifies little and 
could even be considered as a source of greater confusion. An example such as this shows how the film 
toys with the Bordwellian idea of redundancy, inverting it almost, since the repetition of certain pieces of 
information actually obscures more than it reveals.  








Fig.12. The photograph as viewed by Pete during the robbery at Andy’s. 
 
Fig.13. The ‘same’ photograph as seen by the detectives in a later scene. 
The lack of clarity surrounding character identities and the various realms they inhabit 
effectively constructs a series of unsolvable riddles and ironically it is the intrusion of characters, or at 
least fragments of them, from one seemingly distinct narrative strand into the other that helps to bind 
them together. Our attempts at reconciliation are made all the more tempting and frustrating by the 
appearance of details which are recognisable from earlier scene  but appear ultimately to evade definitive 
categorisation or explanation. As was mentioned earlier, the viewer will most likely feel compelled to 
retain each detail in the hope that vigilance will result in narrative clarity. Certain details and characters 
from apparently distinct narrative threads intrude upon and refer back to one another, making it difficult 
for the viewer to reconcile inconsistencies and paradoxes since categorisation and identification of 
apparently distinct threads cannot be achieved. In addition to the wound on Pete’s forehead we also hear 
the sound of Fred’s saxophone solo from an earlier scene playing on the radio in Pete’s garage. Elsewhere, 
Mr Eddy/Dick Laurent creates a bridge between the two sections of the film as we hear the detectives 







refer to him as 'Laurent', which links him to the intercom message heard by Fred at the start of the film. 
Quite why he is known by two different names is never explained although relative to some the film’s 
other unexplained features it is perhaps reasonable to infer that as a gangster he may use aliases in his 
line of work.  Being reminded of characters as they had been intensifies the viewer's challenge to try and 
make sense of the details and provide an explanation; to try in some way to re-orientate their 
understanding to the point where it was at the outset of the narrative. By pulling our interpretive instincts 
in seemingly contradictory directions the viewer is forced to consider alternative interpretations or simply 
accept the inconsistencies as an integral part of the viewing experience. Lost Highway could be regarded 
as projecting the type of bewilderment and uncertainty experienced by the characters in The Thing onto 
the viewer, and rather than exploring themes of identity in an expository way its narrative works 
demonstratively in order to raise questions about the nature of self-identity.  
The uncanny and self-estrangement 
 
In one notable scene, which I touched on earlier, Fred encounters the Mystery Man at Andy’s 
party and during the course of their exchange the Mystery Man hands Fred his phone and tells him to call 
home. When the Mystery Man answers at the other end while still standing in front of Fred, incredulity 
turns to fear as Fred realises this is no cheap trick.As with the moments of physical mutation, the narrative 
offers little evidence to account for what has transpired and the scene, with its eerie and unsettling tone, 
serves simply to generate hypotheses about a supernatural or m gical element that may emerge within 
the storyline. Details such as these illustrate how L st Highway shares some common ground with T e 
Thing but also how it contrasts greatly in terms of tone, imagery, and narrative clarity. In some respects 
they are an inversion of one another in terms of their respective proportions of grotesque horror versus 
unsettling uncanniness. The scenario therefore is intended to generate a mood of dread and uncanniness 
as opposed to what Carroll would call ‘art-horror’. Cynthia Freeland writes how films that she would 
categorise as ‘uncanny horror’:  







are not enjoyable for their presentation of interesting monsters…[T]he horror goes beyond, or 
lies behind, the men who seem to be monsters in them, so we cannot invoke Noël Carroll’s views 
to explain their appeal.71  
Carroll of course concedes as much himself when he uses Norman Bates from Psycho as an 
example of a monstrous individual who is not of the ‘art-horror’ variety, and there is certainly evidence 
in Lost Highway to suggest that Fred is similarly unhinged and guilty of a brutal murder. However, Fred’s 
arrest and incarceration does not develop into an investigation examining the details of Renee’s murder 
since, as we have seen, the narrative departs along a much more unconventional route following Fred’s 
transformation into Pete. As is evident from the large volume of psychoanalytic writing, there are a 
number of theorists who believe that Lacanian and Freudian theories can satisfactorily answer these 
apparent inconsistencies, and several of these authors pr vide illuminating interpretations and 
hypotheses.72 If we return to Freud and uncanniness there are a number of observations that can be made 
that could perhaps guide our interpretative efforts while also holding back from offering up any form of 
definitive interpretation of Lost Highway’s myriad riddles and paradoxes. Although the film contains 
narrative inconsistencies, physical discontinuity and a disregard for spatio-temporal logic, I would argue 
that the ability to comprehend the narrative requires nither greater familiarity with non-mainstream 
narratives, nor the adoption of psychoanalytic approaches, but rather a reassessment of how we 
understand and define subjective identity and selfhood. In this respect my approach could be closely 
aligned with that of Gregory Currie who argues against the dominance of certain psychoanalytic schools 
of thought in favour of a cognitive approach. He writes that 't e most a cognitivist need hold is that 
psychoanalysis is not the central or...exclusive means by which we understand the psychology of film'.73 
Freud’s writing on the uncanny and selfhood, for instance, can provide useful insights regarding Lost 
Highway but this does not constitute a wholesale adoption of a Freudian approach. While I do not intend 
to adopt a psychoanalytic approach, for my purposes it is still of value to draw on Freud’s landmark 
theory of the uncanny, particularly in the context of Carroll, Freeland and Smith’s work. In his seminal 
essay ‘The Uncanny,’ Freud writes of an experience he had whilst riding on a train and mistook his own 
reflection for another passenger: 







I at once realized to my dismay that the intruder was nothi g but my own reflection in the 
looking-glass of the open door. I can still recollect that I found his appearance thoroughly 
unpleasant.74 
What is encapsulated in this extract is one of the central features of Freud’s description of 
uncanniness, which is the sensation that a particular perception or phenomenon feels simultaneously 
familiar and unhomely, both attractive and repellent. The quotation at the opening of this chapter includes 
a phrase spoken by Fred - “it looked like you, but it wasn’t” - which could almost have been drawn 
directly from Freud’s description of how uncanniness relates to personal identity. Fred’s words point 
towards the fact that the film contains individuals whose physical representations both confirm and deny 
our ability to recognise definitively who they are. They way in which this is achieved, however, is 
markedly different to the sort of identity confusion associated with a film like The Thing and many of the 
other examples I have looked at so far. In TheThing, it is difficult or almost impossible for those who are 
still human to differentiate between those who are alien imitations and those who are genuinely the person 
they appear to be. The desire to see the person for who they are is in direct conflict with the paranoid 
impulse to mistrust the individual who may actually be an imitation. The horrific interstitial sight of the 
alien and the issue of identity confusion provoke the attraction / repulsion response common to both the 
uncanny and the grotesque, even though the pervading mood of the film itself is not one of uncanniness. 
According to Freud’s account, doubling and repetition can serve as major sources of uncanniness and in 
this respect uncanniness abounds in Lost Highway. There is the obvious doubling of characters through 
Fred changing into Pete and Arquette playing a dual role, and although there is ambiguity surrounding 
the exact nature of the Fred/Pete relationship, the film clearly emphasises a link of some sort, such as the 
intercut close-ups of their eyes during the mutation and similar ties of framing (Fig. 14).  
   
Fig. 14. Shot composition contributes to the film’s many instances of doubling and repetition.   







As well as through his alarming, ghostly appearance, the Mystery Man also evokes the uncanny 
through a different form of doubling, namely his capacity to exist in more than one place, as evidenced 
in the scene at Andy’s party. His apparent ability to transcend normal spatial boundaries is deepened 
further when Fred seems to see his face superimposed over Renee’s one night when they are in bed (Fig. 
15), a sight which is subsequently dispelled when Fred hurriedly turns on his bedside light in fear. We 
see Fred waking in distress, presumably because of a nightmare, aking it tempting to dismiss the image 
as a hallucination resulting from Fred being somewhere btween dreaming and waking. However, against 
this interpretation is the destabilising element of h w the lead up to this moment is framed. We see what 
appears to be a retrospective dream sequence as it is being recounted by Fred to Renee as they both lie in 
bed, which runs counter to the fact that the sequence concludes with Fred waking rather than a cut to 
something like Renee listening to Fred’s description of the dream he had. This generates a discord both 
in terms of our expectations of narrative progression but also in terms of our efforts to delineate dream / 
fantasy from diegetic reality. Since we cannot draw a firm conclusion about what Fred actually saw, this 
instance of conflating discrete entities into a single individual is of a different nature to the ‘fusion figures’ 
present in The Thing, which frames its events in a folk-scientific context. As a result, Lost Highway has 
a capacity for generating uncanniness that is absent in The Thing due to the fact that the latter’s ambiguity 
about character identity operates only on the diegetic level and not at the level of narrative design.  
 
Fig. 15. The alarming appearance of the Mystery Man’s face superimposed on Renee’s exemplifies a 
different method of fusing or conflating character identities. 
In addition, this moment follows on directly from a sex scene which is portrayed in such a deeply 
uncanny way that it could be regarded as the polar opposite of th  celebrated sequence in Don’t Look 
Now (Nicolas Roeg, 1973). The couple’s flesh is defamiliarised through the use of slow motion while a 







swirling, throbbing hum on the soundtrack instead of music and / or diegetic sound creates an eerie, 
distant mood. The atmosphere is rendered dark and unsettling, something which is at odds with the 
physical intimacy of the characters but communicates the emotional distance in their relationship. 
Moments like these build cumulatively as the narrative progresses to create a pervading air of 
uncanniness, over which hangs a nagging ambiguity surrounding character identities.  
Earlier I looked at how uncanniness could be regarded as an inversion of the imagery and 
atmosphere common to mainstream horror, with the former displaying subtle dread in place of the latter’s 
reliance on emphatically grotesque visuals. Overall Lost Highway generates an uncanny atmosphere 
relying on a sense of dread, with moments of horror and shock periodically punctuating the narrative. The 
appearance of the Mystery Man in Fig. 17, representing horrific impurity in Carroll’s sense through a 
blending of young and old, male and female, would be one such example. Fre land draws a similar 
comparison but compares uncanniness with what it feels to xperience the sublime (in the Romantic sense 
of the word). Witnessing terrible and impressive natural phenom na like ocean waves or tornadoes create 
a type of self-affirming outcome by virtue of how they make one feel tiny and awestruck and yet not 
directly threatened and therefore glad to be alive. The uncanny however generates a feeling of losing 
oneself, not in the hackneyed sense of becoming deeply absorbed in a storyline but rather something akin 
to having a comforting rug of individuality pulled from under our feet: 
By contrast, the forces of the uncanny dwarf us in a way th t simply threatens a dissolution of 
the self, meaning, and morality…we lose our sense of self, we are frightened by something 
unexplained.75 
It is quite fitting that Freeland’s notion of uncanniness as a kind of ‘antisublime’ creates yet 
another example of doubling, only this time it is the very concept of the uncanny itself which finds its 
inverted double in the form of the sublime. In the context of Lost Highway, two things in Freeland’s 
description stand out as being particularly applicable and significant. ‘A dissolution of the self’ and being 
‘frightened by something unexplained’ to my mind resonate on both the diegetic and thematic levels. On 
one reading we might consider that Fred has literally ‘lost himself’ and been replaced by Pete, while 
Freeland’s mention of a ‘dissolution of the self’ takes on a literal manifestation similar to the fate of the 







scientists in The Thing. Freeland also makes the point that ‘we are frightened by something unexplained’ 
and this resonates deeply with the vagueness and ambiguity running through Lost Highway’s narrative. 
As Carroll examines in great detail, horror monsters are repulsive and threatening but more often than 
not the threat is clear and visceral. Not so with Lost Highway since it is the uncertainty and vagueness of 
the narrative itself which carries much of the t reat, making it unlike ‘art-horror’ as Carroll defines it. 
Both he and Freeland regard ‘dread’ as the most suitable term to describe this emotional response, which 
Freeland describes as ‘a sense of something evil, something out there as a threat in a distinctive and 
stronger sense, different from the threat of sheer power.’76 Freud and Freeland both identify an aversion 
to and / or loss of familiarity with one’s own self as an aspect of uncanniness, and that normally the source 
of the unsettling sensation is a vagueness about what is causing us to feel disturbed. The term ‘autophobia’ 
denotes a fear of oneself and like many phobias they oft n appear peculiar to non-sufferers, however 
unlike a fear of heights, which could be seen as rooted in a desire for self-preservation, one might query 
what we have to fear from ourselves. To regard one’s self with a sense of ‘otherness’ would certainly be 
an unfamiliar sensation and could very well provoke an autophobic response, something we might call a 
sense of ‘self-aversion.’ A central feature of uncanniness is the sensation that a p rticular perception or 
phenomenon feels simultaneously familiar and unhomely, both attractive and repellent. It is hard to 
imagine something more familiar and homely than one's self, th refore it is perhaps equally difficult to 
consider oneself as an unfamiliar person, let alone a person to fear. In her analysis of horror and 
monstrosity Marie Mulvey-Roberts isolates this very notion:  
As a manifestation of both the uncanny and the abject, the monstrous body represents a horror 
of the indifferentiation of the now defamiliarised human. Monstrosity is also a fear of oneself, 
particularly of the alienation within the self.77  
There are of course numerous ways of imagining, portraying and interpreting a fear of the self, 
or an alienation within the self. A psychoanalytic approach might argue that what we have to fear from 
ourselves is a return of the repressed, an alter-ego or double lurking within; 'someone' who is the very 
essence of our most base and destructive desires.  Such an idea has been explored at length in many art 
forms and has produced characters like Frankenstein's Monster; an individual who represents a literal, 







physical manifestation of a threatening alter-ego. Similarly, the theme of an aversion to one’s self can be 
seen in examples such as Dostoevsky’s The Double and The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, by 
Robert Louis Stevenson. The same idea is employed for comedy effect in Multiplicity (Harold Ramis, 
1996), in which the main character, Doug, clones himself so that he can manage his work/life balance 
better, but ends up squabbling endlessly about priorities with his multiple selves. Similarly, when the vain 
and self-indulgent character Rimmer, from the TV sci-fi comedy series Red Dwarf, is accidentally cloned 
in the episode ‘Me2’, he moves in with his double only to see their cohabitation descend into a series of 
petty arguments. Similarly, Doug in Multiplicity does not see his life enriched by his clones nor does he 
even recognise an affinity with them. Rather, just like Rimmer finds in Red Dwarf, he becomes alienated 
from his new selves as they grow progressively distinct from their source, albeit in a farcical way that is 
played overwhelmingly for laughs. Moon (Duncan Jones, 2009) explores similar ideas by way of a 
storyline involving an astronaut who is cyclically cloned to allow him to continue to carry out lunar 
mining, effectively a form of slave labour involving clones that are designed to die every three years. The 
tone of the film is tragic rather than farcical but it nonetheless exhibits a character who seems repelled, 
or at least discomfited by, another version of himself.  
Looking in more detail at one more example, in Chapter One I m ntioned Christopher Nolan’s 
film The Prestige in the context of Derek Parfit’s thought experiments involving teletransporters and 
doppelgängers, something which Rupert Read discusses in much greater detail in his essay ‘The Tale 
Parfit Tells.’ Read regards The Prestige as something close to a dramatistion of Parfit’s thought 
experiment, and with good reason since it engages with duplication of an individual by way of a 
teleportation device. Read objects to what he sees as Parfit’s oversimplification of a (fictional) scenario 
that would involve killing another person and he credits The Prestige as being ‘far more finely attuned, 
physically, than Parfit’s…[because it] expertly explores the horror, the terrible turn in events, that may 
follow from duplication of human beings.’78 For Read, precisely why the film is ‘more finely attuned’ 
than Parfit’s thought experiment is because of the extent to which The Prestige considers the moral 
implications and outright horror f killing one’s doppelgänger. While it is true that Parfit’s scenario seems 
to gloss over the murderous aspect of his thought experiment, it might also be said that The Prestige is 
able to mobilise a philosophical idea in a different way due to its medium. As I mentioned in Chapter 







One, there is much debate over whether or not film can be considered capable of advancing a 
philosophical argument purely through cinematic means. I highlighted how the visual immediacy and 
temporal character of film provides filmmakers with a unique set of choices when trying to put their ideas 
across, and Carroll argues that, through the medium of film, there are times when ‘[t]he context may be 
so pregnant and the thought experiment so deft that everyone gets it on contact.’79 Perhaps there is an 
element of this at work in The Prestige which allows it to explore a similar scenario to the on Parfits 
envisages but with a nuance and impact that is specific to moving images.  
Nolan’s film is primarily a warning about obsessive competition and jealousy between rival 
magicians but the technological component in the storyline provides a very literal example of autophobia. 
An extended flashback near the film’s conclusion explains how the protagonist Angier (Hugh Jackman) 
managed to improve on his rival’s ‘transported man’ illusion after coming into possession of an actual 
teleporter. The machine operates in the same way as in Parfit’s scenario in that it produces a duplicate 
person rather than simply transporting the ‘original’ individual. We also learn that, in order to keep his 
method a secret, Angier kills the source individual but his life carries on without interruption in the form 
of the transported / duplicated version of himself. The alien life-form in The Thing generates a source of 
fear and horror because it represents annihilation and a loss of one’s individuality that is equivalent to 
‘normal’ death. Parfit’s teleportation scenario carries with it a variation on this kind of threat, and this is 
manifest in examples like The Prestige wherein a character sees a threat to his self-identity by way of a 
reduced sense of individuality and uniqueness. Running alongside this threatening element is the complex 
and horrific sight of an individual who manages, in a sense, to commit murder and suicide through one 
and the same act – and survive.  
In the context of Lost Highway, one can identify elements of all these types of self-aversion, 
albeit with greater ambiguity and a difference in tone a d that is once more comparable to Freeland and 
Carroll’s ‘uncanny horror’ and ‘art-dread’ labels. For the viewer, we must accept that Fred ‘breaks’ from 
himself but there is an emotional disconnect created by the ambiguity over whether this fracturing is 
physical or psychological. As such, ‘self-estrangement’ rather than ‘self-aversion’ would perhaps be a 
more suitable term, particularly since Fred displays no apparent knowledge of who or what Pete is (or in 







fact any awareness of Pete’s existence), and therefore cannot show any direct animosity or fearfulness 
towards him. By contrast, in the opening scene, Fred hears an unidentifed voice on his intercom telling 
him “Dick Laurent is dead”, and although Fred has no frame of reference for this mesag  nor is he able 
to see from his window who is at his door speaking into the int rcom, his expression is one of 
apprehension. By virtue of the narrative’s Moebius strip design we learn by the end of the film that the 
person leaving the message is actually Fred himself. He is visibly agitated by the buzzing of the intercom 
and then noticeably anxious after hearing the (his) voice at the other end but there is insufficient narrative 
evidence to account for his behaviour. Are we to assume that he recognises his own voice, which is 
partially distorted through the crackling speaker? If so thenat would surely influence his subsequent 
actions and behaviour but in the scenes that follow there is no further reference to the message. The 
vagueness of this sequence generates  lack of clarity surrounding Fred’s motivations and conspires to 
create an eerie and slightly menacing tone. I  addition to the paradox created by Fred’s co-existence with 
himself at either end of the intercom, consideration of a condition like autophobia or feeling of self-
estrangement also makes a second viewing of Lost Highway particularly poignant.  
We can also extend an assessment of ‘estrangement’ beyond the confines of the narrative events 
to consider what effect the games Lost Highway plays with character identities has on the viewer / 
filmmaker relationship. Roger Ebert wrote that ‘David Lynch's Lost Highway is like kissing a mirror: 
You like what you see, but it's not much fun, and kind of cold,’80 which in traditional or folk terminology 
suggests that he sees a lack of a character with whom he can ‘identify.’ We generally understand that this 
term is meant to denote our capacity for enjoying a narrative because the narrative contains a character(s) 
with whom the viewer is likely to express a sense of emotional attachment or affinity. Writers like Smith 
and Currie have argued that the notion of ‘identification’ is insufficient for critical analysis due to the 
vagueness of what it describes. Smith proposes a more develop d model, the 'structure of sympathy',81 
which breaks down the concept of ‘identification’ into more specific component parts: recognition, 
alignment, and allegiance.  ‘Recognition’, as we have seen, breaks down into ‘individuation’ and ‘re-
identification,’ which covers the process of being able to discern a discrete individual as separate from 
other characters and surroundings and subsequently identify them as the same person later in the narrative. 
‘Alignment’ denotes the level of viewer knowledge about the actions, thoughts, and emotions of particular 







characters, and the extent to which viewers share information with characters, which is governed by the 
formal decisions made by the filmmaker. Lastly, ‘allegiance’ is the component which most closely 
resembles the traditional notion of ‘identifying’ with a particular character. It describes the way in which 
one morally evaluates particular characters, something that is of course tempered and informed by a 
spectator's extra-diegetic values and beliefs.  
In this context, by equating watching Lost Highway to kissing a mirror Ebert seems to be 
suggesting that the film is lacking an emotional reference point that would give rise to a strong sense of 
allegiance. Such an effect is no doubt aggravated by the way in which the film challenges our ability to 
trace the trajectory of certain characters by going against what Smith terms recognition. We might again 
use the term ‘estrangement’ to describe an absence of ‘allegiance,’ as the implication is that an emotional 
void exists where there might otherwise be an affinity w h or sympathy towards a particular character. 
As I mentioned at the outset of this chapter, Bordwell and Smith see characters as the obvious candidates 
through which viewers engage with narratives. It would follow therefore that creating a discord in the 
portrayal of our ‘fictive counterparts’82 of the sort that Lost Highway demonstrates could evoke a 
corresponding cognitive dissonance in the viewer. For example, in Lost Highway we have individuated 
and been aligned with Fred through the opening sequences in which he is continuously present and during 
which we see his actions as well as having access to hi subjective states in the form of a dream sequence. 
Viewer knowledge closely matches Fred’s as we are predominantly shown things that Fred sees, does 
and thinks. However, the narrative sees him break the laws of physical continuity and we must individuate 
and re-identify a new character, Pete, who may or may not in some way retain the memories and 
characteristics of Fred.  
As we have seen, the lack of narrative clarity about howFred and Pete are connected presents 
viewers with a situation that they must try to reconcile in some way. In addition to the term ‘redundancy,’ 
Bordwell also introduces the term retardation 83 to describe the way in which exposition of narrative 
information can be suppressed or delayed in order to create dramatic tension, arouse interest, and invite 
hypotheses about how a storyline will develop. The paceand manner in which key pieces of information 
are revealed is fundamental to dictating a film’s overall tone, style, and intelligibility. What is particularly 







jarring about Lost Highway is that it appears to be r tarding comprehension since extended sections of 
the film, although by no means closely resembling a classical narrative paradigm, do contain causal links 
and adhere to principles of spatio-temporal continuity. As such, the viewer may assume that any narrative 
inconsistences or paradoxes, like the dual roles played by Patricia Arquette or Fred’s transformation into 
Pete, will be explained at some point later in the film. If a narrative does not fully deliver on such an 
expectation then it may arguably estrange the viewer fromthe experience, although conversely we may 
also be primed with the expectation that Lynch very often s ts up questions and paradoxes that cannot be 
resolved or fully understood. What is perhaps discomfiting s the fact that the narrative upsets our grasp 
of character identities in a seemingly uncued, unpredictable and unmotivated way. However a feeling of 
estrangement, if that is what one indeed experiences, could equally be regarded as an appropriate reaction 
since it reflects Fred’s emotional and psychological disconnect from both his failing marriage and 
arguably from himself.  
Smith uses the term ‘estrangement’ (unconnected to the Brechtian technique of ‘alienation’) to 
describe the process whereby the level of engagement a spectator can have with a particular character is 
limited by an increased level of abstraction. That is to ay, the more allegorical or symbolic a character's 
function appears, the less we as viewers are able to engag  with that character, at least in the conventional 
sense of emotional engagement. It could be argued that by corrupting character identities in the way Lost 
Highway does the spectator becomes estranged from the characters for the reason that they no longer 
resemble a person as we understand them in the non-filmic world but start to resemble something 
metaphoric or symbolic. If logical answers to the question  around shifting identities are quite elusive a 
viewer may be inclined to interpret these events as symbolic and metaphorical rather than literal 
occurrences within the diegesis. 84 Smith puts this argument forward as a potential strategy for film 
viewing when he deals specifically with the phenomenon of actors playing multiple roles85 and notes how 
characters can be used to embody particular themes, emotions, and moral values or represent abstract 
concepts. An accessible, mainstream example of ‘character-as-concept’ can be found in Identity (James 
Mangold, 2003) in which the cast of what appears to be a murder mystery turn out to be multiple 
personalities housed inside the psyche of a murderer. In the context of Lost Highway we might choose to 
borrow this line of interpretation by attempting to understand characters as symbolic of wider or less 







literal meanings. As I mentioned earlier, a common example is one that regards Pete as merely the product 
of his Fred’s fugue state brought on by the latter’s guilt and psychological trauma.  
As many critics have observed, temporal, spatial and narrative logic, in the conventional 
cinematic sense, are not of primary importance for Lynch, which as we have seen has led to some writers 
dismissing the narrative as impossible to penetrate and almost unwatchable.86 The events of Lost Highway 
cannot be easily reconciled in the way that a film likeId ntity can, however, if we adjust our general 
interpretative approach the former’s ambiguities and inconsistencies appear enriching and in one sense 
entirely justified. For instance, after the 'arrival' of Pete, we must rapidly re-evaluate our understanding 
of the narrative and form new hypotheses in light of new i formation, and after accepting this unexpected 
event the task of the spectator then becomes a search for supporting or explanatory information to provide 
a context within which this character transformation can be understood. However, in Dreams of Chaos, 
Visions of Order, James Peterson sees the exercise of appreciating ‘difficult’ films as something to be 
learned and developed through repeated exposure. Peterson’s argument is that a viewer’s capacity to 
reconcile or tolerate certain kinds of narrative paradoxes and inconsistencies is simply an issue of 
familiarity with avant-garde or, at the very least, non-mainstream stylistic features.87 As such, in this 
context, familiarity with other David Lynch films means that a viewer will anticipate and tolerate uncued 
tangents and narrative obscurity, a significant amount of which may revolve around character identity. If 
we are aware that many of his films set up intricate and frequently unsolvable puzzles then we may be 
ready and willing to embrace paradoxes, ambiguities and inconsiste cies, or may perhaps even actively 
anticipate them. Mulholland Drive, Lynch’s 2001 follow-up film explores and builds on similar themes 
and ideas and is something of a companion piece to Lost Highway which can provide a useful counter-
example. There is a difference between how estrangement is manifest in each of these films, which I term 
a 'localised disruption' and a ‘global disruption'. In Lost Highway, after Fred's transformation, the prison 
guards react with fear and disbelief at what has happened, thereby aligning the spectator with the guards 
since we know approximately as much as they do and are equally confused by Pete’s appearance. The 
fact that Fred/Pete is the only character who is subject to any particular distortion of identity is what I 
mean by ‘localised’. In Mulholland Drive, a multitude of character transformations occur simultaneously 
and appear to affect almost every character, therefore the disruption is ‘global’. In contrast with the 







reaction of the prison guards in Lost Highway, there is no character or perspective within the diegess of 
Mulholland Drive unaffected by these transformations and as such characters themselves do not display 
the same level of alarm or confusion. Connected to this is the way in which we can regard the characters 
in Mulholland Drive as belonging to distinct ‘sets’ who can be arranged as inversions of one another more 
readily than Lost Highway allows. Although both make use of narratives governed in part by dream logic, 
it is arguably possible to discern greater coherence in Mulholland Drive at least in terms of interpretation 
if not diegetic causality and continuity. Furthermore, contextualised within Peterson’s arguments one 
would perhaps be less perplexed by unexplained shifts in identity of any sort, be they ‘local’ or ‘global’, 
if one has witnessed a similar trope in earlier examples ev n if the exact details vary slightly. That is to 
say, watching Mulholland Drive immediately after Lost Highway would be a quite different experience 
to watching either directly after The Thing.   
Justifiably Inscrutable 
 
Where Peterson’s theory cannot be applied, however, is in the fact that Lynch is operating (just 
about) within the realm of mainstream cinema, while Peterson’s focus is solely on the avant-garde and 
looks at the work of filmmakers like Stan Brakhage, Maya Deren, and Andy Warhol. Casting recognisable 
actors against type is another of Lynch’s hallmarks and may go some way to explaining some negative 
responses to a film like Lost Highway. Familiar faces in lead roles give the film the superficial appearance 
of a mainstream film, which could raise a certain level of viewer expectation and make the thwarting of 
such an expectation more difficult to tolerate. The fact that Lost Highway could be seen as communicating 
simultaneously on both literal and symbolic levels illustrates the depth and complexity of its narrative. 
While the film may not seem to be an obvious example of r alist fiction, by providing the viewer with no 
easy answers when it comes to the questions about character identities is actually quite appropriate as it 
acknowledges and does justice to the complexity of the question of what constitutes personhood.  In his 
analysis of the personality traits of characters, Gregory Curries writes that:  







Within a narrative, we may expect to do much better [than we can manage in real life]; getting 
ourselves, within a space of hours, into the position of making confident evaluative judgements 
about a person’s deepest motives.88 
Currie makes the point that we make huge leaps of inference about fictional characters of the 
sort we would never consider when drawing conclusions about other people’s intentions and motivations 
in real life. This gives rise to the opportunity of complicating and acting against audience expectation 
about how a character might be expected to behave in order t g nerate, for instance, a twist in a tale or 
unexpected deviations from an established pattern or storyline. Lost Highway certainly exhibits many of 
these elements but adds a layer of complexity by tempering its ambiguous, fantastical moments with 
extended sequences that follow a more conventional structure with reliable continuity between action and 
characters. In the context of Parfit’s arguments about certain phenomena being qualitatively and / or 
quantitatively identical, it is not possible to say unequivocally how Fred and Pete measure up to this type 
of evaluation. Rather than trying to resolve this perhaps the viewing strategy that is most useful i  that 
suggested by Peterson, which Graça P. Corrêa also favours when she writes how in much of Lynch’s 
work personal identity is significant only insofar as it can be shown to be something unstable. Instead of 
advancing a narrative that builds ever clearer and increasingly ‘rounded’ characters, Lynch’s aim is to 
highlight a conflict between misleading surface appearances and ‘infinite reduplication’ of multiple selves 
beneath.89 Corrêa’s point about ‘multiple selves’ may on one reading refer to psychological trauma such 
as a fugue state but it may equally point towards a more introspective, philosophical view of selfhood 
such as W. Somerset Maugham’s when he wrote:  
There are times when I look over the various parts of my character with perplexity. I recognize 
that I am made up of several persons and that the person that at e moment has the upper hand 
will inevitably give place to another. But which is the real one? All of them or none? 90 
In this sense, character portrayal in Lost Highway goes against the narrative tendency of 
constructing characters about whom one can ‘make confident evaluative judgements’, which arguably 
makes them comparable to real people, albeit in this very strict sense. Nevertheless, the point still stands 
that the portrayal of characters whose identities appear unstable and inscrutable generates a complexity 







which is at times in line with real selves, and not simply ones which are traumatised in one way or another. 
Speaking generally, we can say that, Lost Highway explores issues and themes also evident in The Thing 
by raising questions over who is who within the narrative and foregrounding the physical aspects of 
personal identity so that character identities are render d vague and appear malleable. The method of 
Lynch’s film and the overall narrative principles governing the storyline, however, are vastly different 
from those in The Thing. As we saw in Chapter One, The Thing uses grotesque imagery at the heart of 
some of its most important sequences and these scenes frequently involve a violent, visceral intertwining 
of mutated physical features and unidentifiable masses of organic matter. Ambiguity and a mixing of 
tropes and features is also a defining feature of uncanniness, even though it is manifest in ways that are 
distinctly different to grotesqueness. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the fantastical and unambiguously 
other-worldly nature of the threat in The Thing could be seen as more comforting than the events in Lost 
Highway. Although the creature in The Thing is horrific to behold and dangerous in its behaviour, the 
film sets out its diegetic logic early on and clearly establishes the invasiveness of the creature and the fact 
that it represents a disruption of the film’s ‘natural order.’ Carpenter’s creature generates ambiguity over 
character identities but the film is unambiguous about how tis situation comes about; the cause is clearly 
established as something monstrous and unnatural. As such, one can enjoy the thrill of being ‘art-
horrified’ because of the fact that it establishes an us-and-it situation thereby conforming to a standard 
protagonist/antagonist dynamic common to most mainstream narratives. Lost Highway, on the other hand, 
is riddled with ambiguities that go beyond the mere question of whether or not a given chara ter is the 
person they appear to be. For instance, by providing no definitive account of whether Fred’s 
transformation into Pete literally took place the viewer is forced to question a multitude of other factors 
that appear to be caught up in the wake of this significant narrative detail. By never clearly establishing 
the nature of such a crucial element of the film’s diegetic logic, the film positions itself firmly within 
Freeland’s ‘uncanny horror’ category.  
The discords in the narrative as regards character portrayal generate a cognitive dissonance both 
within the storyline (the prison guards for instance share the viewer’s surprise) but also in the viewer’s 
perception and affective response (a conventional narrative explanation never arrives). On Peterson’s 
reading Lost Highway does not present a puzzle that has an answer but rather it pr sents an alternative 







way of understanding fictional characters and, by extension, the physics and metaphysics of personal 
identity. Parfit’s billiard ball illustration, which I looked at in Chapter One, cannot help us adequately 
reconcile the Pete/Fred relationship since the film does not abide by the one body: one person norm. The 
diegetic world of Lost Highway operates by a different set of rules, and while the concept of mutable 
identities may seem supernatural and magical, on another reading it o ly reflects the psychological 
transformations we undergo in real life during the course of an rdinary day or a single lifetime. Of course, 
Lost Highway goes far beyond a mere dramatization of shifts in understanding and daily changes to our 
mental states or moods; the film displays fractured selve  in a number of guises and the narrative can be 
interpreted in different and perhaps contradictory ways.  If we subscribe to the psychogenic fugue 
interpretation then the film is a portrayal of a significant mental breakdown that is very different from the 
everyday mental behaviour of a human being. The film’s approach to character portrayal effectively 
erodes a binary way of regarding personal identity and perhaps highlights that a self is more fragmentary 
and composite in nature than is immediately apparent. Portraying fictional character identities as arbitrary 
and unstable can generate feelings of disorientation and perhaps frustration due to the negative effect it 
has on narrative clarity and viewer comprehension. Critical responses like Ebert’s might simply stem 
from frustration at not being able to follow a story in the conventional sense, but there might equally be 
more to it than that. A negative reaction may also suggest that the literal portrayal of something that is 
more subtle yet potentially more accurate, such as an arbitrariness or lack of stability inherent to our own 
sense of self, is what truly unsettles the viewer.  
In the broader context of this debate, ambiguity over subjective states and the blurring of 
distinctions between the physical and the psychological provides an opportunity to consider the 
complexity of self-identity. Despite the multitude of reviews and commentaries  proclaiming what appear 
to be definitive interpretations, it seems only fairto conclude that there is no single conclusion to be found 
for Lost Highway. The film doubles up its ambiguity by not only making thedistinctions between 
characters less clear but also keeps the precise nature of he identity shifts themselves deliberately vague. 
We cannot conclude with certainty whether or not Pete is an actual person within the diegesis because we 
cannot say for sure if the changes we witness are physical or psychological. If it is undoubtedly the latter 
then we can identify Pete as an alter-ego and the mutations a product of Fred’s damaged mind. In other 







words, his selfhood is fractured on the psychological level only. If it is the former then we must 
acknowledge Fred as possessing some type of shapeshifting ability with very little information to 
reconcile such an ability within the ‘natural order’ of the diegesis. The way in which the fi lm delves into 
the psychology of its characters and blurs the line between mental and physical phenomena provides the 
ideal opportunity for my discussion to move on and consider in more detail the subjective and 
psychological elements of personal identity. In the next section I will look at how memory is variously 























II Mind Games 
As I outlined in the main introduction, this project has been structured according to the body-mind 
dichotomy that tends to emerge within discussions of selfhood and personal identity. While the discussion 
itself is clearly much more complex than such a simplified distinction allows, it is convenient for the 
purposes of arranging the first two sections of my project. In the opening chapters I looked at examples 
of film narratives which draw attention to physicality and character identity through devices and 
storylines involving mutation, physical trauma, and transformation. From the more straightforward 
handling of bodily transformation as portrayed in The Thing and other examples from the science-fiction 
and body horror canon, I moved on to consider a more ambiguous offering in the form of Lost Highway. 
Carpenter’s film served the function of showing how fantastical storylines can mobilise debate along the 
same lines as philosophical thought experiments, while Lost Highway walks a more indeterminate line 
both regarding its genre categorisation as well as its narrative closure. Lynch’s film hints at physical and 
mental fracturing but does not definitively settle on either, making it the ideal point from which to shift 
the discussion to examples which are more exclusively engag d with the psychological elements of 
character identity. 
Attempts at portraying subjective states and experiences through moving images have been 
closely intertwined with cinema since the medium’s inception, and memory in particular holds a rich 
fascination for viewers and filmmakers alike. The latter can be seen as striving to find new and innovative 
ways of telling stories about memory and portraying how memory functions, and the fact that there is 
much that we do not know about how the brain stores and retrieves memories almost serves as the perfect 
invitation for storytellers to speculate and imagine. The ways in which memory function has been 
portrayed in film is vast and varied, at times drawing heavily on and trying to remain faithful to 
established scientific facts and at other times wildly fantasist and unashamedly far-fetched. The 
psychologist Charles Fernyhough picks up on this fact in order to highlight the habitual (and mistaken) 







tendency of regarding memories as being stored and retrieved ntact like an archive of the mind. He 
writes:  
Metaphors of memory are overwhelmingly physical: we talk of filing cabinets, labyrinths and 
photographic plates, and we use verbs such as impress, burn and imprint to describe the 
processes by which memories are formed. This view of memori s as physical things is 
guaranteed to mislead. The truth is that autobiographical memori s are not possessions that you 
either have or do not have. They are mental constructions, created in the present moment, 
according to the demands of the present.91  
Whether scientifically accurate or not, there is undoubtedly an appetite amongst certain 
filmmakers to build storylines around concepts of the psyche as an environment which one can physically 
enter and explore; two notable examples being Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (Michel Gondry, 
2004) and Inside Out (Peter Docter and Ronnie del Carmen, 2015), as shown in Fig. 16. 
 
 
Fig. 16. The psyche conceived as a physical space in which memories are stored in an archive (Inside 
Out) or portrayed as a domain in which experiences can be re-lived like live action (Eternal Sunshine).  







My main focus in this section will be on Memento (Christopher Nolan, 2000) and Last Year in 
Marienbad (Alain Resnais, 1961), two films which in very different ways serve to highlight the complex 
interplay between one’s memory and one’s sense of self. With regard to the cinematic portrayal of 
memory function, my concern is not so much to evaluate the scientific accuracy of Memento and 
Marienbad but rather to investigate the extent to which they reflect what might be called an ‘everyday’ 
understanding of how memory operates despite exhibiting significant differences in style, tone, and 
narrative structure. Both narratives work ‘demonstratively’ to illustrate certain theories about how 
memory storage and recall function in the human mind, and in various ways could be seen as both 
adhering to and deviating from what one might call a scientifically accurate portrayal. By demonstratively 
I mean that their challenging avant-garde styles and structures combine with their respective storylines 
to go beyond the act of merely telling tales about memory and instead create immersive viewing 
experiences that challenge viewer comprehension and foreground the viewer-filmmaker relationship. 
Each film exerts a form of cognitive pressure on the viewer and their respective deviations from 
established narrative norms and paradigms help reveal the habitual expectations and tendencies we have 
when consuming film narratives.  
A significant proportion of the mental activities we employ when functioning in the world is 
bound to our ability to recall earlier events and anticipate future outcomes. Similarly, the way in which 
we engage with narrative structures such as these can reveal much about how reliant we are on memory 
for building up a picture of fictional characters and the world(s) they inhabit. Furthermore, the debate 
surrounding autobiographical memory and ‘self-narrativising’ is evoked by each of these narratives, and 
in this way the films provide a useful entry point for considering theories about how our sense of personal 
identity and personal history may or may not resemble a form of (linear) storytelling. In the wider context 
of the philosophy of the self and identity, the natural strting point in any discussion involving memory 
is John Locke since he was a key critic of the prevailing theory that a human being’s true personal identity 
resides in an immaterial soul; a main proponent of this theory being Reń Descartes.92 In An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, Locke argued against the existence of a soul claiming that it is a 
person’s consciousness, and particularly their memory, which should be considered the essence of one’s 
personal identity.93 In my introduction I cited Locke’s assertion that personal identity could be described 







in the following way: ‘as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or 
Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person94’; and by which token it followed that if we cannot 
access or retrieve a particular memory or experience then it c ases to be part of that individual’s identity 
anymore. This point was disputed and argued against by philosophers such as Joseph Butler and Thomas 
Reid, because of significant issues it raises such as accountability for one’s actions, and the way in which 
it seems to imply that when we can no longer remember our childhood we cease to be continuous with 
our younger self. I introduce these arguments here for the reason that, over the next two chapters, I will 
be looking at films which, in a variety of ways, represent a fusion of cinematic expressiveness and this 
particular branch of philosophical debate. I will be considering the cinematic portrayal of memory 
retrieval in the dual context of philosophical theories of elf-identity and the ways in which we form an 
understanding of characters in fiction films. Memento and Marienbad are examples of fictional narratives 
which manage to mobilise thes  sorts of philosophical discussions while also raising salient questions 
about the nature of film viewing and audience expectations of character development. I will also introduce 
findings from cognitive psychology to offer an additional angle from which we can approach each film, 
particularly in terms of how their diegetic content combines with their notably unconventional style . 








 Hold That Thought: Memento, memory and Self-identity 
 
Fred: I like to remember things my own way.  
Detective Ed: What do you mean by that?  
Fred: How I remembered them. Not necessarily the way theyhappened. 
Lost Highway provided us with pertinent examples of how a narrative can blend subjective and objective 
perspectives in order to create ambiguity over whether or not particular characters have gone through a 
literal, physical transformation or not. The lines above, taken from an exchange between Fred and the 
detectives who visit his home, can help open my analysis of how certain psychological aspects of selfhood 
are portrayed in film, with a particular emphasis on memory. What is the significance of memory in 
relation to our own sense of self and how does this compare to the ways in which we build an 
understanding of fictional characters and narratives? The dialogue above exemplifies the common-sense 
or ‘folk’ notion that memories are entirely subjective and are ther for  very prone to inaccuracy as well 
as revision through the natural passage of time. In this chapter, through a close analysis of Memento 
(Christopher Nolan, 2000), I will expand upon this notion and assess how the relative dependency and 
reliability of memory compares to the ways in which we process and build an understanding of fictional 
characters and fiction film narratives. Beyond this, I will look at the relationship between memory and 
personal identity – a fundamental theme in Memento – and consider the extent to which its narrative 
content and style illustrate some of the ways in which memory storage and recall operate. I will examine 
the way in which the narrative structure and the protagonist’s memory impairment are closely intertwined 







and, more broadly, the philosophical implications and moral dilemmas which are highlighted by the film’s 
premise. 
Memento tells the story of Leonard Shelby, a one-time insurance i vestigator turned would-be 
private eye on the hunt for a man who he believes raped and murdered his wife, along with an accomplice, 
during a break-in at their home. The film implies that oneman was brought to justice for the crime but it 
is Leonard’s belief that a second man was involved but ultimately evaded capture. Complicating the 
situation is the fact that as a result of being assaulted during the break-in, Leonard now suffers from 
anterograde amnesia, a neurological condition which means th t he cannot consolidate any short-term 
memories formed after the incident; or, as Leonard explains it, “I can’t make new memories. Everything 
fades.”95 Stylistically Memento draws on the film noir and detective genres but certain avant-garde tropes 
and features help distinguish it, as David Bordwell puts it, as at once ‘one of the most novel and most 
conformist films of recent years.’96 Even though this assessment may seem paradoxical, a close analysis 
of the film’s formal elements reveals the aptness of such a description.  
“It’s all backwards!”97 
 
The single most striking feature of Memento’s narrative structure is the fact that its chronology 
is for the most part played out in reverse, or at least appears to upon a first viewing. The opening scene 
of the film represents the chronological end of the story, and the final scene shows the action directly 
following the film’s opening sequence. With one notable exception, the action itself plays forwards but 
the events are divided into sections roughly ten-minutes in length, shot in colour and arranged with slight 
overlaps meaning that each sequence begins with repeated action we have just seen at the conclusion of 
the preceding one. Intercut with these sections are two black-and-white sequences, which are 
distinguished from one another through respective variations in contrast and lighting schemes. One takes 
place almost entirely in a motel room, apparently in the diegetic present, while the other is an extended 
flashback to Leonard’s life before the incident when he worked as an investigator for an insurance firm. 
The former frames the latter as Leonard recounts his pre-injury experiences over the phone in his motel 
room to an unidentified caller while a selection of the ev nts he describes are shown in an embedded 







flashback. For example, the third segment chronologically show  Leonard at the motel front desk when 
Teddy, another of the film’s principal characters, arrives and takes Leonard to an abandoned building. 
The fourth segment is in black and white and shows Leonard i  a motel room and we can hear his thoughts 
in voiceover. The fifth segment begins with Leonard in his motel room and concludes with the earlier 
shot of Teddy arriving at the motel front desk. The film has been designed using a ‘hairpin’ structure, 
which we can only appreciate when at the end of the film when the black-and-white sequences fade to 
colour and reveal the turning point at which these previously di tinct sequences intersect.98 
The significance of the black-and-white flashback scenes is reinforced by the words ‘Remember 
Sammy Jankis’ which Leonard has tattooed on his left hand. We learn that Sammy was an insurance 
claimant whose case was referred to (pre-incident) Leonard for investigation to determine its validity. 
Bizarrely, Sammy suffered from the same memory disorder, in his case following a car accident, which 
Leonard would later develop. Leonard’s investigation, based on medical assessments, leads him to 
conclude that Sammy should be capable of making new memories and recovering from his trauma. By 
concluding that Sammy’s condition is psychological rather than physical, his insurance claim is turned 
down. Sammy is barely able to function due to his condition and he and his wife become burdened by 
mounting medical costs; however Sammy can still carry out certain tasks provided he learned them before 
his accident. One such task is administering insulin shots to his wife – a duty which ultimately leads to 
tragedy. Sammy’s wife, convinced by Leonard’s assessment that Sammy should be able to generate new 
memories through repetition and routine, ‘tests’ her husband by asking him to give her repeated shots of 
insulin in quick succession to see if his memory is genuinely resetting every couple of minutes. Sammy 
does not register that he has already provided multiple shots and his wife dies of an overdose as a result. 
The tale concludes with Sammy apparently seeing out his days in an institution, unaware that he has killed 
his wife. 
The notable exception to the forward-motion reverse-chronology structure is the film’s opening 
scene, which depicts Teddy being shot in the face by Leonard who subsequently takes a Polaroid photo 
of his corpse. What is exceptional is that here the action itself is shown in reverse, so we begin with the 
sight of a Polaroid ‘un-exposing’, followed by Leonard ‘un-taking’ the photograph, the bullet exiting and 







‘repairing’ Teddy’s skull, going backwards into Leonard’s pistol, and so on. Presenting the opening 
sequence in this way enables salient thematic features to be communicated in a concentrated burst whilst 
also foregrounding the narrative’s avant-garde credentials. The backwards action highlights Time as a 
central and highly-salient narrative feature, while the fading Polaroid stands as a visual metaphor for 
Leonard’s memory impairment. In addition, Teddy’s violent death serves the more conventional purpose 
of setting up what Noël Carroll refers to as the narrative’s ‘macro-questions’99, which in this case are: 
“Who was killed, and why?”  
By the film’s conclusion we are provided with answers to these questions, albeit with a 
significant number of loose ends, inconsistencies and ambiguous details remaining.  During the course of 
the narrative we see Leonard carrying out his investigative work in all its clumsy, perilous, and ultimately 
flawed glory. One clue he follows is that the assailant s called John or James G, and Teddy, ostensibly 
the film’s antagonist, appears to be helping Leonard although his capacity, motivations, and role in the 
investigation are unclear. The concluding sequence presents us with a twist in which it is suggested that 
Leonard has already carried out his revenge but is unable to accept, or perhaps simply cannot recall, the 
fact that he already killed his assailant some time ago. By his own admission he is only living for reveng 
but since he will never be able to remember if he has achieved his goal then this impetus will never wane. 
We see him burn a Polaroid which Teddy claims shows Leonard, smiling and victorious, moments after 
he and Teddy had supposedly tracked down and killed John G. He also burns a Polaroid of Jimmy, a local 
drug dealer who Leonard has just killed and then photographed. Teddy apparently convinced Leonard 
that Jimmy was the man he was looking for, however the subsequent suggestion is that Teddy simply had 
a vendetta against Jimmy and used Leonard to execute him. After destroying this evidence without 
Teddy’s knowledge, Leonard then leaves himself false clues intended to lead him to the conclusion that 
Teddy is John G, safe in the knowledge that he will soon forget having done so and most likely kill Teddy 
as a result; which, as we have already seen in the film’s opening sequence, is precisely what Leonard will 
end up doing. This is a hugely significant detail as it suggests a greate  level of volition on Leonard’s part 
regarding what he does or does not remember, but it also creates ambiguity over his motivations and 
moral convictions which will affect the level of sympathy a viewer may feel towards his situation.  







My aim here is to highlight the ways in which Memento can reveal salient points about how we 
build up an understanding of fictional characters, particularly since the film explores social and moral 
themes in the context of personal identity. Moreover, the focal point of the narrative is an individual with 
a damaged psychology, which represents another variation on the kind of fractured selves I have 
examined in the preceding chapters. In a similar fashion, therefore, I will consider the way in which the 
film develops its protagonist’s condition and circumstances in order to broaden the consideration once 
more to the relationship between fictional and real-world selves. A close look at how the narrative content 
combines with the film’s structure is an essential starting point; the film’s reverse chronology has been 
well documented and discussed at length by a number of theorists, w th the most common observation 
being that denying the viewer access to events in the immediate past places us in a position comparable 
to Leonard’s. We learn that his memory ‘refreshes’ or ‘resets’ every five to ten minutes and, according 
to Leonard, “it’s like you just woke up!”100 By dividing the reverse chronology into segments which are 
roughly the same length of time as Leonard’s short-term memory capacity, the film aligns us closely with 
Leonard’s situation, to use Murray Smith’s terminology. Smith’s term denotes ‘the process by which 
spectators are placed in relation to characters in terms of access to their actions, and to what they know 
and feel,’ which he breaks down into ‘two interlocking functions, spatio-temporal attachment and 
subjective access.’101According to this model we are very closely a igned with Leonard since he is present 
in every scene and because we also have access to his th ughts (voiceover) and recollections (flashbacks). 
Crucially, however, unlike the viewer striving to process the narrative elements, Leonard ‘will never be 
able to reconstruct the big picture [whereas] we will be a le, by the end of the film, to assemble a coherent 
story out of the pieces.’102 In effect, although we are placed in an epistemically similar position to 
Leonard, the gap between Leonard’s knowledge and our own widens as the film proceeds. What, then, 
are the effects of combining this style of narration with a storyline which is heavily engaged with how 
memory enables us to function properly in the world and helps us to construct and recognise who we and 
other people are?  
Bordwell’s assessment is that on one level we are dealing with a straightforward noir-esque plot 
while on another we have a self-referential text which foregrounds viewer expectation and draws attention 
to the ways in which film narratives are constructed.103 Similarly, Carroll argues that Memento’s 







backwards narration creates a heightened awareness of the tec niques we normally employ for 
comprehending film narratives. By making the process of film viewing ‘difficult’ the viewer is made 
more conscious of the thought processes and techniques normally e ployed when engaged in such 
activities;104 an effect perhaps comparable to asking someone to use their non-dominant hand to complete 
a simple everyday task.  
The theorist William Little is of a different opinion to Bordwell as regards the film’s accessibility 
when he writes how an initial viewing of Memento might evoke a ‘profound disruption of expectation’ 
as it goes against ‘Hollywood cinema’s commitment to linear narrative.’105 While not essentially incorrect 
in his assessment, Little’s description is somewhat ironic given that Memento is actually, by the director’s 
own admission, ‘“very, very linear,”’ so much so that ‘“[y]ou can’t remove a single scene, or the whole 
thing comes to a grinding halt. Each scene follows very tightly af er the next, more closely than they 
would in a conventional movie.”’106 It is really only the reverse chronology which is like y to cause 
comprehension difficulties since, despite being familiar with reordered time in the form of flashbacks and 
the multitude of other ways film editing can manipulate time and space, viewers are accustomed to 
diegetic time moving forwards. It would seem that Little is using the term “linear” to denote an 
unproblematic sequence of events that, temporal digressions aside, moves forwards in time, while Nolan 
on the other hand is referring to the sum total of events when arranged in chronological order; in other 
words, plot vs. story.  
However, the adjustment we are required to make is not a simple switch to backwards thinking 
instead of forwards since, like many noir / detective tal s, the narrative is tightly bound to the 
protagonist’s experiences with viewer knowledge similarly restricted. In addition, even though each 
colour sequence takes us further back in diegetic time, it is only the opening sequence in which the flow 
of time is wholly reversed. Viewer comprehension is adversely affected by the fact that Leonard, the 
film’s ‘filtering consciousness,’107 cannot retain his short-term memory which, as we shall see, has 
significant implications for the intelligibility of the storyline and the reliability of what we see and hear. 
The combination of the reverse structure with Leonard’s predicament immerses the viewer more deeply 
in the narrative events and compounds their overall impact.  The use of an unreliable narrator is a well-







established storytelling technique and its potency in film narratives is complemented by a corresponding 
body of film theory which looks at this particular device.108  Running counter to having a narrative with 
an unreliable narrator/protagonist is the fact that the filmmakers go to great lengths to ensure that general 
clarity does not suffer, as this is often a vital comp nent for maximising the effect of any twists that the
filmmaker has put in place. Bordwell’s concept of ‘redundancy,’ which I outlined in relation to Lost 
Highway, refers to the way in which narrative details such as specific objects, motifs, musical signatures, 
symbols and so on are shown repeatedly in order to increase cl rity and reduce ambiguity.109 Bordwell 
argues that ‘the more complex the devices, the more redundant the storytelling needs to be. Unusual 
techniques need to be situated in an especially stable frame.’110 Regarding Memento he points out how 
key details are repeated and reinforced beyond the point one w uld normally think necessary, such as 
having ‘virtually every piece of writing we see…read aloud to us by Leonard, and an extensive inner 
monologue [providing] a flow of commentary reiterating the key motifs.’111 Indeed, Nolan himself points 
out how the narrative was meticulously organised so that the overlaps of repeated action would minimise 
any disorienting effects and prevent them from overwhelming the storyline. With this in mind we can 
appreciate the accuracy of Bordwell’s assertion that the film is both ‘novel’ and ‘conformist,’ which he 
reaffirms by concluding that ‘[s]eldom has an American film been so daring and so obvious at the same 
time’.112  
The narrative is highly concentrated in terms of locations a d characters with viewer knowledge 
restricted to Leonard’s perspective. The opening scene sets up a question over why the shooting took 
place rather the standard trope of an investigator trying to discover who was responsible. We slowly learn 
about how Leonard came to have his memory impairment and the way in which it led him to his quest 
for vengeance. Covered with attoos of ‘facts’ and useful reminders, and armed with pockets full of 
Polaroids depicting his car, where he is staying, people he has met, and other essential data, we are shown 
how Leonard is able to navigate his way through daily life. Each image he keeps and refers to has 
explanatory notes in his handwriting either beneath or on the reverse which supposedly verifies their 
authenticity. On one occasion Leonard disagrees with Teddy about which car is his until Leonard 
produces a photograph with the caption ‘My car’ written underneath. He collates other important details 
in a notebook and even seems to have been provided with the police file relating to his wife’s murder, 







which he perpetually analyses in the hope of finding a crucial det il that may have been overlooked during 
the original investigation. According to Leonard, the police did not believe there was a second attacker 
and so broke off the investigation once the sole person they deemed responsible was apprehended.  
As we see Leonard’s detective work in action, it becomes apparent that he is being manipul ted 
by at least two other characters, Teddy and Natalie, with the suggestion that the former has been exploiting 
Leonard’s condition for his own ends for some time. We gradually learn how, despite his assertions to 
the contrary, Leonard’s ‘system’ for compensating for his memory impairment is flawed and prone to 
abuse. This becomes all too apparent in the film’s closing scene when we learn that Leonard has in fact 
set himself up to kill Teddy by leaving a note that was deliberately misleading, a note which he knew he 
would feel compelled to act upon as soon as his memory of writing it had faded. Before reaching this 
point we are led to believe that Leonard is on a crusade of v ngeance, a fact that may evoke a degree of 
sympathy given the supposed events that led to his condition and the wretched situation he now finds 
himself in. The narrative’s destabilising element, however, is Leonard’s unreliable memory, with the 
deceptive, duplicitous behaviour of the supporting characters acting as a further complicating factor. The 
latter could be seen as fairly typical within this type of st ryline and, on its own, could be reconciled 
through being consistent with genre expectations. For instance, even though we know that Teddy will be 
killed by Leonard, finding out the reasons why positions the narrative on territory similar to a film like 
Sunset Blvd. (Billy Wilder, 1950) where almost the entire narrative is conveyed in flashback.  
Dramatic tension is generated through anticipation of how the storyline reaches its point of 
climax, and whether that point is reached by looking backwards or moving forwards arguably makes less 
difference than one might think. The narrative is driven by questions raised in the opening scene / 
culmination of the story, namely “How did Leonard get there?” which is a question that perfectly mirrors 
the way Leonard feels every time his memory ‘resets.’ Bordwell writes that Hollywood narrative norms 
‘posit a hierarchy of importance, with narrative gist at the top and local stylistic manipulations 
subordinated to that.’113 In other words, in the classical Hollywood tradition, it is the story and not its 
telling that is given greater importance. The emphasis is on constructing a coherent storyline which allows 
viewers to extract meaning and maximise comprehension, while also concealing formal features that may 







draw attention to the filmmaker’s decisions and interventions and therefore distract from the story. 
Memento, however, straddles generic and stylistic boundaries and attempts to tell a story which is aimed 
at the mass market but which also promotes its ‘local stylistic manipulations’ beyond the level normally 
associated with mainstream films. Style and narrative content are intertwined and inform one another to 
a significant degree, so we need to examine the way the story is conveyed as much as the story itself in 
order to appreciate the way in which it challenges our ability to draw a clear understanding of the 
characters who inhabit the narrative. The film is able to highlight the relationship between memory and 
self-identity through its themes and diegetic events, but it is also able to foreground our habitual viewing 
strategies and reveal our reliance on remembering depicted events in order to follow a storyline. In Section 
I, we saw how altering the physicality of characters can be used to unsettle a viewer’s capacity for 
distinguishing one character from another. Memento poses a similar challenge and raises equally 
discomfiting ideas about personal identity to those in Section I, but the emphasis is placed more squarely 
on psychological fracturing and disunity. 
A proportion of screen time is necessarily devoted to establishing the details of Leonard’s 
condition, which in essence operates as the basis of the film’s diegetic logic and governing principle. The 
filmmakers map out their own interpretation and hypothesis about how memory storage and recall 
function and translate this into pro-filmic ideas and portrayals, opting also to remain as scientifically 
accurate as their position as creators of a work of mass art/entertainment will allow. The coherence of the 
film and the plausibility of its storyline ultimately hinges on establishing and remaining faithful to a set 
of ideas and principles which are laid out in the film itself. Last Year in Marienbad (Alain Resnais, 1961), 
which I will look at in the next chapter, is a contrasting example in which the narrative’s governing 
principle is far less clearly established or codified. While Memento strives to carefully define the nature 
of Leonard’s condition, Marienbad perpetually deflects our efforts to glean meaning since there are 
insufficient reference points or footholds with which we can contextualise individual scenes and 
sequences. A major reason for this is the lack of any definitive boundary between subjective and objective 
viewpoints, which results in a blurring of past and present events as well as competing versions of 
recollected experiences. For all its ambiguity, Memento by contrast for the most part distinguishes 







flashbacks from present events while also clearly framing those narrative elements that are a product of 
Leonard’s subjectivity.  
Nonetheless, by Memento’s conclusion a host of narrative uncertainties and contentious, 
ambiguous details remain. In the lead up to the scene when Leoard writes the fateful note to his future 
self, an exchange of dialogue between Leonard and Teddy casts significant doubt over much of what we 
may have hitherto come to accept as diegetic fact, a great deal of which relates to the extended flashback 
concerning Sammy Jankis. Teddy claims that Leonard’s wife actually survived the attack during the 
break-in and that she did not believe Leonard about his condition. He also claims that Sammy didn’t have 
a wife and that it was actually Leonard’s wife who was diabetic, with the implication being that Leonard 
actually killed his wife by giving her an overdose of insulin. Leonard defiantly responds by saying “That 
was Sammy, not me. My wife wasn’t diabetic,” before Teddy taunts him by asking: “Are you sure?” He 
stops short of claiming that Sammy never really existed but the possibility is certainly suggested through 
the combined weight of other contradictions and inconsistencies in the narrative. During this exchange 
we cut to a revised version of an earlier scene which showed Sammy preparing his wife’s insulin injection, 
only this time with Leonard and his wife in their place (Fig. 17). This is followed by a flashback which 
almost exactly matches one we saw earli r in which Leonard pinches his wife’s thigh; this time round, 
however, he is injecting her with an insulin shot (Fig. 18). Further doubt is cast as Leonard asserts once 
again that his wife wasn’t diabetic, which prompts the original shot once more: a revision of Teddy’s 
revision. Amendments to details such as these are of particul r significance because they involve pre-
incident memories, and up until this point in the story the established truth of Leonard’s impairment is 
that his memories from before he was assaulted are all intact. Furthermore, the reactions of the characters 
and the competing versions of events do not indicate any indisputable conviction or definitive account; 
doubt and ambiguity permeate a significant portion of the narrative and this remains the case until the 
end. Significantly, though, Leonard’s internal monologue as he prepares the misleading clues for himself 
at the conclusion of the scene is noticeably unequivocal: 







Can I just let myself forget what you've told me? Can I just let myself forget what you've made 
me do? You think I just want another puzzle to solve? Another John G. to look for? You're John 
G. So you can be my John G... Will I lie to myself to be happy? In your case Teddy...yes I will.114 
The revelation that Leonard has set himself up complicates his moral positioning within the 
narrative and diminishes viewer sympathy by laying bare his callous motive. Whatever else is tinged with 
ambiguity, this moment acts as a reliable reference point for evaluating Leonard’s actions at that point in 
the narrative.  
 
Fig.17. Two very brief shots seem to show Leonard preparing a  insulin injection for his wife.  
 








Fig.18. The alternate ‘versions’ of Leonard’s recollection. Original, revised, then back to the original.  
As part of his analysis, Bordwell looks at a number of other puzzle / experimentation films which 
are notable for their surprise endings and the fact that they engage heavily with character subjectivity and 
the passage of time. He points to a number of examples, re ased around the same period, which present 
us with a twist, or a partial twist, forcing us to reassess much of the earlier narrative.  The Usual Suspects 
(Bryan Singer, 1995), Fight Club (David Fincher, 1999), The Sixth Sense (M. Night Shyamalan, 1999) 
The Others (Alejandro Amenábar, 2001) and The Game (David Fincher, 1997) are given as examples of 
films where the viewer is required ‘to think back over what has been shown, or to rewatch the film in the 
search for clues to the key revelations.’115 Common to these sorts of narrative is the fact that any 
‘revelation is as much of a surprise to the protagonist as it is to us,’116 which is a staple feature of the 
detective genre. He also notes how certain of these films may replay earlier scenes to put a different spin 
on them or alter the context in which we now view them; or even, as with Fight Club, repeat earlier scenes 
but now with noticeable alterations or omissions (see Fig. 19).   
 







     
Fig. 19. In Fight Club, certain scenes near the film’s conclusion are replayed with Brad Pitt’s character 
now absent.  
When the images above are presented together one can easily observe the discontinuity between 
them. However, it matters little since the amount of intervening screen time between each scene will most 
likely mean that a viewer will not notice the fine detail such as the positioning of Edward Norton’s head 
in the frame. Furthermore, the viewer’s attention will be focused on the more significant dramatic 
revelations that a sequence such as this brings into play. Indeed, Bordwell himself picks up on this type 
of discontinuity when he examines replayed scenes from Mildred Pierce, and he explores how a key 
element of the viewer-filmmaker interplay is an inability to notice (or perhaps a willing acceptance of) 
apparent inconsistencies.117 Part of the enjoyment of watching these films comes from one’s own 
consideration of how feasible such a twist could be and how successful (or otherwise) the filmmakers 
have been in executing it. Memento, however, presents us with more than a twist which simply inverts or 
overturns our understanding of preceding events. Rather, it casts doubt on some of the film’s central 
reference points without providing an irrefutably unambiguous set of alternative diegetic truths. Narrative 
closure is ultimately elusive, particularly after the slew of ‘revisions’ with which Teddy confronts 
Leonard are raised and then left hanging. Teddy even casts doubt on himself by telling Leonard that 
‘Teddy’ is a name that only his mother uses and that he is actually called John Gammell - another John 
G. It’s not clear whether this is a coincidence or whether there ever was an original John G in the police 
file.  
Memento can be further distinguished from Bordwell’s other examples, such as Mildred Pierce, 
in which it is the fallibility of our own ability to recall certain details which is exploited. Memento goes 
further than this by not simply exploiting the viewer’s fallible memory but also foregrounding the fragility 







of memory in general through its flawed and vulnerable protagonist’s amnesia. Consider the sleight-of-
hand trick involving Sammy being ‘replaced’ by Leonard in the asylum flashback (Fig. 20), another 
moment which helps to muddy the narrative water. According to Leonard’s testimony as he tells it over 
the motel phone, Sammy saw out his days in a psychiatric nstitution after accidentally killing his wife. 
The scene we cut to apparently depicts Sammy in said insttution, where he spent the remainder of his 
life unsure of where he was and ignorant of his wife’s death. As the camera slowly tracks towards Sammy 
a figure passes very closely in front of the frame, disguising an edit, and for a brief moment we glimpse 
Leonard in Sammy’s place.  
 
Fig. 20. Using a concealed cut, Sammy in the institution is momentarily replaced by Leonard before we 
cut back to the main thread. 
This brief moment stands as an example of how the limits of our perception, or at times 
inattentiveness, can be exploited by filmmakers with relative ease. If the substitution of Leonard for 
Sammy does pass us by and we are told about it after the event then that is perhaps all the more fascinating 
since it is housed in a narrative which foregrounds the importance of vigilance and attention to detail. 
 
 









As we have seen, Nolan’s film challenges stylistic and narrative norms in a number of ways 
while also remaining indebted to established genres and mainstream storytelling conventions. At this 
point I will consider how the act of consuming or processing the film helps to foreground certain viewing 
practices and audience expectations, a proportion of which will necessarily relate to how characters are 
established and developed. The role of memory is directly highlighted in Memento by way of Leonard’s 
amnesia but also indirectly through the cognitive challenges pr ented by its narrative structure. As a 
result, some of the issues it raises about the role of memory in self-identity operate beyond the diegetic 
level; Leonard’s attempts to gain an understanding of past events mirror our own efforts at piecing 
together the storyline, while the portrayal of his condition encourages deep reflection on memory and 
self-identity. 
As is often the case, anomalous, atypical and extreme examples are useful for highlighting 
conventions and established norms; or, more succinctly, the exceptions often help prove the rules. This 
principle calls to mind the celebrated case of Patient H.M, whose real-life condition supposedly inspired 
the character of Leonard, and whose brain was posthumously dis ected to determine if its anatomical 
structure could shed further light on how memory functions.118 The hope was that analysing a brain with 
a dysfunctional memory would illuminate how a healthy brain should operate. If one accepts that 
Memento is an exceptional film which deviates from narrative norms then what are the narrative 
conventions and ‘rules’ it could be said to highlight or prove? 
Despite their inherent capacity for depicting various shifts in time, film narratives traditionally 
advance rather than regress, and as viewers we are accustomed to stories being told forwards rather than 
backwards. This is the case with Memento insofar as the colour segments are self-contained vignettes 
which are forward-moving. Additionally, once we have reached the end of the fi lm we can also appreciate 
the way in which the black-and-white scenes in the motel r om form a loop with the colour sequences. 
One need hardly acknowledge that viewers can reconcile and process any number of temporal leaps or 
digressions during the course of a film, as long as the framing is clear and the necessary cues are provided 







to allow us to map temporal elements in relation to one a other. Devices such as flashbacks move 
forwards through narrative time in order to bring the story back to the point from which the temporal shift 
was motivated. Despite any number of deviations or tangents, narratives generally rely heavily on cause 
and effect, with past and future events referencing and informing each other throughout the story. 
Furthermore, in most cases the diegesis retains a forward-moving trajectory, therefore to say that a story 
is being told forwards does not necessarily describe the way in which the narrative events are temporally 
arranged.  
Watching and processing Memento, however, forces viewers to perform an activity similar to 
walking backwards without being able to turn one’s head, and this foregrounds how we generally expect 
a narrative to have a forward thrust. Furthermore, the revrs  chronology is combined with a lack of 
perspective above and beyond Leonard’s experiences which denies the viewer any real objective 
overview, while a lack of temporal markers make it difficult to contextualise the events we are shown. In 
John Sutton’s analysis of the film he brings to bear on Leonard’s situation the work of philosopher 
Christoph Hoerl and introduces the idea of ‘temporal disorientation’:119  
Leonard is acutely aware of his temporal disorientation, on this view, just because he can still 
recall particular past events and experiences from his own past, however imperfectly. He still 
knows how time works, in other words, but can’t reliably place himself and his actions or 
experiences within it…Our narrative dislocation within the film thus gives us not just insight 
into his loss but an experience that echoes it...120 
At one point, when questioning the credibility of Leonard’s investigation, Teddy quite rightly 
points out to him that he (Leonard) has no idea how long it has been since the incident, while there is 
equally scarce narrative evidence for the vi wer to draw upon to indicate how much time has elapsed. 
Sutton declares that being unable to accurately orientate oneself in a temporal location and an awareness 
of an indeterminate period of time both ‘fascinates and frightens.’121 The film concludes with Leonard 
aptly uttering the lines, “Now, where was I?” - but since his knowledge about his temporal location is no 
more precise than that of his spatial one he might just as well ask himself what year it is.  







According to Sutton, Leonard ‘qualifies’ as an individual who is temporally disoriented due to 
the fact that he can still appreciate the concept and flow of time, despite being significantly disadvantaged 
when trying to act in a way that anticipates future outcomes. Leonard is returned to a perpetual present 
but he is, crucially, also aware that this experience is not normal; his knowledge and instincts tell him 
that the feeling “like you just woke up”122 is inconsistent with his experience of how time passes, or at 
least how he used to experience it in the period of his life before his injury. Leonard has an impared 
memory and he knows it, whereas an individual in a similar s tuation who did not sense that anything was 
amiss could not be classified as temporally disoriented.  
We too are aware how time ‘works’, both in relation to daily life and in terms of how stories are 
told, and it is evident from the outset that time in Memento is operating in a way that goes against the 
grain of how we normally process film narratives. Significantly, we are not presnted with a clear origin 
or starting point other than the film’s end, back from which we must regress in order to build up an 
understanding of when and where Leonard is located. By omitting details such as the exact length of time 
that has passed since Leonard’s wife was killed, the narrative forces a sense of temporal disorientation 
upon the viewer, thereby narrowing the experiential gap between viewer and protagonist. This narrowing, 
of course, does not close entirely and even at the beginnin  of the film, when we are in the situation which 
is closest to Leonard epistemically, our experience is not wh lly congruent with his. We are aware that 
our memory is functioning normally and we also anticipate that we will be able to use the information we 
are shown to gradually learn more about what is happening. Although the reverse chronology appears 
unusual as far as cinematic conventions are concerned, the iegetic world itself is governed by what we 
recognise as a normal temporal order. It is fair to say th t we are dealing with a storyworld that is 
reasonably congruent with our own reality, something which is borne out by the efforts made by the 
filmmakers to portray an anterograde amnesic in a scientifically accurate way.123 As Jo Alyson Parker 
writes:  
[W]e must assume cause-effect still works normally in the world thatt e film depicts; there is 
no Star Trek-like “space-time anomaly” that makes future causes impact on past events.124  







The practical and social hurdles Leonard encounters and the ways in which he deals with them 
are presented as feasible scenarios in their own right,such as using notes and photographs in order to 
compensate for his fading memories. In contrast to narratives such as Lost Highway, the characters in 
Memento are reasonably stable in terms of how we are able to individuate them, recognise them from one 
scene to another, understand potential motivations, and ide tify the consequences of actions. Characters 
and their activities in this storyworld appear consistent with our own understanding of reality and there 
is no evidence of other-worldly, magical, or supernatural occurrence or influences. Of course, we are also 
dealing with an entertainment product intended for mass-market ppeal and not a documentary about 
memory impairment. Leonard’s situation therefore requires framing in a wider scenario that will enable 
the film to operate successfully as cultural product intended to be sold as entertainment; in this case a noir 
tale of vengeance and mystery. However, its subject matter nd complex structure arguably allow it to 
achieve much more than the minimum requirement of simply attracting and entertaining an audience.  
In addition to highlighting viewer expectations of how film narratives should behave temporally, 
Memento also foregrounds the way in which we scour narratives for details that will potentially aid our 
understanding of depicted events. Leonard initially appears organised, meticulous and careful, such as in 
an early scene where we see him pin Polaroids onto his ‘map’, the layout of which is reminiscent of an 
incident room in a police station (Fig. 21). Even the language that Leonard uses – “I got a lead on a 
place”125 - resembles that of a screen detective.  








Fig. 21. Leonard gives the initial impression of being organised and methodical 
As the film progresses, however, we see the inadequacy of his methods and realise that the 
challenges he faces are in fact insurmountable. His apparently rigorous detective methodology is 
fragmented and incomplete, his ‘incident room’ no more than a tragic mockery of the real thing. As we 
build an increasingly clear picture of Leonard’s character, we appreciate how limited and miserable his 
existence truly is and how starkly it contrasts with how e sees himself. Indeed, his self-perception begins 
to look more like self-deception, a point which Teddy explicitly articulates when he says to Leonard: “So 
you lie to yourself to be happy. There's nothing wrong with that. We all do it.”126  
Not unlike the Replicants in Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982), Leonard must supplement his 
experiences through ‘off-site storage’ in the form of photographs, notes, and tattoos, while also being 
unusually dependent on information given to him by others. In contrast to Leonard, the Replicants’ have 







had their memories implanted and the photographs are faked in order to add another layer of realism to 
their sense of personal history and keep them from realizing the artificial nature of their existence. 
The Replicants are duped by their creators and ultimately come to discover that the photographs which 
correspond to the memories in their heads are the work of pure fiction, designed to bolster a falsified 
history and sense of self-identity. In Leonard’s situation we see him exploit his own condition so that he 
may deceive himself and unwittingly carry out an act of misplaced vengeance. Although the events he 
records with his photographs and notes pertain to an empirical reality within the diegesis (unlike in Blade 
Runner), the potential for misinterpretation and outright deception is plain to see.  
The search for narrative clarity and reliable information about characters and events are 
fundamental processes which we employ constantly when attmpting to comprehend film narratives, 
whether or not we are conscious of this mental activity.  Memento to a certain extent thwarts our efforts, 
or at least makes our task more difficult, through devices such as an unreliable narrator located within a 
reverse narrative. One result of this, according to Carroll, is that the film draws attention to he viewer’s 
role in ‘co-constructing’ the story:  
The audience is always involved in constructing what happened in the storyworld from the 
movie narration…[but Memento makes]…this process difficult, thereby forcing us to take a 
close look at it…The meta-narrative function of the backwards storytelling in Memento is, in 
other words, to afford the opportunity for the thoughtful spectator to gain certain insights 
regarding narrative – both in terms of its structure and its comprehension.127 
He concedes that such a theory is ‘one of those things that “everybody knows”’ but that it is 
‘easily forgotten, and, therefore, always worthy of a vivid reminder;’128 and Memento, it would seem, 
provides just such a reminder. As Bordwell also argues, spectators participate in a complex process of 
actively elaborating what a film sets forth – they “go beyond the information given,”129 in Jerome 
Bruner’s phrase – although this does not imply that each spectator’s understanding of the film is unique 
since several patterns of elaboration are shared by spectators.130 Rather, the point being made by Bordwell 
(and Bruner) is that inference is an essential process in viewer comprehension, and it is one that is relied 
upon greatly by filmmakers as they will use hypothesis forming and viewers’ assumptions to provoke 







and guide specific emotional and intellectual responses. In order for a film to have a wide appeal, of 
course, there must be a broad level of agreement about certain elements within the narrative, if only to 
grant the film’s storyline a degree of intelligibility and tell the story economically. Beyond that, however, 
there can be varying amounts of ambiguity or details which are open to interpretation, with the level of 
variance depending greatly on the overarching goal(s) of the filmmakers in question. Although Memento 
draws upon a recognisable genre and, through its use of limited characters and locations and very 
immediate cause-effect sequencing, appears unusually linear, ts style of narration combined with an 
unreliable guiding character creates numerous obstacles for the viewer. Th se factors make Memento 
‘difficult to cognize, and that provocation compels the viewer to reconstruct the story self-consciously, 
thereby, in the process, acquiring phenomenological access to one’s response to the vast majority of 
movie narratives.’ 131 We can see this in action if we take the delimited case of cause and effect and 
continuity across different scenes. The note that Leonard writes, at Teddy’s behest, on the back of his 
photograph of Nat lie is obscured for the first half of the narrative, and all we can see initially is that 
something had been written but was then scored out (Fig. 22). 
 








Fig. 22. The mysterious note beneath the scribble is eventually revealed  
Once the film has hit its stride and established the reverse chronology, it is likely that a viewer 
will begin to make mental notes of key details, especially those highlighted through repetition such as the 
scribbled out note. Curiosity builds as each time we see Leonard refer to the back of the photo of Natalie 
we can’t help but notice that something must have been written there but was scored out an earlier point 
in time, but which we expect to see at a later point in the narrative. What this helps to highlight is the way 
in which certain narratives build up a story through adding layers of details upon existing ones. Memento 
draws attention to this process by reversing it. We watch s successive layers are peeled back, in this 
example almost literally, to reveal vital details underneath. Our understanding of the history of successive 
details, such as the broken car window or the scratches on Leonard’s face, requires that the effects of time 
are rolled back, which ironically deepens our knowledge of Leonard’s situation. In other words, the more 
details that disappear and the more actions that are undone, the more we understand; we already know 
the outcome but are gradually forming a complete picture through the accumulation of these cause-and-
effect ‘units’.  







The extent of our comprehension does have its limits, however. Consider once again the final 
sequence in which Teddy confronts Leonard and attempts to confuse and/or contradict the film’s 
established truths. Should we regard his account as the definitiv  version of events? Bordwell proposes 
that at a basic level ‘in any narrative in any medium, characters are built up by the perceiver by virtue of 
two sorts of agent-based schemas.’ 132 These are the person elements of a character (human body, 
thoughts, perceptual activity) and the institutional role that a character occupies or holds. With Teddy, as 
with the other characters in the film, his person elements are unproblematic and straightforward. His role 
in the storyworld is, however, far less clear. Is Teddy a cop? A bad cop? A snitch? He could be all, some, 
or none of the things he claims to be, which makes it difficult for the viewer to situate him in the narrative 
according Bordwell’s criteria. He goes on to point out how genre conventions normally imply audience 
familiarity and as such there will be a certain degree of expectation: 
[W]e’re expecting to be misled [by puzzle films]… Many invite re-viewing, teasing the spectator 
to discover the hows and whys of their construction. At the same time, these strategies exploit 
the redundancy built into the classical norms and often mobilize some underused resources of 
studio-era moviemaking. And although the innovations look fresh on the movie screen, many 
rely on our acquaintance with story schemas circulating in popular culture at large.133   
As the film plays out, evidence accumulates which casts doubt on Teddy as a trustworthy 
character. Narrative closure is ultimately elusive since the slew of ‘revisions’ of crucial details with which 
Teddy confronts Leonard at the film’s conclusion are left unresolved and an abiding ambiguity remains. 
A prevailing interpretation is that Sammy is simply a projection of Leonard’s own personal history and 
his anterograde amnesia is partly a psychological refuge from the guilt he feels at having killed his own 
wife. This calls to mind the situation we encountered with Fred in Lost Highway, since many 
commentators regard the character switch in Lynch’s film as representing a psychological refuge taken 
by Fred to escape his guilty conscience.  
Another way of considering the film’s many loose ends is to regard it in the wider canon of the 
“art film” as defined by Bordwell. In his analysis, Bordwell argues that the prevalence of unresolved or 
partially resolved narratives containing multiple ambiguous details is a key feature of films in this 







category. He writes: ‘Put crudely, the slogan of the art cinema might be, “When in doubt, read for 
maximum ambiguity”’134 He also highlights the emphasis on character subjectivity as a prevalent feature 
of many art film narratives, and this can often be used as a way of reconciling seemingly unresolved 
diegetic elements. Andrew Klein embraces this kind of explanation by concluding that ‘the only way to 
reconcile everything is to assume huge inconsistencies in the nature of Leonard’s disorder.’135 I take 
Klein’s conclusion to mean that inconsistency of recollection is an inherent feature of Leonard’s condition 
and not that the filmmakers have presented the story in a way that is inconsistent. Even so, such a 
conclusion is a little simplistic and is something of a catch-all theory, although there are certainly specific 
instances in the film when character subjectivity seems to be the only way of accounting for what we see.  
One such moment takes place in the film’s final sequence, which comes after Leonard has set 
the clues for himself and is driving to a tattoo parlour. In the photograph which Teddy claims shows 
Leonard in the moments after he killed John G (Fig. 23), he is pointing to an area on his chest which has 
no tattoos. As he drives we hear his inner monologue and a series of images are intercut with a close-up 
of his face, one of which shows his wife lying on his bare chest with a new tattoo that reads ‘I’ve done it’ 
(Fig. 24), the location of which directly corresponds to the area on his chest that he is pointing to in 
Teddy’s photograph. This image of course presents an impossible combination of details that can only 
really be regarded as the product of Leonard’s imagination, since he could not be trying to avenge his 
wife’s death if she was still alive. Furthermore, marrying his inner monologue to an image such as this 
strongly indicates that what we see is Leonard’s subjective state. However, blending a character’s 
imaginings with details from an artefact such as the photograph, which we must regard as empirically 
real within the diegesis, further challenges viewers to reflect on what they have seen and try to separate 
one from the other.  








Fig. 23. Leonard after having allegedly avenged his wife. 
 
Fig. 24. A paradoxical combination of narrative details. 
Is the narrative simply using well-established techniques to exploit the limits of a viewer’s 
working memory in order to wrong-foot its audience and thereby demonstrate the ease with which a 
viewer can be duped? Perhaps so, and in light of Bordwell’s analysis about pleasure derived from the noir 
and mystery genres, as well as those in the art film category, viewers may glean a certain degree of 
enjoyment from unsolved mysteries. Or, as Klein puts it: “what’s the point of a good movie about memory 
if you don’t leave a few things up for grabs?”136 
 







Hold That Thought 
 
Teddy: You don’t know who you are!    
Leonard: I’m Leonard Shelby, I’m from San Francisco… 
Teddy: Nah, that’s who you were. That’s not what you’ve become. 137 
Teddy’s accusation in the lines above resonates with the deeper themes inherent in Memento. In 
his analysis of the film, Little highlights how Leonard’s hunt for the alleged assailant who evaded capture 
is subordinate to the film’s ‘real’ missing person investigation. He argues that Leonard ‘is a missing 
person of sorts, a figure lacking memory of, and guilt for, actions he takes throughout the film’138 and 
that ‘missing’ or ‘incompleteness’ is a key theme of the film - incomplete information, u known persons, 
lost memories, a deceased wife - and he regards Leonard, whose personal identity is fractured and 
incomplete due to his memory impairment, as chief amongst the e.  
Given the context and plight of its protagonist it is clear that the narrative is highlighting the 
fragility and fallibility of memory in general, not just Leonard’s, while also entertaining viewers by way 
of a genre and storyline which owes much of its appeal to ambiguity, deception and mystery. Arguably 
the narrative achieves even more than this, particularly according to those theorists who are engaged in 
the ‘film-as-philosophy’ debate. Carroll regards Memento as belonging to ‘a tradition of motion-picture 
production that attempts to meld popular genres with philosophical meditations,’139 and for my purposes, 
the ‘philosophical meditation’ of most significance is the link between memory and self-identity. When 
describing the real life case of Jimmie G, a patient who suffered from a debilitating memory impairment 
similar to Leonard’s, Oliver Sacks was prompted to ask: 
what sort of a life (if any), what sort of a world, what sort of a self, can be preserved in a man 
who has lost the greater part of his memory and, with th s, his past, and his moorings in time?140  
A question like this is central to Memento’s storyline and the film not only draws attention to 
how we comprehend film narratives but also highlights salient ssues and theories about the role of 
memory in how we construct our own sense of self and individuality. In the wider context of cinematic 







output, it is important to distinguish Memento from offerings like Still Alice (Richard Glatzer and Wash 
Westmoreland, 2014) in which the effects of memory loss on personal identity are told in a much more 
conventional way. In addition to its very obviously unconventional narrative structure, Memento ‘quite 
explicitly raises [the] philosophical [discussion about] what makes us who we are, both at any given 
moment in time and across time, with an emphasis on the role of memory.’141 Significantly, though, the 
structure of the film serves as a means of communicati g its philosophical considerations in a way that a 
film like Still Alice does not; considerations which are most apparent during scenes in which Leonard 
articulates existential conundrums he encounters as a result of his condition. In one scene, while Natalie 
sleeps on Leonard’s chest, we hear him ask (ostensibly to Natalie but in reality only to himself) “How am 
I supposed to heal if I can’t feel time?”142 while during a later conversation he maintains that “just because 
there are things I don’t remember, it doesn’t make my actions meaningless.”143 Curiously, at one point 
we can glimpse a tattoo on Leonard’s upper left arm which reads “She is Gone. Time Still Passes,” which 
suggests he may have already tried to anticipate a period in the future when his condition may have 
impaired his ability to experience the passing of time. It also stands as a painfully inadequate attempt to 
force himself to recover from his wife’s death. As Klein observes, one of the film’s ‘brilliant tangential 
themes [is] that relief from grief is dependent on memory as well — and [such relief] is one of the chief 
hells our unfathomable hero is subjected to.’144 Leonard’s utterances foreground the film’s aim of 
engaging with wider existential and philosophical considerations, ones which are of relevance to all of us 
but have particular significance for someone with Leonard’s condition. This point is perhaps most evident 
during the voiceover which concludes the film in which Leonard alludes to concepts such as solipsism 
and moral worth:  
I have to believe in a world outside my own mind. I have to believe that my actions still have 
meaning…even if I can’t remember them. I have to believe that when my eyes are closed the 
world’s still here.145  
A monologue such as this suggests that debating these sorts of philosophical ideas is part of the 
filmmakers’ agenda and that they regard the narrative as being a vehicle for more than just a character 
trying to solve a murder mystery, and indeed more than just a study of how someone with Leonard’s 







condition may try and cope with daily life. One might argue that Memento lacks the profundity which 
others have attributed to it because the questions it raises re quite obvious and spring from academic, 
abstract scenarios. In addition, as Carroll points out, those skeptical of whether films can ‘do’ philosophy 
might particularly refute films with philosophical pretensions if they are perceived as belonging to 
mainstream, commercial cinema.146 The counterargument to this, however, is that a film like Memento, 
which displays tropes from both avant-garde and mainstream cinema, arguably manages to take an 
abstract philosophical argument and frame it in a fictional narrative premise. As a result the film is imbued 
with the capacity for mobilising an emotional as well as an intellectual response in the viewer. A key tool 
in philosophy is the thought experiment which, as Thomas Wrtenberg writes:  
functions in a philosophical argument by presenting readers with a hypothetical case. They are 
then asked to endorse a general conclusion on the basis of their reaction to this case. The thought 
experiment mobilizes people's intuitions about certain ideas or concepts so that they can see why 
a general claim is true. 147  
Wartenberg is one of many theorists involved in the general d bate over whether or not certain 
films can be regarded as functioning works of philosophy in their own right. George Bragues regards 
Memento as a thought experiment in film form as it manages to ‘advance  a  coherent  and  plausible  
picture  of  how  the  human  mind works' as well as ‘serve the aesthetic imperative of crafting a 
compelling plot.’148 In relation to Memento, the argument put forward by Bragues is that the film’s 
stylistic devices combine with its subject matter to create an absorbing experience and ask the viewer to 
consider a life without short-term memory. Wartenberg argues that: 
Even though a thought experiment tells a particular story, he truth that it establishes is general, 
for it does not rely on the specific details of its story. Instead, the story is used to illustrate a 
general truth that the reader is supposed to be able to accept by means of his or her reflection on 
the thought experiment's narrative.149  
A distinction must be made here between narratives which simply frame engaging questions in 
an orthodox paradigm and those which try to combine a thought experiment-style storyline with a less-







than-mainstream narrative structure. Memento could perhaps be regarded as occupying a midpoint 
between narratives which simply communicate ideas like a fable, and those which attempt to 
communicate an idea in a more experiential or phenomenological way. Since the structure itself plays an 
active part in adding an extra level to the issues raised in thearrative, the film is able to do more than 
simply consider the relationship between memory and identity and have them played out via the words 
and actions of its characters. That is to say, devices such as the reverse chronology deepen and intensify 
the impact of the storyline because, as Kania writes, it ‘serves the…purpose of putting us in Leonard’s 
epistemic shoes.’150 This is not to say, however, that S ill Alice fails to connect empathetically or 
sympathetically with the lead character’s experience, and the title of the film itself points towards an 
awareness on the part of the filmmakers about the existential consideration of the storyline. Rather, the 
key distinction between Memento and Still Alice (and others like it) is the way in which the former elevat s 
its stylistic features to give them a prominent, expr ssive function that deviates from more conventional 
cinematic methods.  
Whether or not this constitutes a film ‘doing’ philosophy is the question which Carroll and others 
consider. 151 A number of theorists have considered Memento against the backdrop of these philosophical 
standpoints to argue how the film helps illuminate key issue  around character portrayal and self-identity. 
Although the scope of this study will not allow me to explore the finer detail of the film-as-philosophy 
debate, it is evident that Memento is sufficiently thought-provoking to be included in this kind of debate 
in the first place, with Richard Hanley’s assessment being that ‘we shouldn’t get too carried away thinking 
that a movie like Memento has anything special or new to say. What Memento does is get you thinking.’152 
Thinking about what, though? Certainly the narrative raises a number of issues, not least the question of 
Leonard’s personal identity and the extent to which he can claim to be the same person over time.  
Historically, much of the philosophical debate over personal identity has focused on trying to 
determine which part(s) of a person could be said to constitute The Self. The discussion has for the most 
part revolved around whether one’s self can be said to reside predominantly in the body, the mind, some 
combination of the two, or none of these. Locke and Hume were key contributors to this debate and their 
arguments are of relevance to my analysis of Memento. As detailed in the introduction to this section, 







Locke took up the position that the mind, and specifically memory, provided continuity over time and as 
such there was no need to reach for an immaterial soul by way of explanation. Hume153 in turn argued 
that the search for self-identity (whether in our body or in our consciousness) is an erroneous one as there 
is no element(s) of a person that endured untouched by time, flux or decay.  
The film does not present the viewer with problematic character identities of the sort we 
encounter in a film like Lost Highway, a fact which further underlines the filmmakers’ aim of ensuring 
the unconventional narrative structure does not impair narrative comprehension. In Smith’s terms, 
Leonard can be individuated, identified and re-identified154 consistently throughout the narrative, while 
cosmetic changes such as physical injuries, changes of clothing and so forth can be reconciled with 
depicted events and adhere to recognisable laws of causality and temporality (albeit in presented in 
reverse). As such, one can assert that a character named Leonard Shelby is present throughout the 
narrative and, physically at least, his condition remains more or less unchanged. In which case, what lies 
behind the accusation uttered by Teddy in the epigraph when he says that Leonard Shelby from San 
Francisco is who Leonard was but is not what he has since b come? There are obviously different levels 
of meaning one could attribute to Teddy’s words but it would be safe to assume that he isn’t referring to 
a literal, physical transformation of the sort we are pr sented with in The Thing. If we want to consider a 
more symbolic or metaphorical interpretation, a useful starting point is the moment the viewer learns how 
Leonard has effectively deluded himself into believing Teddy is “his John G” so that he can have a new 
mystery to solve and can continue his search for vengeance. Notwithstanding the moral implications and 
issues of accountability, this turn of narrative events also raises significant questions about personal 
identity and the persistence of selfhood through time. Consider the use of everyday phrases like “the Me 
of two years ago would’ve been grateful for that knowledge,” or “this time next week I’ll be glad I did X 
ahead of time.” This curious distancing of oneself from, well, one’s self, is rendered literal in Leonard’s 
case since his condition, and his awareness of it, allow him to exploit the perpetual interruptions to his 
personal continuity. Leonard correctly assumes that even if his memory will fade his desire for vengeance 
will persist, and that his future self will feel compelled to act on the false clue he has deliberately left. He 
is also simultaneously counting on the fact that he won’t remember doing so which, on one reading, 







allows him to both instruct a future Leonard to carry out an act while absolving the same future self of 
any culpability.  
Sutton argues that Memento foregrounds the complexity of memory site storage in the brain and 
highlights how different types of memory are generated and how t ey interact. Quoting Nolan: ‘I wanted 
to not make it as simple as Leonard describes the condition…You can’t reduce the human mind to this 
incredibly simple separation of different functions, different brain parts.’155 Citing examples from the 
film, Sutton tries to highlight how emotional and experiential memories can and do ‘seep’ into present 
experience even if the personal, historical recollections are not intact. For example, the fact that Leonard 
retains the instinct to look in specific pockets for specific items, such as Polaroids, his motel key and so 
on, suggests that his procedural memory is unaffected by his impairment even if his declarative memory 
is. That is to say, even though he cannot remember developing the routine of using his pockets in this 
way, he has internalized the habit and instinct to do so. A key moment which reinforces this point emerges 
when Natalie attempts to tear up the incriminating Polaroid of Dodd, and without hesitation Leonard tells 
her that they have to be burnt to be destroyed. We learn the significance of this moment at the end of the 
film when we see that Leonard probably knows this fact about Polaroids since he burnt the image which 
allegedly confirmed that he has already avenged his wife’s death. Another example which permeates the 
entire narrative is the question over how Leonard can atually know he has a memory impairment since 
any diagnosis would have been made after the incident. Other than accepting this was a deliberate 
oversight to make the storytelling feasible, one must as ume that he has somehow assimilated the 
knowledge of his condition even if he has no recollection of being told that he suffers from amnesia.  
On this evidence one could regard Leonard’s existence as a combination of both continuous and 
discontinuous elements; certain aspects endure while others are lost to history. In the context of Sacks’ 
quote we might respond that the sort of life that one can have when suffering from a condition such as 
Leonard’s is quite a miserable, challenging and limited one. However, it is still a life that carries durable 
enough links to strengthen the connectedness of pre- and post-incident Leonard. The organic evolution 
of one’s personality over time may not seem a valid reason for claiming someone has become a different 
person, however the spectrum of philosophical opinion on this point is broad and varied. In Hanley’s 







study of the film he examines how a character like Leonard c n be positioned within certain philosophical 
models and frameworks which grapple with the issue of how personal identity persists through time. 
With Leonard there appears to have been a twofold evolution which renders him distinct from 
his earlier, pre-incident self. Firstly, the self-deception constitutes a potential break from his moral 
standards which we may have assumed were more wholesome in the life he lived before the assault. 
Admittedly, his moral fibre is called into question by virtue of the way in which he handled Sammy 
Jankis’s insurance claim, however there is little or no narrative evidence to suggest he was in the habit of 
committing murder. The film does not equate aggressive and discriminatory insurance investigations with 
homicide but it does appear to use this aspect of Leonard’s life to open up the possibility that he was 
perhaps a less savoury individual in his pre-incident life than he appears at the outset of the narrative. 
Secondly, the apparent state of Leonard’s personal identity, and the way in which he only partially persists 
through time, points to the idea that with every memory reset he is once more a new person springing into 
existence. The person who emerges after each reset sharesthe pre-incident memories with pre-incident 
Leonard, but any new short-term memories will be unique to that ten-minute period – to that ‘ten-minute 
Leonard’ – and this process is replicated each subsequent period when his memories fade and he ‘re-
awakens’. This is of course a more existential assessment of Teddy’s statement and one would probably 
assume that he is referring to the way in which Leonard h s lost his moral compass when he ominously 
tells him that he has “become” someone other than Leonard Shelby from San Francisco. The revelation 
that Leonard has set himself up to kill Teddy complicates his moral positioning within the narrative while 
also potentially diminishing viewer sympathy for him, and there is little ambiguity over his motivation 
given the confessional nature of the internal monologue which accompanies the scene. As such, one could 
take Teddy’s words as meaning a shift has occurred in Leonard’s moral values which is severe enough to 
render him distinct from the pre-incident Leonard insofar as his personality and character are concerned. 
Such an interpretation might seem fairly mundane, however, since most people will undergo a certain 
amount of change in their lifetime, aspects of which may often manifest in their value systems or character 
traits. As Hanley puts it: ‘Any individual psychology – even an abnormal one like Leonard’s – undergoes 
intrinsic change over time,’156 and it is not difficult to reconcile certain ‘intrinsic changes’ with our 
continued recognition of individual persons. Unless, of course, the changes are particularly sudden or 







extreme, such as in Leonard’s case, where it could be argued with more conviction that he has ‘become’ 
someone else.  
As part of his analysis of Memento, Basil Smith looks in detail at certain ideas about memory 
and self-identity put forward by John Locke, who argued that when a person’s consciousness cannot 
access or retrieve a memory or experience then it ceases to b  part of that person anymore.157 This point 
has been argued against by successive philosophers for placing too great an emphasis on the mind and 
memory, especially when considering moral accountabili y. In Leonard’s case, although his memory 
deficit appears genuine one would be hard pushed to defend his decision to prime himself to murder 
Teddy for reasons that amount to little more than personal satisfaction. Ignorance is no defence and the 
fact that Leonard cannot recall how he manipulated himself does not absolve him of blame and is an 
example of one of the main objections to Locke’s theory. If we accept that his memory impairment cannot 
exonerate him of past crimes, or to put it differently, that blame traverses successive memory lapse 
periods, can it be argued that there are genuine interruptions to hi  continuity of self? Certainly his 
condition produces unbridgeable gaps in his autobiographical memory, therefore his own sense of self 
and understanding of his past actions is adversely affected. However, one cannot necessarily draw the 
conclusion that an inability to remember one’s past means that one is no longer the same person one was 
at an earlier point in time. Several of those who have written on Memento make the step from Locke to 
Hume when considering the philosophical issues around self-identity which are highlighted by the 
narrative. Hume famously wrote: 
What was life without connection [of memories across time]? I may venture to affirm, that we 
are nothing but a bundle or collection of different sensations, which succeed each other with an 
inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and move ent.158  
When Natalie asks Leonard to remember his wife with his eyes closed we see a succession of 
shots - very much like Hume’s description of sensations ‘which succeed each other with inconceivable 
rapidity’ - depicting Leonard’s wife in a variety of circumstances: seated at the kitchen table; exiting her 
house into the garden; lying in bed; looking out of the kitchen window; a close-up of her hands as she 
rinses them under the kitchen tap; a close-up of Leonard’s hand caressing her shoulder. These shots are 







cross-cut with Leonard and Natalie in the diner, and Leonard can be heard in voiceover as his 
reminiscences are shown:  
You can just feel the details. The bits and pieces you never bothered to put into words. And you 
can feel these extreme moments, even if you don’t want to. You put these together and you get 
the feel of a person.159  
The unnameable details Leonard describes give depth and emotional substance to the way we 
visualise people we encounter by virtue of how they add to existing memory impressions we have of 
them. In addition, they also help contribute to the substance of individuals in a way that coalesces around 
the more obvious identifying factors such as body, actions, behaviours, tendencies, and voice. Such 
impressions are fleeting and transient, and Leonard’s descriptions and the accompanying flashbacks 
chime with Hume’s “bundle theory” of self-identity; Leonard’s description of getting ‘the feel of a person’ 
communicates something nebulous and perhaps intangible but equally undeniable, at least from an 
individual’s subjective perspective. ‘The bits and pieces you never bothered to put into words’ a e at once 
an addition to the more obvious physical elements of a person, while also residing in no single one of 
them. While reflecting on the patient mentioned at the opening of this section, Oliver Sacks writes how:  
In some sense, [the patient] had been reduced to a ‘Humean’ being— I could not help thinking 
how fascinated Hume would have been at seeing in Jimmie his own philosophical ‘chimaera’ 
incarnate, a gruesome reduction of a man to mere disconnected, incoherent flux and change.160 
While in relation to another of his memory-impaired patients he writes:  
Abysses of amnesia continually opened beneath him, but he would bridge them, nimbly, by 
fluent confabulations and fictions of all kinds. For him they were not fictions, but how he 
suddenly saw, or interpreted, the world.161   
A properly functioning memory provides an individual with the n cessary autobiographical 
reference points – or ‘moorings in time’ to use Sacks’ phrase - to draw on past events and plan for the 
future. The ‘flux and change’ which Sacks refers to is perhaps closer to the reality of self-identity than 
we are comfortable with, and perhaps Leonard’s frantic processes of fabricating an identity for himself 







are no more than a magnification of what underlies one’s apparently ordinary and dependable personhood. 
The film, however, seems to propose that one’s ability to function and sustain one’s selfhood can be 
achieved without full continuity of memory. Through a combination of his mementos, information 
provided by those around him, conditioned responses, and pl in old guesswork and inference, Leonard 
manages to traverse similar abysses in his own life and psyche much as the viewer confabulates and 
hypothesises as each successive shot is presented during the course of a film. Just as a viewer learns to 
“go beyond the information given” 162 and infer meaning from a sequence of shots which may only hi t 
at certain details, so too does Leonard form an aggregate or partial understanding of himself and the world 
around him; an understanding which is continually revised and reformed according to what he 
experiences. A bitter irony of Leonard’s situation is the fact that it is those around him who have a clearer 
understanding of who he is and what he has become since they are able to witness his actions and 
remember them. This is paralleled by how the viewer will build an increasingly clear picture of the film’s 
narrative and Leonard’s place within it.  
Parker argues that ‘Leonard’s memory loss seems to constitute…a loss of what it means to be 
human’163 since by her assessment, it is one’s capacity to achieve continuity of memory which elevates 
an individual from someone who merely survives to a person living a life in which self-identity actually 
means something. Echoing Parker and Sacks, Ba il Smith also considers ‘whether such personhood is 
worth having’164 and it would be fair to say that few viewers would regard Leonard’s predicament in 
Memento as an enviable one. As Leonard’s condition is based on medical fact, viewers are thus being 
asked to treat the storyline as a scenario drawn from real lif . Leonard confesses to Teddy that he is only 
living for revenge, and since he will not be able to remember whether he has fulfilled his desire, or perhaps 
cannot remember already having done so, this single-minded purpose for his existence will endure. A 
contrasting but no less painful effect of his condition is that he cannot move on from his wife’s death. 
The flipside of his desire for revenge is his inability to m ve on from his grief, since grief is a process 
that requires the ability to both remember and forget. In one scene we see him trying to achieve some sort 
of closure by orchestrating a role play scenario with a prostitute, which ends with him burning some of 
his wife’s possessions. As he watches the fire devour various objects that belonged to or were associated 
with his wife, Leonard’s voiceover delivers one of the film’s most potent lines:  







I’ve probably tried this before. Probably burned truckloads of your stuff. Can’t remember to 
forget you. 165 
The expression ‘hold that thought’ takes on new significance when applied to Leonard as he 
cannot achieve the continuity of memory necessary for full selfhood; he cannot ‘hold’ any thought long 
enough for it to evolve from impression to consolidation. Or, as Teddy puts it when lamenting the ‘fact’ 
that Leonard does not remember that he has already killed the second assailant:   
When you killed him, I was so convinced that you'd remember. But it didn't stick. Like nothing 
ever sticks. Like this won't stick.166   
If indeed Leonard has killed John G. and has therefore completed his miss on, he can only move 
forwards if he can retain and consolidate the memory of having done so. Similarly, in direct contrast, the 
memory he is desperate to forget is that of his wife’s murder since it is the barrier to his ability to grieve 
and is the memory which gives rise to his desire for vengea ce. These factors combine to effectively 
reduce his complexity as a human being and his capacity for agency since the limitations of his memory 
mean that he has lost his capacity for deep reasoning and reflection. He has become increasingly reliant 
on instinctual responses and reactive behavior and the fact that he is dependent on others to prop up his 
sense of self means his identity more closely resembles Sacks’ “Humean being”. As part of his analysis 
of the film, Hanley summarises the philosophical standpoint of Derek Parfit, which is framed in the 
context of his teletransportation thought experiment. As outlined in section I, Parfit’s scenario involves a 
device that can replicate an individual on Mars but which also destroys the ‘source’ individual back on 
Earth. He develops this idea further to consider alternative outcomes, such as the source individual 
surviving for a few days before dying, or the device creating two replicas while still destroying the source. 
Hanley picks up on Robert Nozick’s concept of the ‘closest continuer’ in order to explain how, in this 
situation: 
we have a tie for closest continuer. They cannot both be [the same as the source individual], 
since that would require them to be each other. So neither of them is…Parfit’s diagnosis of 







Double Replication is that psychological continuity is, like psychological connectedness, non-
transitive.167  
Each scenario is presented as a conundrum to try and tease out an answer to the question about 
which individual (if any) could be said to be the ‘r al’ one. Psychological continuity, in the context 
Memento, would refer to the link Leonard has with his pre-incident self: he remembers who he is/was 
and, apparently, what has happened to his memory. Psychological connectedness i  distinguished from 
continuity to refer to the link and the sense of time passing by virtue of memories that can account for 
past experiences; this is the area in which post-incident Leonard has a deficit. In Parfit’s scenario, the two 
replicated individuals would be continuous with the source but not each other, which is why, for Parfit, 
psychological continuity and identity must be considered non-transitive i.e. incapable of bridging the gap 
between distinct individuals in a way that could be considered as an unbroken continuum. Whether or not 
that is that same as saying the id ntity of an individual in scenarios like the one he presents, or the one 
that we encounter with Leonard is, in Parfit’s view, less of a concern since it is survival that is more 
important:  
[Parfit] argues further that Double Replication is about as good as ordinary survival, and much 
better than ordinary death…So your survival is not your persistence – rather it is having someone 
in the future psychologically continuous with you now, whether or not they are you! 168  
In Parfit’s terms Leonard is numerically identical with his pre-incident self but is qualitatively 
different given the extensive psychological damage he has incurred. As far as Nozick’s argument is 
concerned, post-incident Leonard emerges as the only candidate for ‘closest continuer’ since we are not 
dealing with anything like cloning or duplication. Although he is qualitatively altered there is no other 
individual who has any form of continuity with the person known as Leonard Shelby, and even though 
the ties may be weak they do still exist. Beyond the question of whether or not an individual like Leonard 
could be regarded as the same person post-trauma as the person th y were pre-trauma, is a second and 
perhaps more pressing, discomfiting one, which I touched on earlier by way of Sacks onsideration of 
whether a life without short-term memory could even be considered worth living. Rupert Read explores 
this issue in relation to The Prestige and argues that Parfit’s abstract scenario does not take the moral and 







ethical implications of his teletransportation thought experim nt sufficiently into account.169 For Read, 
the usefulness of Parfit’s scenario is devalued because it treats the death of the source individual too 
lightly and dismissively when in fact this aspect should be central to the debate. That is to say, in both 
Memento and The Prestige the emotional states of characters and the moral choices they make are 
foregrounded by Nolan and it would appear that an emotional investment on the part of the viewer is 
crucial to one’s engagement and enjoyment of the narratives. To reduce the individuals in the stories from 
human beings to something resembling units on a productin line for the sake of debating an abstract 
scenario, Read argues, prevents the discussion from ever b ing anything other than academic. This point 
is central to the ongoing discussion about whether film narratives can be rightly thought of as suitable 
vehicles for advancing philosophical ideas which are both n vel and achieved purely through cinematic 
means.  In ‘Film Art, Argument, and Ambiguity,’ Murray Smith concludes that films can engage with 
philosophical arguments in a variety of ways but ultimately a fictional narrative cannot put forward a 
logical argument in the same way a philosophical essay can. This, he argues, is partly because the primary 
function of a narrative is not to put forward a particular epistemic point, therefore: 
[the] subordination of the epistemic to the artistic is surely the main reason why narrative films 
based on philosophical themes…will often compromise the “logic” of the philosophical problem 
that they dramatize.170   
In response to this point, Carroll raises the objection that what Smith is describing is a matter of 
‘tendencies [that] most philosophy in a certain tradition goes in for clarity [but at times] one like 
Nietzsche…may have a motive for shrouding their thought experiments in ambiguity.’171 For Smith, 
however, ambiguity is one of the factors that most definitively separates the functions of art and 
philosophy since, in the case of the former it is something to be praised whereas for the latter is 
symptomatic of a weak argument. This is a distinction rather than a critical evaluation since, as Smith 
points out, it stems from the fact that philosophy and film narratives serve fundamentally different 
purposes; philosophical thought experiments do not strive to r nder the experience of types of individual 
in certain sorts of situation. Rather, this is the functio  of many types of mainstream film narratives and, 







as we have seen, a feature such as ambiguity is exploited t  great effect by Memento in terms of how it is 
put together, and it serves us well in terms of how we appraise it as viewers.   








    
Organised Chaos in L'Année Dernière à 
Marienbad 
Leonard: Memory is unreliable; [ it]  can change the shape of a room, it can change the colour of a car. 
172 
Leonard utters the lines above in Memento when arguing with Teddy about the reliability of eyewitness 
testimony in police investigations. The point he is making is of course meant to describe the way in which 
our recollections can be easily misremembered, however his description finds something like a literal 
manifestation during a scene in L'Année Dernière à Marienbad (Last Year in Marienbad, Alain Resnais, 
1961), a notoriously challenging avant-garde narrative from the French New Wave movement. I  the 
scene (Fig. 25) we see two characters, a male and a female, in a hotel lobby with a reception desk visible 
in the background. A jump cut results in the male characte  suddenly vanishing and the background 
changing to a ballroom populated by chairs and a handful of different individuals. As the woman begins 
to turn her head, perhaps struck by these sudden changes, the background alters once again and she 
appears back in the lobby with the reception desk behind her; the action of her head turning is matched 
across each edit.  I use this example not just because it neatly matches Leonard’s words about memory 
changing the shape of a room but also because it typifies the unconventional style of the film. The 
potentially jarring effect of a sudden, unmotivated change of location, or the unexplained disappearance 
of a character within the frame is wholly consistent with the narrative’s style and structure.    








Fig. 25. A typically jarring sequence in which the mise-en-scène is altered with no obvious diegetic 
motivation or explanation.  
Like Memento, Marienbad is a film which has at its thematic core the fallibility of memory and 
recollection, however in terms of tone, style and structure it is vastly different o Nolan’s film. Imagine a 
spectrum with the broad title ‘Films About Memory’, on which the extremes denote a film’s relative 
mainstream or avant-garde characteristics. If we placed a film such as Still Alice towards the mainstream 
/ accessible end then Memento and Marienbad could be plotted near the centre and at the opposite extreme 
respectively. In this chapter I will explore the multitude of ways in which Marienbad blurs the boundary 
between subjective and objective perspectives, and in doing s  helps highlight the connection between 
memory and selfhood and the relationship between viewers and fictional characters. I will take a detailed 
look at Marienbad in order to see how its depiction of memory, and its potential failings and limitations, 
compares to Memento’s handling of the same issues. In the wider context of my analysis, the film’s strong 
emphasis on memory combined with the challenges we face in trying to triangulate characters in a spatio-







temporal sense, raises salient questions regarding personal ide tity. From a philosophical perspective, a 
key contributor in this area of discussion is John Locke who advanced the argument that it is a person’s 
memory that constitutes a continuity of selfhood. An individual’s psychological connectedness, and 
memory in particular, was what Locke regarded as the princial means of assessing whether one could 
be considered to be the same individual over time. As I di cussed in relation to Memento, Locke’s 
argument is especially problematic in terms of how it allows scope for guilt to be assuaged purely because 
an individual cannot remember committing a harmful act. This objection resonates with Memento’s 
storyline and, depending on one’s interpretation, it is of particular relevance to Marienbad as well. I will 
draw in a number of key ideas and theories from cognitive psychology and the philosophy of mind in 
order to bolster certain arguments and also to offer up alternative ways of considering the stylistic choices 
which define Marienbad and the likely reactions these may provoke in the viewer. I will put forward an 
alternative way of reading the film when I look again at the work of Charles Fernyhough and consider 
how our memory patterns and mental recall functions could offer another way of regarding personal 
identity.  
  The film takes place in an opulent hotel inhabited by a dozen or so guests dressed in formal attire 
and engaged in a variety of leisure activities; ballroom dancing, watching performances of drama and live 
music, card games, a firing range, and so on. The film’s opening ten minutes disseminate information 
about settings and characters at a slow pace but then gradually focus in on three characters who are not 
named within the narrative but are credited as A, M, and X in the screenplay. Timeframes and locations 
remain ambiguous and fluid throughout the film; however the storyline revolves around a perpetual 
conversation between A (Delphine Seyrig) and X (Giorgio Albertazzi) about whether or not they met last 
year in the same hotel they are in now, a hotel variously referred to as Marienbad, Frederiksbad, Karlstadt, 
and Baden-Salsa. The conversation about whether they have met before is conducted through a 
combination of dialogue and voiceover. The voiceover we hear alternates between X’s monologue and 
his dialogue with A. The other principal character is the man credited as M (Sacha Pitoëff) who appears 
periodically throughout the narrative and whose exact relationsh p to A is unclear, although it is clearly 
of a romantic nature and they may be husband and wife. Although the premise appears straightforward 
on paper, the film’s ambiguities and inconsistencies are legion and the (apparent) lack of diegetic clarity 







is something which defines the film and polarises viewers. I want to assess how this ambiguity is 
generated and consider potential viewer responses in the cont xt of salient arguments surrounding 
character portrayal that I have looked at in earlier chapters. From there I will consider whether or not 
certain stylistic and structural patterns can be discerned a d then discuss these in the wider context of 
memory and personal identity.  
In the previous chapter I looked at a scene in Memento which appears to shows a double revision 
of one of Leonard’s memories, brought on by Teddy’s goading about whether or not Leonard’s wife was 
diabetic (Fig. 20). This technique, used sparingly in Memento, could be seen as an example of 
Marienbad’s narrative style in microcosm, since the repetition and alteration of action and dialogue that 
we have seen before is one of the film’s defining features and a central stylistic principle. The first ten 
minutes of the film set the tone and pattern which the narrative will follow throughout, and from the 
outset Marienbad signals the unconventional way in which its story and characters will be developed. 
The film opens with a vertical shot looking directly upwards at an ornate ceiling and pillars with the 
camera meandering between the columns and under the vaulted roof accompanied by an all-encompassing 
score of discordant organ-playing. A distant voiceover, which we later learn belongs to X, gradually 
becomes audible and we hear the monologue reciting the following lines: 
I made my way once again along these corridors and through these rooms, in this building that 
belongs to the past, this huge, luxurious, and baroque hotel, where endless corridors… 
The audio trails off and fades out but there is sufficient detail in X’s words to suggest some 
correlation between sound and image – ‘corridors, building, baroque hotel,’ – with the natural assumption 
being that we are hearing a description of the interior we are being shown. However, as the voiceover 
fades and the organ continues, successive shots cut to different angles with a slow editing pace matching 
the tracking motion of the camera as it picks up details like chandeliers and enormous mirrored walls and 
doors. In contrast to a (in some respects) similar opening like the long tracking shot which opens Andrzej 
Wajda’s Kanał (1957), we cannot use facial expressions of characters to guide our expectations about 
narrative events or to provide an understanding of offscreen space. Marienbad’s opening minutes provide 
no meaningful establishing shot, has a complete absence of characters, and the camera is not obviously 







heading towards a particular focal point. It is not until more than five minutes have passed that we see the 
first characters, and they are merely two butlers standing motionless in the middle distance on either side 
of a lavishly decorated corridor. Although the voiceover fades back in and we can hear repetition of 
certain lines heard earlier, this clarifies very little; exposition is generally very gradual. When we see 
characters for the second time, they all appear motionless and unblinking (Fig. 26) and their rigid 
appearance is suggestive of an audience watching a performance, but they could equally be frozen in time 
since we have very little contextualising information about what is taking place and no real sense of 
spatial relations or setting. The tracking shots are all close-ups and the soundtrack continues as a 
combination of X’s monologue and organ music before a wider framing, functioning as an establi hing 
shot, appears shortly before the ten-minute mark. In this shot, we are able to see a group of individuals 
gathered in a ballroom facing a stage on which a play is being performed, and as the characters sit 
motionless we hear one of the actors recite his line; the camera cuts to the expressionless faces of the 
audience. The framing then becomes increasingly wider and we intercut between the actors performing 
on stage and the assembled audience watching the performance; there are also alternate staticand tracking 
shots, the latter primarily used to glide past the rows of audience members. The lines we hear – “this very 
hotel, filled with emptiness, these static silent characters, long since dead,’ ‘rows of frozen faces,’ – 
resonate deeply as they could be describing the audience and surroundings as much as they are connected 
to whatever scene is being performed. In addition, the words ‘frozen’ and ‘freeze’ are heard numerous 
times throughout the film and are just one of the narrative’s litany of motifs that recur on the soundtrack 
and in the mise-n-scène. The repetition of certain details in what we see and hear suggests that we should 
be building a clear picture of the storyline, but the ovrall significance of these motifs is kept tantalisingly 
out of reach. 
 








Fig. 26. The film’s opening sequence reveals the faces of characters but it is a relatively long time before 
a clear establishing shot is used.  
By this point in a film we might reasonably expect narrative details to emerge such as a 
protagonist being established or additional information about the location and characters to be provided. 
However, the style of the opening moments of Marienbad continues in much the same way for the 
duration of the film and therefore the way in which we approach and analyse it requires a strategy different 
to that which we would normally apply to a mainstream narrative. By working through some examples, 
I will illustrate how the film’s formal design, particularly its editing, costumes, and soundtrack, builds a 
narrative landscape in which space, time, and character identities are rendered malleable, fluid, and 
unstable. I will look at how patterns emerge within what can be a disorientating viewing experience and 
consider how the film’s themes of trauma and repressed memory are communicated as much through the 
narrative’s stylistic features as they are through its diegetic events and dialogue.  
Mapping Marienbad’s Narrative Landscape 
 
One of Marienbad’s most iconic images is a high-angle shot of the immaculately tended hotel 
garden inhabited by the characters standing motionless in an odd ge metric arrangement, with a touch of 
the surreal added by the fact that the characters cast shadows but the trees lining the avenue do not (Fig. 
27). It is an establishing shot which shows much but tells us very little, and the clarity with which we can 
see the assembled characters and their relative position to each other stands in stark contrast to the 
challenges the viewer faces in understanding the spatio-temporal and interpersonal relationships within 
the film.  








Fig. 27. As a visual metaphor, the film’s enduring image of motionless characters in the hotel grounds 
contrasts greatly with the dizzying shifts in time and space that we witness.  
As viewers we digest and remember narrative details and reflect on what has been shown based 
on the understanding that these things may be, indeed probably should and normally would be, integral 
to our ability to follow the storyline. In Chapter Three wsaw how Leonard’s detective work in Memento 
is mirrored by our own efforts to stay ahead of the narrative twists, and the narrative arguably rewards 
the careful, discerning viewer. Can the same be said of Marienbad? Certainly on a first viewing one will 
most likely pay close attention to particular lines in the dialogue and narration, trying to decipher their 
meaning by making mental notes of details in the expectation that their significance will ultimately 
become clear as the film progresses. The absence of cl arly signalled narrative cues or framing which 
would normally help the viewer reconcile the film’s ambiguities is compounded by the way in which 
certain details and motifs are repeated. The voiceover as well as dialogue between all characters, including 
those who are not identified even in the screenplay, create t nuous links through repetition of certain 
descriptions and recollections. At times these are reinforced with images that appear consistent with 
earlier descriptions but at others we only hear a description or an anecdote about events that happened 
sometime in the past but which are never elaborated upon. Our efforts to glean meaning and achieve a 
narrative foothold are challenged by the way in which details that we might justifiably assume are relevant 
for plot development actually lead nowhere or are left under-developed. One of the key reasons why we 
might struggle to apply significance to such details is the film’s evasiveness when it comes to how its 
spatio-temporal context, or ‘narrative landscape,’ is established.  







The film’s title provides its overarching temporal consideration and references to ‘last year’ 
permeate all aspects of the story and supply the context for many of the challenges that the viewer 
encounters. The film is essentially a verbal tug-of-war between X and A’s competing accounts, opinions, 
and recollections about ‘last year’, and the core detail being disputed is whether or not the two have ever 
met before. Gregory Currie describes Marienbad as ‘infuriatingly unspecific about crucial elements of 
timing’173 and the temporal landscape is uncertain because it is difficult to determine if the scenes we are 
witnessing are flashbacks or if they are taking place in the diegetic present. The film deflects our efforts 
to group or categorise specific time periods alongside corresponding locations or surface appearances in 
a number of ways. As we saw in Memento, the narrative establishes different time periods by contrasting 
black and white and colour sequences, and variations in lighting schemes within the former. Clothing also 
plays an important part in how we differentiate sequences from one another, such as the checked shirt 
Leonard is wearing in the scenes before he changes into Dodd’s suit. Noticeable changes in clothing are 
also used in Marienbad but there is not the same system of coding that we can dr w upon to help 
categorise time periods. M’s clothing alternates between a suit and tie (one light in colour, one dark), and 
a tuxedo, while A is seen in a variety of formal dresses of different styles, shades and materials. However, 
the changes in clothing do not correspond to straightforward groupings such as ‘tuxedo = diegetic past’, 
‘light suit = diegetic present,’ but the temptation to discern an organising pattern of this sort is one way 
in which Marienbad repels our habitual viewing strategies.  
In addition, alterations to clothing are mirrored by changes in location and décor and these too 
defy any attempt at clear categorisation, and the ambiguity of the film’s spatial environment is further 
complicated by M and A’s disagreement over the name of the hotel where they allegedly met, or indeed 
where they are currently situated. Very often the spatio-temporal shifts are unmotivated and a variety of 
formal techniques are used to set up narrative cues that are mbiguous and misleading. In one instance, 
shortly after A and M first encounter each other, they ave an exchange in which M enigmatically tells 
A that the hotel is full of secrets and offers to tell h r more. The scene cuts from M extending his offer to 
a scene in which they are dancing and both individuals are dressed differently, and the soundtrack bridges 
the two scenes as we hear A accept M’s offer to ‘show her more.’ (Fig. 28).  In a more conventional 
narrative we might assume that the change in clothing indicates an intervening period that we have not 







been shown but one that has required a change of outfit. We might also infer that M and A are becoming 
more acquainted with each other and that this scene is a subsequent step in some sort of romance that will 
develop as the narrative continues. By looking at several examples of this type of sequence, however, we 
can see how the editing pattern and narrative structure ensure that such an expectation on the part of the 
viewer is very rarely met.  
  
Fig. 28. The editing pattern displays an awareness of conventional plot development but only to work 
against it in favour of one that breaks established norms of continuity and causality. 
There are frequent changes in location of the sort outlined i  Fig. 25 at the beginning of this 
chapter, and these unexplained shifts in space and time occur spontaneously and, crucially, with no 
obvious effect on the characters. One example shows X and A e gaged in their continual assertion and 
denial about what they each remember and as they talk they advance towards the camera while it tracks 
backwards. (Fig. 29). X describes what A was wearing when they last met and talks about how she was 
reacting while she denies everything he says. Without breaking the flow of their conversation or their 
respective strides, an edit relocates them to a different corridor before another edit a few steps later takes 
them to a third location. There is nothing in the characters’ words or expressions to indicate that these 
shifts in space have affected them in any way, it is simply jarring and arresting for the viewer.  








Fig. 29. Jump cuts to different locations are not me with any surprise or obvious effect on the characters, 
in contrast to the jarring effect it may have on the viewer  
Fig. 30 illustrates a slight variation on the same technique, omitting in this case any movement 
within the frame but retaining the continuity of dialogue across several edits which bring with them 
noticeable changes to location as well as costume. Similarly, Fig. 31 exhibits a clear change of location 
and costume but links two shots by matching A’s action across the edit as she reaches her hand up across 
her shoulder.  








Fig. 30. A similar technique uses unbroken dialogue to create a bridge across the jump cuts, as we see 
the characters remain static within the frame but their position within the frame with each subsequent 
shot changes.  
 
Fig. 31. Continuity of action as well as dialogue is used in some instances to bridge the gap between 
successive shots that are noticeably altered, both in terms of location and costume.  







These examples are typical the of film’s narrative style and there is no point at which a more 
conventional editing style begins to emerge, with one of the most disorienting and challenging effects 
being the fact that the alterations of time, space, and character appearance are not met with any visible 
sign of surprise or disorientation by the characters themselves. In sharp contrast to a scene like the one in 
Sherlock Jr.(Buster Keaton, 1924), in which Keaton’s dreaming self is comically bounced around as the 
background of the film he has ‘entered’ changes, X and A move smoothly and seamlessly between jumps 
in time and space and give no outward sign of awareness or alarm. Indeed, the example in Fig. 25 in 
which the female character shows a hint of surprise is in fact an atypical reaction to these recurring shifts 
in location. Since these jumps in space and time do not appear to affect the characters it makes sense to 
consider that the formal elements of the film have been elevated to an expressive role designed not simply 
to complement the narrative events but also to communicate ideas or themes inherent in the storyline. 
Furthermore, as far as character identity is concerned, we can once again use Murray Smith’s definitions 
of ‘recognition’ and ‘re-identification’ to conclude that the characters who appear in Marienbad are 
physically consistent throughout, notwithstanding the cosmetic changes to clothing and hairstyles. Spatio-
temporal jumps are disorienting for the viewer, but in terms of recognising the characters, the changes do 
not involve anything like a physical mutation or a heavily-altered version of the same character so as to 
render them unrecognisable from characters we have previously encountered. Rather, it is the film’s fluid 
and malleable narrative landscape that challenges our efforts at categorising and understanding the nature 
of the characters who inhabit it and as such we need to appr ch the film with a sensitivity to the potential 
function(s) of its stylistic choices. 
Shifting Sands or Organised Chaos? 
 
The apparent randomness of changes to spatio-temporal locations is undoubtedly a factor which 
could alienate certain viewers, but it would be remiss to regard Marienbad’s structure as haphazard. The 
film’s narrative patterns exhibit stylistic variations in the way it alters and revises details within the frame, 
and its use of repetition reveals a meticulous design within the structure. One method involves X’s 
voiceover seemingly controlling and dictating the action and content within particular scenes. In one 







example we cut to a shot of X standing before A as she sits on a bench, laughing, before we hear X say 
“No! You weren’t laughing” at which point the scene is revised and we cut to a tighter angle of A on the 
same bench but no longer laughing and now wearing a different d ss. (Fig. 32). More recent examples 
of the same technique can be seen in the films Don Juan de Marco (Jeremy Leven, 1995) and 
Reconstruction (Christopher Boe, 2003), which also bind their voiceover narration to depicted action and 
arbitrarily interrupt certain scenes based on the narrator changing his mind about what he remembers.  
  
Fig. 32. At some points X’s voiceover seems to exert control over particular scenes and details are altered 
in line with how he revises his own recollection.  
As the sequence continues however there is a further variation on the pattern since X contradicts 
himself one more time with an assertive “No”, which relocates the scene to the edge of the fountains. 
Before this alternate version can progress for very long, he changes his mind a third time but on this 
occasion his assertion is not matched by a corresponding change in location (Fig. 33). A mismatch such 
as this perhaps weakens the hypothesis that X’s voiceover is tied to the depicted action and that what we 
are seeing is entirely a portrayal of his subjective experiences. Furthermore, his voice rises with anger 
and he repeats the word “No” as the scene continues, suggesting a reduced level of control over what is 
being depicted, or perhaps frustration and denial about what he remembers compared to how he would 
like to remember a particular moment.   








Fig. 33. Within a single sequence we see the mise-en-scène seemingly change in l e with X’s words, 
however his second assertion is thwarted as the setting remains the same and does not alter according to 
what he describes.  
A third version of this stylistic pattern can be observed when t e action follows X’s words (Fig. 
34), almost like a response to a piece of directorial instruction rather than a description of something 
recalled from memory. In one instance we hear his voiceover say: “It was in the gardens in Frederiksbad. 
You were standing alone. You were leaning on a stone balustr de” and as the description continues the 
action mirrors what we are hearing. Rather than using jarring cuts with breaks in continuity, these 
instances are more suggestive of a memory being built and formed as it goes along as opposed to some 
intact element of conscious memory being recalled. The words appear to control, construct and influence 
the depicted events rather than merely describe them.  








Fig. 34.  A variation on the technique in Fig. 33. As X speaks the movements and actions of A correspond 
to what we hear, almost like a director working with an actor on a particular scene.  
Quite why the narrative varies the way in which these unmotivated changes manifest themselves 
is unclear, and there is seemingly no obvious pattern to the different ways in which causal links and 
continuity are broken or interrupted. You could say that there is no consistency to the film’s 
inconsistencies, or that the film is exploring variations on a particular stylistic effect elevating style to a 
level of significance in line with what Bordwell calls ‘parametric’ narration. The result, Bordwell argues, 
is that the film suggests ‘a coherent fabula world while again and again denying that any such entity can 
be constructed.’174 In addition, there are littered throughout the film a number of scenes which display a 
hint of spectatorship as the characters are positioned side by side and appear to be ‘watching’ the scene 
they are discussing (Fig. 35).  








Fig. 35. As X and A’s differing versions of events are spoken aloud they are at times shown looking 
offscreen as though witnessing the very moments and details they are each describing.  
What should we make of this? Are X and A experiencing a joint recollection that is being played 
out before their eyes in the same way the events are shown to the viewer? As part of my analysis of 
Memento I suggested that key lines of Leonard’s monologue indicate that communicating philosophical 
ideas about personal identity are of importance to the filmmakers. Currie makes a similar observation 
about Marienbad and time when he writes how, paradoxically: 
the very lack of temporal detail puts time high on the agenda…time has low status so far as story 
content goes… but a high expressive status… lack of specificity about time in the story is 
compensatable by features expressive of a concern for time.175  
While time may appear disordered and chaotic as it relates to the characters and storyline, the 
narrative strategy shifts its method for communicating ideas about temporality to the structural, authorial 
level and away from the purely diegetic level. Frank P. Tomasulo describes Marienbad as a ‘genuinely 
phenomenological film’ because of the fact that its ‘aesthetic choices are precisely how [the film] conveys 







its existential themes about time, memory, identity, death, and human consciousness.’176 As Smith points 
out, the area of avant-garde filmmaking has long been r garded as being particularly well-suited to 
analysing and illustrating aspects of consciousness and subjective states, by acting as  ‘metaphor for 
consciousness’ through its tendency to place ‘an emphasis on the rendering of subjective experience.’177 
Marienbad contains scenes which render the subjective experience in a jarringly literal way, with scenes 
being reimagined so that backgrounds, lighting, and costumes can change within a single shot in order to 
demonstrate the pliable and often unreliable nature of memory. Tomasulo’s description articulates the 
breadth of thematic import many critics feel Marienbad generates, and in the context of this chapter the 
issues of memory and identity are particularly salient. If we accept that the film is indeed 
‘phenomenological’ in its approach, then what can we reasonably venture about the ideas it is trying to 
communicate and the reasoning behind its narrative structure and stylistic choices? Although my focus 
here is primarily on memory and subjectivity, a useful starting point is Currie’s analysis of the film’s 
portrayal of time and temporal relations:  
[W]ith its pervasive ambiguities and contradictions in the representations of space, time, and 
causality, [the film] is often said to represent the breakdown of narrative. I am more inclined to 
say that the work exhibits the coming apart of the two aspects I have considered are determinants 
of narrativity: representation of story features and expression of authorial focus. For example, 
while the work expresses (partly through voiced commentary) an interest in time amounting 
almost to obsession, there is very little we can identify which represents temporal relations 
between events in the story.178  
While Currie is primarily concerned with assessing the film’s ‘narrativity,’ the point he makes 
about an ‘almost obsessive’ interest in time being expressed through the voiceover is particularly 
interesting. He points out the friction between how the film repeatedly emphasises the passing of time 
through X’s voiceover while also providing the viewer with little or no clear markers with which to 
assemble a coherent temporal landscape. There is a similr, corresponding hollowness or contradiction 
evident in the narrative’s near-obsessive mention of recollections and remembering sice there is no 
resulting version of events that is even partially freeom ambiguity or contradiction. The numerous overt 







references to memory and recollection appear like a playful taunt or suggestion that the viewer may have 
missed a crucial detail that will reveal a system behind its mosaic of motifs.  
The question of what (if anything) happened last year in Marienbad remains unanswered and the 
film does not even offer up unequivocal answers about whe her or not X and A have indeed met before. 
The lack of resolution about what happened ‘last year’ even extends beyond the work itself in the form 
of responses from the writer and director who each gavecontradictory responses to interviewers about 
whether or not there was a definitive version of X and A’s competing recollections. As Neal Oxenhandler 
points out:  
Resnais wants to analyze character, he wants to make conn tions; he believes that something 
really did happen at Marienbad. Robbe-Grillet, on the other hand, maintains only that we can 
perceive a series of "emotional states" that cannot be connected up in any rational way.179 
A cynical response might regard Robbe-Grillet and Resnais’ contrasting interpretations as a 
useful marketing strategy by feeding into the overall contentiousness of the film’s ‘meaning’ and 
presenting themselves in a neat parallel with the competing versions of events put forward by X and A. 
For Oxenhandler, the film is best viewed with a general acceptance of the fact that the film cannot be 
deciphered and organised in a way that mainstream film texts can. In keeping with the nouveau-roman 
movement, to which Robbe-Grillet was a key contributor, the film’s high-modernist approach to narrative 
structuring demands a method of interpretation that accepts high levels of ambiguity and a lack of 
resolution:  
But obviously the literal meanings will be out of phase. Theatt mpt to connect them up is only 
the vestige of bad habits, a kind of mental literalism, a debris that must be swept away. We must 
learn instead to take for granted the "de-chronology" of the mind and emotions.180  
András Bálint Kovács is of a similar opinion and writes that ‘the factual status of the past event 
[in Marienbad] is made uncertain…and is subject to mental manipulation by the characters,’181 and this 
is a major distinguishing factor between Memento and Marienbad. David Bordwell’s concept of 
‘redundancy’, which I introduced in Chapter Two, is a prominent feature of Memento as the narrative 







twists rely on unambiguously establishing certain diegetic details so that the shadow of doubt cast at the 
end of the film will have maximum impact. Marienbad, by contrast, is very low on redundancy and 
ambiguities are present from the outset and continue throug out the narrative, and it is no surprise that a 
film as riddled with ambiguity as Marienbad has invited a multitude of interpretations. One common 
interpretation is that X and A are a couple stuck in a doomed relationship, and the film’s erratic spatio-
temporal changes are symbolic of how they keep repeating past mistakes wherever and whenever they 
find themselves. Alternatively, some see the film as striving to highlight the artificiality of film as a 
medium by highlighting the erroneous assumption that the fictional world in the narrative even exists. If 
we consider how the modernist novels of Robbe-Grillet challenged its own medium, this way of regarding 
Marienbad certainly makes sense. In contrast with the way in which we strive to form an overall picture 
when watching a film like Memento, Marienbad seems to present us with a realist setting as regards 
characters and locations, and our temptation to approach it in line with corresponding expectations is one 
of the film’s most effective ploys. As with Lost Highway, Marienbad presents spatio-temporal 
impossibilities within what appears to be a real world setting but does not offer any explanations that 
resemble the tropes common to fantastical, magical or even science-fiction storylines. As such, and given 
the modernist background of the filmmakers, we can regard M ienbad as a challenge to the very concepts 
of character construction, setting, narrative events and performance; an anti-mimetic strategy which 
appears – temptingly but superficially - like a realist mystery or r mance.  
For Tomasulo, the narrative is encased in and is the product f the subjectivity of one or more 
character: ‘[the] spacious hotel, elegant rooms, cultivated gardens, and lugubrious, labyrinthine hallways 
can be said to represent the inner workings of consciousness, the “corridors of the mind,” so to speak’.182 
It is certainly tempting to regard the narrative events as entirely the product of X’s memories, thoughts, 
recollections, and desires, particularly since his monologues dominate the soundtrack; however there is a 
lack of consistency in this respect as well. The structu e is not sufficiently uniform to allow such an 
interpretation since the depicted events appear to waver and alternate between X and A’s competing 
accounts. At times A flatly denies all that X claims to be true, at others she appears to agree, while at 
others she partially agrees but disputes certain details such a  the layout of a room, the weather when they 
met, the time of day, or other events that were taking place in the hotel. As I outlined previously, 







Leonard’s perspective acts as the ‘filtering consciousness’183 in Memento as evidenced by the ten-minute 
segmentation within its reverse chronological structure, design d to mimic the sensation Leonard 
experiences each time his memory resets. However, the dieg tic information we are presented with does 
not throw up consistent contradictions of the sort we encou ter in Marienbad, particularly since we can 
observe causal links and consequences between scenes and segments. Despite Leonard’s limitations and 
the fact that the narrative structure seems to be anchored t  his condition in order to give the viewer a 
flavour of how he experiences the world, the narrative also works to create a sense that Leonard exists in 
an empirical reality that functions in a way that resembl s our own. Leonard may be damaged and 
impaired but the film rests on the understanding that the passage of time is consistent and that there is a 
world that carries on functioning irrespective of his memory lapses. The same cannot easily be said of 
Marienbad since the narrative seems to be housed entirely within the realm of subjective experiences, 
although whether that is the subjectivity of X or A or a combination of the two is impossible to say. We 
might also try to merge or reconcile the interpretation offered by Tomasulo with the anti-mimetic 
approach, particularly if we recall the post-mutation condition of Pete in Lost Highway. In Chapter Two 
I looked at the detail of a wound appearing to heal on Pete’s face, which on one reading is suggestive of 
actual physical trauma and transformation. However, the alern tive reading would be to regard the entire 
middle segment of the film as Fred’s fugue state – encased in subjectivity as Tomasulo argues of 
Marienbad – in which a healing wound could simply be another detail conjured up by a delusional state. 
In a similar way, we might choose to regard the seemingly anti-mimetic performances and narrative 
events in Marienbad as having the dual intention of drawing attention to the constructed nature of its 
characters while also representing the product of a character’s traumatised subjectivity. As I mentioned 
in Chapter Three, Bordwell writes how ‘the slogan of the art cinema might be, “When in doubt, read for 
maximum ambiguity”’184, and this approach serves us well in relation to Marienbad.  
Thomas Beltzer offers yet another take on the film and argues that Marienbad is a ‘high 
modernist masterpiece’ which has been ‘"outed" as a postmodern, science fiction film’; according to his 
interpretation, Robbe-Grillet’s screenplay used the novella The Invention of Morel, by Adolfo Bioy 
Casares, as its inspiration. The book tells the story of an escaped convict who hides on a desert island 
only to wake one morning to find it suddenly populated by people from a different era, who repeatedly 







perform actions and behave in particular ways in some form of temporal loop. These individuals, the 
protagonist discovers, are in fact hologram simulations generated by machinery placed on the island by 
the Morel of the title. On this reading the inhabitants of the hotel are merely echoes or recordings of real 
individuals playing out the same routine endlessly, a storyline which is similar to that of The Shining 
(Stanley Kubrick, 1980) in which the hotel retains ghosts of previous visitors which spring into life 
repeatedly over the passing years. This in itself could be regarded as another form of memory recall, 
albeit one that resides like a supernatural echo in the walls of the hotel, just as Morel taps into the concept 
of artificial memory as it relates to computer programming a d looped recordings. With these theories in 
mind, at this point I would like to advance an alternative way of regarding the film, one which 
acknowledges the subjective perspective of the film and its phenomenological structure, but which also 
draws in findings on how memories are stored are recalled.  
A Normal Sort of Fracturing 
 
There is a scene in Marienbad that serves as a good example of spatial impossibility and an 
apparent fracturing of physical identity (Fig. 38). As the scene begins, an unidentified male character is 
relating an anecdote of some sort to an assembled group which includes M and A. The camera tracks 
away from their location and into an adjoining room as the man continues speaking before a cut takes the 
camera back to its starting location to show the characters laughing, presumably at some part of the 
anecdote that we did not hear. The tracking motion is repeat d and as it moves into the adjoining room 
we can see M standing with the same group before he reappears at the opposite side of the frame in the 
next room.  








Fig. 36. An example of how laws of causality and physical space are repeatedly broken.  
It is a continuous shot with no visible edit making it appear that M is simultaneously listening 
to the anecdote in one room but also engaged in a conversation with X in the adjoining room. The short 
duration of the shot all but rules out the possibility that M walked quickly out of shot into next room 
particularly since he and X appear to be in mid-conversation by the time M enters the frame from the 
right. This may not appear unusual since the characters are attending a party in a hotel and appear to be 
mingling and moving freely around the rooms. However, the audio suggests that the anecdote being told 
in the next room has continued across both instances therefore it is unlikely that X could have taken the 
other man’s place and also become engaged in a conversation with M in such a short space of time. If 
there had been a clear edit then we would be able to regard these moments as taking place at different 







times in the same evening. Therefore, the film depicts events which are wholly inconsistent with spatial 
and temporal reality and must therefore be assessed using a different set of criteria and/or alternative 
narrative conventions. One possible interpretation is that we are being shown a flashback through a very 
subtle and disguised technique, but one that does not set up the temporal shift using conventional cues, 
something like the technique which features prominently i  Lone Star (John Sayles, 1996) in which the 
present segues into the flashback with no detectable edit. There is little evidence elsewhere in the film to 
suggest that we should consider a flashback to be the most likely explanation, however; it is not a pattern 
that is repeated in the film, and the content of the dialogue does not set up such a transition. Apart from 
the fact that the assembled group are discussing a past event, the content of their dialogue does not link 
up with the subsequent scene in any way, nor are there any clear indicators of a temporal shift to an earlier 
time in the story. If we are to reject such a theory then we might opt to equate M’s capabilities with the 
physical fracturing demonstrated by the Mystery Man in Lost Highway; an apparently magical (but 
ultimately unexplained) occurrence. Against this, however, is the fact that Marienbad does not display 
supernatural tropes nor does its tone resemble a film that is concerned with uncanny mysteries so we must 
therefore consider alternative explanations.  
Towards the end of Fight Club, when Norton’s character is made to realise that he and Durden 
are the same person, we are shown a variety of flashbacks which alternate between Durden as played by 
Norton but also by Pitt. We hear the latter say “naturally you’re still wrestling with it so sometimes you’re 
still you. Other times you imagine yourself watching me.” Cognitive psychology uses the term autonoetic 
consciousness to denote the way in which we are able to place ourselve  in a first-person perspective 
when we recall past events or place ourselves in future scenarios; which allows us, in Charles 
Fernyhough’s words, to ‘relive [past] moments from the inside.’185 Fernyhough’s analysis is primarily 
concerned with the age at which children develop the ability to form memories with a first-person 
perspective and the findings demonstrate the elasticity of consciousness in terms of how we can place (or 
displace) ourselves within our personal narratives. Skewing chara ter perspective in this way is also 
common to the way in which we experience our sense of slf in dreams, something which is evoked in 
the examples outlined in Fig. 35, as well as the character portrayals in films like Fight Club and Lost 
Highway.   







Currie highlights the temporal ambiguity in the film and it is certainly apt to once again consider 
Oliver Sacks’ phrase “moorings in time” in relation to Marienbad just as we did with Memento. The 
narrative shifts without warning from one apparent spatiotemporal l cation to another. By offering little 
or nothing for the viewer to latch on to that might serves as a fixed reference point, the narrative deflects 
our ability to build a gradual understanding of people, places, timespans, and events. This creates a 
spiralling sense of randomness, what in lay terms one might call ‘madness’, and the suffocating, all-
encompassing subjective perspective might be regarded as something akin to Leonard’s condition but 
seen from the ‘inside’. Shifts and jumps in space and time might be seen as consistent with how we revise 
our own recollections, in the way that Leonard speaks of memory ‘changing the shape of a room’, but on 
a different reading this might also be considered consistent with everyday, almost routine neurological 
behaviour. Fernyhough writes:  
[T]he view that I want to explore…is that memory is more like a habit, a process of constructing 




Fig. 37. Repetition of similarly composed and framed shots helps reinforce the sense of temporal loops 
operating within the narrative.  







His use of the phrase ‘subtly changing ways each time’ resonates with Marienbad’s repetition 
of similar shots in which key details are altered, such as in Fig. 39. The two shots are separated by roughly 
thirty minutes of running time but there is sufficient overlap of details to give the viewer a sense that they 
have seen this arrangement before, one may even wonder if it is the same scene being repeated. As we 
saw with the example from Fight Club in Chapter Three, it is easy to spot the differences between these 
shots when they are presented side by side but the filmmakers need only present a mostly congruent 
duplication of the earlier scen  for the trick to be successful. We can see how the positioning within the 
frame of both X and M is carefully set up to contrast one against the other since they are both the middle 
individual of five in their respective setups. X is foregrounded through his lack of a tie, which shows how 
there is a strategy within the narrative to distinguish him from others characters. A key distinction, 
however, is that unlike in Fight Club, Marienbad is not presenting us with a denouement that works to 
unravel much of what has transpired and contradict certain narrative ‘truths’. The repetition here does not 
constitute a twist, nor even signal a particularly telling moment that clarifies narrative ambiguity.  
At the core of both Memento and Marienbad is a search for some item or detail that the 
protagonist (and by extension the viewer) can regard as a diegetically empirical truth. Leonard searches 
for a truth outside his own flawed consciousness and X strive  for something similar. They each yearn 
for corroboration which will in turn validate their own existenc  by bolstering the spatiotemporal contexts 
that they each cling to. If the subjective perspective is vulnerable then the instinct may be to look 
elsewhere, to empirical reality, to find reassurance that one’s actions, if not one’s actual existence, are 
real. While Memento draws on the detective genre and amasses information in rder to build a clear 
picture (of sorts), Marienbad’s central question is something of a red herring. In Memento we gradually 
acclimatise to the reverse chronology structure and get on board with the role of viewer-as-detective, 
carefully memorising key details just as Leonard does and adjusting to the fact that successive narrative 
segments are actually moving backwards through diegetic time. Asking the viewer to make such an 
adjustment is challenging but not too onerous and as I highlighted earlier, the director was at pains to 
keep ‘redundancy’ (to use Bordwell’s term again) high and plot developments tight and linear. Ambiguity 
is minimised until the film’s conclusion when it casts doubt over much of what has occurred up until that 
point. Marienbad also starts as it means to go on; however its departure f om narrative norms and 







mainstream techniques is far more extreme than Memento’s, and it is debatable whether or not one can 
adjust to its approach in the same way we are able to with Memento. As Currie puts it,  
[t]he problem with Marienbad is the degree of trade-off it demands; we can think of it as high 
in narrativity if we are willing to shift the burden of temporality almost entirely from what is 
represented concerning the story to what is expressed concerning the intentions behind the 
story.187  
Currie’s argument is that the viewer’s task could be made easier if we accept that temporal 
relations with the diegesis are subordinate to what he calls ‘the expression of authorial focus.’188 On this 
reading, attempting to organise the story time into a coherent picture is something of a fool’s errand, 
while focusing on how the film’s structure foregrounds the process of manipulating cinematic time could 
be ultimately more rewarding. Time is not an irrelevance but rather the way in which the film explores 
questions concerning time - or memory or subjectivity depending on one’s interpretation - is achieved as 
much through the structure as through the storyline. As we sa  in the previous chapter, Memento achieves 
something similar in the way that its structure creates n epistemic link with Leonard, which distinguishes 
it from other films which are ‘about memory’ but which relate their tales using more conventional 
methods.  
So far I have considered a variety ways in which the self-identity of characters can be regarded 
as fractured, and we may be inclined to think that a fracturing of personal identity should carry a negative 
connotation since it suggests trauma, injury, or some form of malfunction. Leonard in Memento and Fred 
in Lost Highway exist as damaged individuals whose psychologies are fractured and impaired through 
physical injury or emotional trauma, or a combination of both. There is scope, however, for an alternative 
way of regarding a selfhood as something fractured but in a way that does n t necessitate a negative or 
unappealing connotation. If we place any degree of importance o  memory as an important component 
of selfhood, then the concept of reconstructive memory theory provides a different way of regarding our 
psychological makeup and, by extension, the way in which self ood can be conceptualised. Challenging 
what he sees as a folk psychological understanding of how memory operates, Fernyhough writes the 
following:  







Thinking differently about memory requires uto think differently about some of the ‘truths’ 
that are closest to the core of our selves…I want to argue against the view of memories as mental 
DVDs stored away in some library of the mind.189 
Reconstructive memory theory posits that recollection involves memories being reassembled on demand 
from a number of different schema and neurological locati ns but, crucially, also involves a degree of 
revision and confabulation each time the memory is recall d. Thinking about memory in the way 
Fernyhough describes, as something prone to revision rather than a representation which is stored intact 
then retrieved when required, appears to be a neuropsychological confirmation of what Leonard holds up 
as the fundamental problem with an over-reliance on memory. In this context, a fractured self would be 
regarded as a perfectly normal entity, an almost unavoidable condition of personal existence and a way 
or regarding selfhood that has much in common with Hume’s bundle theory. Equally, thinking of memory 
in this way, we can construe a parallel between the role of inference on the part of the film viewer and 
the concept of reconstructive memory – each makes use of imagination or suggestion to construct a 
coherent whole. In Chapter Three I mentioned J rome Bruner’s idea of ‘going beyond the information 
given’, which he uses to refer to the way in which we partially confabulate our autobiographical memory 
in order to build a self-narrative and understand our past; an idea which Bordwell develops to better 
understand how we bring our own inferences and ideas when watching films. In his essay, “The Viewer’s 
Share”190 and in Julian Hanich’s “Omission, Suggestion, Completion,”191 they each analyse the role of 
the viewer has in ‘filling in’ the various necessary, and at times deliberate, gaps that exist throughout film 
narratives. If we then extend this idea further to include the role of memory in the construction of self-
identity, then we can see how we habitually form an approximation of film narratives and characters 
despite inherent gaps in our knowledge, just as we do with our own recollections. Daniel C. Dennett 
draws on scientific findings to put forward a similar argument in his article ‘The Self as the Centre of 
Narrative Gravity’:   
According to [Michael] Gazzaniga, the normal mind is not beautifully unified, but rather a 
problematically yoked-together bundle of partly autonomous systems. All parts of the mind are not 







equally accessible to each other at all times. These modules or systems sometimes have internal 
communication problems which they solve by various ingenious and devious routes.192 
In Marienbad we are presented with a narrative structure that is highly sporadic in terms of how it 
organises its spatiotemporal environment, which is one aspect that makes it a challenging viewing 
experience. The way in which the constituent elements of the narrative are arranged resembles a mosaic, 
a cluster of fractured units which are put together in such an unconventional way that it reveals much 
about how we expect a film to behave. However, to label th  narrative structure as challenging and 
unconventional does not necessarily mean that the same is true for its portrayal of characters. Reading 
the film in the context of Fernyhough’s argument and Dennett’s summary of Gazzaniga’s findings, it 
could be said that what makes the film difficult as a viewing experience is the same thing that makes it 
an accurate portrayal of memory function. Currie suggests that ‘[p]erhaps narrative encourages us to think 
of the mind as more structured, more orderly, more robustly in control of circumstance than it really is.’193 
We need only pause for a few moments to realise how readily our minds leap forwards and backwards in 
time as we process experiences, retrieve memories, and imagine future scenarios. If one could portray 
such a mental process in a moving image might it not look frenetic and apparently random in the way that 
Marienbad does, even though it may not feel that way to the individual experiencing it? On the one hand 
we could regard Marienbad as an attempt to portray the erratic recollections of an individual’s traumatised 
psyche in which the experiencer is displaced and replaced in a constant cycle of shifting perspectives and 
perpetual changes in space, time, and character appearance. As part of my analysis of Memento I looked 
at Oliver Sacks’ account of the unfortunate patient he described as a “Humean being,” 194, a man whose 
sense of his own identity seemed to be reborn every few minutes or even seconds. This process of 
perpetual revision could also be applied to our experience of watching Marienbad in the sense that the 
viewer attempts to find reliable narrative ground only for it to repeatedly fall away. On the other hand, 
the way in which the film alters the mise-en scène without obvious narrative cues might also be regarded 
as an illustration of the standard ‘reassemble on-demand’ process of recollection that Fernyhough 
describes. If we subscribe to the interpretation that the entirety of Marienbad is X’s subjective experiences 
then it may be wholly consistent to have repetition of certain moments we have already seen but with 
noticeable alterations. The reassembling of memory ‘in similar but subtly changing ways each time’ 







makes the processing of Marienbad’s narrative much more straightforward and makes its host of 
ambiguities easier to reconcile. While on the one hand Sacks’ patient scrambles around for any 
psychological prop he can use to reinforce his sense of lf, the process of reimagining the past from 
disparate fragments is a mental process being carried out continuously in our daily lives. If we extend 
that idea to include philosophical discussions about the role of memory in self-identity then in a certain 
sense this reassembling of memories suggests a type of self with a greater level of fluidity and dynamism 
than we might ordinarily assume. If we accept that our psychological makeup is at least part of what 
constitutes our self-identity then of course memory willconstitute a large proportion of what makes us 
who we are. We need not take Locke’s position that memory is the essence who we are, but it is hard to 
deny that our sense of a lived past is at least part of wh  we are, or how we experience selfhood. That 
being the case, then flawed or inaccurate recollections as well as more reliable ones will be inseparable 
from the whole entity we refer to as ‘memories’, and as such it would follow that a certain proportion of 
our self-identity is built on inaccuracies and falsehoods. This is not necessarily a bad thing, however, and 
need not denote a malfunction or be applied solely to tragic cases like Leonard in Memento or Sacks’ 
patient. As Dennett, Currie, and Fernyhough have argued, the sens  of psychological wholeness is 
perhaps illusory and in reality the mind, and therefore in part the self, is in a greater state of flux and is 
more piecemeal than we might appreciate. To exist and function ‘normally’ does not exclude the 
possibility that we are riddled with fractures, it is just that these are an inherent part of our psychological 
makeup of which we are not routinely aware. Marienbad is perhaps portraying the standard way in which 
we revisit memories and alter details without realising, but it appears erratic and confusing because of the 
gulf between the typical form and behaviour of a conventional narrative and that of a complex system 
like the human brain.  
What partially works against this sort of reading is the area of commonality between Lost Highway, 
Memento and Marienbad: the implication that inconsistencies regarding recalled versions of events is in 
some way linked to the suppression of psychological trauma. Although Robbe-Grillet’s script contains a 
scene depicting a rape, the film does not make this explicit, opting instead for a subtle implication and 
suggestion of violence and / or violation. The fact that e film is not direct about this detail allows room 
for different readings and as such invites the possibility that a structure and style that departs so radically 







from mainstream filmmaking conventions may in contrast adhere to a view of memory that might actually 
be quite conventional. This theory only works as a partial explanation, however, and does not account for 
the foreboding tone of Marienbad. In line with what Tomasulo suggests, we could say that 
phenomenology acts as n inspiration for the film’s structure and stylistic design, but the nature of the 
back-and-forth exchanges between X and M, verging at times on arguments and physical abuse, suggests 
otherwise. The tone of the film, as a result of the actors’ performances and dialogue combined with the 
ominous soundtrack, is rarely light and often feels threatening and dark even if the root cause is unclear 
or uncued. For this reason, we are encouraged to doubt much of what we see and hear – in accordance 
with the way that X and A contradict one another – however moments such as when X shouts aggressively 
or when A screams as if seeming to recall something horrific, suggest that there really has been a trauma 
of some kind. As such, we should perhaps regard the film in its entirety as an attempted rendering of how 
memory operates shot through with the suggestion of psychologica  trauma and a damaged psychology; 
the origin of which is only ever implied and not explicitly il ustrated as it is with Leonard in Memento.  
The search for narrative clarity and reliable information about characters and events are fundamental 
processes, which we employ constantly when attempting to comprehend film narratives whether or not 
we are conscious of this mental activity.  Carroll makes the same link that I have attempted to forge in 
this chapter when he compares Marienbad to Memento: 
Memento recalls Last Year at Marienbad [through how it] manages to make us aware of the 
degree to which our comprehension of narratives is organized around formulating tacit questions 
that we then expect the story to go on to answer. Ma ienbad provokes this insight by generating 
a plethora of questions…but then referains from answering any of them…Likewise…the 
narrative structure of Memento challenges spectators to make sense of it and, in the procss, to 
observe introspectively the way in which they manage to accomplish this feat.’195 
Memento to a certain extent thwarts our efforts, or at least makes our task more difficult, through 
devices such as an unreliable narrator located within a reverse narrative. Last Year in Marienbad goes 
further and its governing principles all but evaporate, with one of the film’s defining features being its 
lack of adherence to any set of rules, even those which t e film itself apparently establishes as being in 







operation in its own diegetic world. While Memento strives to carefully define the nature of its 
protagonist's memory impairment, Marienbad perpetually deflects our efforts to glean meaning since 
there are insufficient reference points or spectatorial footholds with which we can contextualise individual 
scenes and sequences. Or, to put it more idiomatically, Memento spins a yarn before pulling the rug from 
under the viewer’s feet, while Marienbad repeatedly pulls the rug and gives viewers barely enough time 
to get back to their feet. Just as the insulin injection / thigh pinching shots in Memento could be seen as 
an example of Marienbad’s style in microcosm, so too could Teddy’s accusation that Leonard ‘doesn’t 
know who he is’ be regarded as a concept which Marienbad extrapolates and explores for the entire film.  
In the third and final section of this study, one issue I will be looking at is the phenomenological 
debate surrounding how we can or should best describe and categorise our sense of personal history. Part 
of the discourse on this subject revolves around Narrativism, which argues that the way in which 
autobiographical memory allows us to develop a sense of slfhood is comparable to the way in which a 
storyteller creates a narrative. The argument is that we as individuals are the protagonists of our own 
lifelong tales, which are continually being woven through a process of reflection on the life we have lived 
so far in order to make decisions and plans about the future. In the context of this debate, both Memento 
and Marienbad are useful tools for considering how applicable one type of narrative structure might be 
over another when considering both sides of the narrativist argument. Memento more explicitly outlines 
the damaged psychology of its protagonist, compared to the bliquely implied trauma suffered by A at 
the hands of X in Marienbad, and we have seen how the narrative structure is used as a framing device 
to try and replicate Leonard’s memory impairment. However, perhaps this structure could also be seen as 
lending itself too readily to the idea that our creation of a self-narrative, our autobiographical memory, is 
assembled a way that is comparable to a linear story. Admittedly, Memento is atypical in terms of its 
reverse chronology, and it does contain non-linear elements such as flashbacks, but it is nonetheless more 
uni-directional than Marienbad. As we have seen in this chapter Marienbad could also be regarded as a 
less obvious but perhaps more fitting illustration of certain types of subjective processes even though it 
is not explicitly framed as dealing with trauma-induced memory impairment.  
 







III Stay with your Guide 
Jessica Rabbit: I’m not bad, I’m just drawn that way. 
(Who Framed Roger Rabbit? Robert Zemeckis, 1988) 
In ‘The Self as the Centre of Narrative Gravity’, Daniel C. Dennett writes that an important difference 
between fictional selves and real selves is that ‘a fictional character is usually encountered as a fait 
accompli.’ 196 This idea is encapsulated in Jessica Rabbit’s words above when she complains that she is 
destined to come across in a particular way because the creative and artistic decisions that went into 
making her existence a reality mean that she is ‘locked-in’ to her identity. Unlike real world selves, which 
go through a multitude of changes and evolutions, fictional chracters are by their very nature pre-
established and fixed entities, at least for the duration of the text we are consuming. Characters can of 
course evolve over the course of a given narrative, and they can be revisited and revised within subsequent 
works of fiction, such as sequels, prequels, or ‘re-imaginings’; but within its given storyline the fictional 
self needs to have been constructed in its entirety in order for us to consume the story in which the 
character appears. More often than not, certainly in many mainstream narrative films, a protagonist 
features as the focal point around which the story revolv s, and in a sense this central character acts as 
the narrative spectator’s ‘guide.’ If we put it in aviation terminology, the roll, pitch, and yaw of a central 
character’s trajectory very often bends the narrative focus in a corresponding way. This very general 
description that does not account for the myriad nuances and complexities that a protagonist’s arc can 
take during a film, but the analysis that follows in my final two chapters will add some more depth to this 
rather bare sketch. Like Dennett, I wish to explore the relationship between how we experience a sense 
of self and the function of characters in fiction narratives; something which is deftly alluded to in a 
celebrated passage from George Eliot’s Middlemarch 197: 
Your pier-glass or extensive surface of polished steel made to b  rubbed by a housemaid, will 
be minutely and multitudinously scratched in all directions; but place now against it a lighted 







candle as a centre of illumination, and lo! the scratches will seem to arrange themselves in a fine 
series of concentric circles round that little sun. It is demonstrable that the scratches are going 
everywhere impartially and it is only your candle which produces the flattering illusion of a 
concentric arrangement, its light falling with an exclusive optical selection. 
This passage uses the imagery of a scratched mirror to actas  metaphor for ego-centrism and 
the way in which we, as sentient individuals, cannot av id experiencing the world from a first-person 
perspective and all of the self-interested motivations such a vantage point brings with it. On another level, 
the metaphor is a commentary on narratives and the characters who inhabit them, which is particularly 
poignant in the case of Middlemarch as it features an array of characters whose interpersonal relationships 
and inner lives are described in an extremely detailed way. Its relevance to my project will become clear 
in the two chapters which make up this third and final section of the current study, in which I will be 
looking at the relationship between a central character in film narratives and philosophical and 
psychological theories about personal identity. The focus of the chapters in this section will initially look 
closely at the function and development of fictional characters in general before exploring these questions 
in relation to central or leading characters in particular. The films that I will analyse across the following 
two chapters, Mirror (Andrei Tarkovsky, 1975) and Inland Empire (David Lynch, 2006), are examples 
of non-mainstream filmmaking whose narratives are revealing about our attitudes to and expectations of 
how a lead character should be developed and sustained. The story of each film exhibits features that we 
have already encountered, such as bodily trauma and physical alteration of characters, fractured 
psychologies, and the portrayal of memory in all its capriiousness. In addition to these features, the films 
challenge our assumptions and expectations of how, and eve  if, a protagonist should be developed, which 
in turn opens up wider discussions about storytelling and self-identity and the extent to which our sense 
of self could (or should) be regarded as a narrative in its own right. I will explore how a establishing a 
clear protagonist is something of an assumption or expectation we bring to consuming fiction films, 
perhaps because we are limited to experiencing the world from only one perspective or maybe there is an 
inherent need for human beings to follow leaders rather than groups. Theoretical studies of narrative 
construction and character development find a close equivalent in certain schools of thought in which 
philosophy and cognitive psychology overlap. Narrative identity theory argues that we build a sense of 







self-identity through being able to recall past experiences and also anticipate the future, and there are 
those who believe that this way of building a sense of self is comparable to or can be conceived in the 
same terms as a narrative. As I will illustrate, there is no consensus on this theory and there are others 
who deny that we understand our own identity through the storie  we tell ourselves and each other, and 
that we act as the protagonists in our own narratives.  
Through a detailed analysis of each film I will explore how the narratives upset and challenge 
the very idea of who or what it is that carries or guides a storyline, and what one can conclude from viewer 
expectations about the way in which we operate in the world as self-aware individuals. Mirror  stands as 
a pertinent counter-example to a film like Memento as regards their respective narrative centres. 
Tarkovsky’s film, like Memento, is structured in a way that mimics certain elements of its protagonist’s 
psychology, although in the case of Mirror  there is a noticeable contrast in terms of how its central 
character is established and portrayed. The film also shares common ground with Lost Highway and 
Marienbad through its use of doppelgängers and ambiguity surrounding memories, however the context 
and function of these techniques in Mirror  opens an additional area of discussion in which the 
complexities of authorship and self-narrativising can be examined. In different ways, Mirror and Inland 
Empire also point at the artificiality of what we are seeing, and the very fictionality of characters is 
foregrounded and exposed. Mirror  shares with Inland Empire the use of single actors for multiple roles; 
however it contrasts sharply with Lynch’s film in the way that its protagonist is ambiguous or even non-
existent, depending on your interpretation. With Inland Empire, on the other hand, we are able to see 
Laura Dern clearly in her various roles, but the narrative does n t clearly establish when (or if) a transition 
from one character to another has taken place.  
According to Bordwell’s definition, the classical Hollywood narrative favours clear storytelling 
above all else and as such makes an effort to conceal and suppress the formal features which draw the 
viewer’s attention towards the film’s construction.198 He qualifies this by pointing out that some passages 
in mainstream films, such as credit sequences, ‘present information in highly self-conscious and 
omniscient fashion.’ Although in this example, the classical narrative is perhaps borrowing from the 
theatre tradition - with the credit sequence representing the cinematic equivalent of a production’s 







accompanying programme and its conclusion representing the moment in which the curtain has fallen – 
it can still be perceived as clear moment of self-consciu ness and a moment in which there is viewer 
awareness of artifice. By contrast, in art-cinema and vant garde narratives one can more readily find 
examples of films in which deliberate efforts have been made to highlight from within the diegesis the 
constructed nature of what is being shown, and even at times to directly involve and invoke the 
filmmakers themselves. Bordwell identifies the art cinema tradition as a body of wrk that is identifiable 
through its contrast with classical narrative norms, such as foregrounding rather than suppressing 
authorial choices and creative decisions. Some of the examples I have studied up to this point could be 
situated squarely within Bordwell’s definition of art cinema - Marienbad in particular but also elements 
of Lost Highway and to a lesser extent Memento - and the films which will be the main focus in the next 
two chapters are no different.  
Viewers, then, approach films with certain expectations about h w a central character should or 
is likely to develop during the course a film, and these expectations pertain greatly to whichever particular 
genre or tradition a given film belongs. Jens Eder’s summary of our expectations of character in the 
context of mainstream on the one hand, and independent realist films on the other, is a good place to start. 
What Eder terms ‘independent realism’ is equivalent to what Bordwell refers to as ‘art cinema’ or the ‘art 
film’, and he identifies many of the same key indicators regarding character construction as Bordwell:  
The mainstream film thus conveys an image of humanity that pictures humans as active, 
reflective, rational, emotional, morally unambiguous, comprehensible, coherent, and 
autonomous. The characters of independent realism…are by contrast more opaque, more 
ambivalent, difficult to understand, less dramatic, rather static, more inconsistent and passive 
than in mainstream film.199   
Eder sets up clear dichotomies with his choice of adjectives and makes the assertion that the 
mainstream group will be more accessible and simplified than the characters that are typical of the 
‘independent realism’ group. Naturally there will be examples in each group that do not match precisely 
Eder’s description, but the dichotomy itself is hard to dispute and is clearly observable in films generally. 
For my purposes, some of Eder’s descriptors are particularly useful: ‘opaque, inconsistent, ambivalent’ 







vs. ‘unambiguous, coherent, comprehensible.’ David Bordwell asserts that films do not present us with
‘“real people”’200 but argues that we are instead dealing with representations which resemble real people, 
and who for the most part provide the viewer with access to narratives by virtue of their status as ‘a major 
“entry point” into our engagement with narratives,’201 to use Smith’s terminology. However, as Smith 
points out, it is essential that one acknowledges this ‘entry point’ as just that and no more, since to equate 
a work of fiction (and our responses to it) with reality would constitute a delusion and negates the 
narrative’s status as a work of fiction outright.202 Smith refutes the idea that we can at any point lose 
awareness of the fact that we are watching ‘representations’ as opposed to actual events taking place 
before our eyes. Even if the act of ‘entering into’ the storyline is momentarily forgotten or is perhaps only 
tacitly acknowledged, our real-world experiences will always be brought to bear on how we consume and 
respond to fictional narratives and the characters who in abit them; and one of those experiences is the 
voluntary act of watching a fiction film. 
Experiencing life as an individual dictates a necessarily self-oriented perspective on the world, 
and our ability to recall who we are enables us to operate successfully in the present, to reflect on the past,
and plan for the future. In order to access and comprehend fictional narratives we tend to latch on to 
individual characters, particular y protagonists, primarily because agents such as these are the “best fit” 
in relation to how we interpret and operate in the real wor d. Even when we are presented with a narrative 
that contains no obvious or easily discernible characters the viewer will most likely project human-like 
properties onto whatever narrative details or evidence is available. David Bordwell writes how during the 
process of watching a film: 
[T]he critic scans the text for cues that answer to criteria for “personhood.”’ [and tends to] rank 
cues hierarchically, and at the top of the list are human agents performing actions[…]The 
character-as-person schema seems obvious because it is ours; it is us. 203  
Bordwell, Smith and Eder’s positions provide a rationale for why viewers become absorbed in 
fiction film narratives, and why it is predominantly through the presence of characters that we do so. 
Their accounts also acknowledge the relative ways in wh ch characters can appear more or less congruent 
with ‘real people’, while also continually being aware of the artificial nature of characters. If we broaden 







this consideration to narratives in general, and not only fiction films, we can return to the argument with 
which I opened this introductory section.  
The sense of our own individuality weaving its biography trough time and space finds a 
recognisable fictional counterpart in the form of the protagonist, who acts as the viewer’s guide through 
a narrative. This concept, generally referred to as the Narrativist approach in philosophy, compares our 
experiences and sense of selfhood with the way in which protagonists lead us through works of fiction. 
Dennett, who is one of many proponents of this approach, argues that real world selves contrast with 
fictional ones by virtue of the latter’s ‘pre-written’ nature, a fait accompli which cannot be equated with 
the ever-developing changes we experience as we live and grow. However, this position chimes with the 
points made by Bordwell, Eder and Smith since it draws a similarity between real selves and fictional 
ones while keeping a healthy distance between the two. One notable dissenting voice arguing against the 
narrativist approach is Galen Strawson who sets out his counterarguments in his essay ‘The Unstoried 
Life,’204 and in the next two chapters I will look at how unconventional cinematic portrayals of 
protagonists are highly pertinent to the narrativist / anti-narrativist debate. I will draw on arguments laid 
out in the earlier chapters while also building on them by looking at key ideas about storytelling and self-
narrativizing such as those put forward by Dennett and Strawson. An ther principal theorist in this area 
of debate is the psychologist Dan P. McAdam. On the subject of selfhood and narrative identity, McAdam 
writes: 
Narrative identity is a personal myth. As such, it provides meaning and verisimilitude, more than 
it provides objective truth. We humans need meaning, perhaps even more than we need truth.205 
If we reflect on this passage in relation to some of the points about memory, which I raised in 
Chapters 3 and 4, we can see the relevance of McAdam’s argument. To call one’s sense of a lived past a 
‘myth’ clearly puts emphasis on the highly subjective and most likely inaccurate understanding of at least 
much of what we have said and done in our lives. However, McAdam is not positing that this is 
necessarily a bad thing, but rather arguing that it is an mportant part of our humanity and our ability to 
contextualise and make sense of our place in the world. As we will see in the final two chapters of this 
study, his mention of humans needing ‘meaning’ more than ‘objective truth’ will take on particular 







significance in relation to the narratives of Mirror and Inland Empire. Each film contains imagery and 
character portrayals which present us with paradoxes of space, time and identity, and from which attempts 
at gleaning ‘objective truth’ is perhaps a wasted exercise. ‘Objective’ is a highly charged term and it 
suggests a sense of perspective that can be wholly reliedupon (perhaps beyond the film content proper) 
and, as we shall see in the chapters that follow, we may struggle to gain such a vantage point. Furthermore, 
even if we ‘downgrade’ our search to merely ‘diegetic truth’, we encounter difficulties because of the fact 
that the links between scenes and the respective storylines of both Mirror and Inland Empire do not rely 
very substantially on a reliable cause-effect or goal-oriented narrative trajectory. However, with their 
emphasis on a remembered past and the relative clarity with which we can readily identify and ‘re-
identify’ the characters throughout the narratives resonate with the points McAdam makes. As we will 
see, aiming for ‘verisimilitude’ and the adoption of deeply subjective perspectives has implications for 
both the films’ structures as well as their intelligibility; and much of our appreciation of what each film 
is communicating to the viewer might at times come down to whether we are seeking multiple meanings, 
or seeking literal truth.    
 
  








 The Invisible Self in The Mirror 
 
Mirror  (aka The Mirror) (Andrei Tarkovsky, 1975) was described by the director as 'the rem mbrances 
of a man who recalls the most important moments in his life, a man dying and acquiring a conscience'.206 
This rather simplified description, however, reveals nothing of the complex and highly unconventional 
narrative style of what is a deeply personal film rooted in the director’s own life experiences. In his 
retrospective essay on Tarkovsky’s work, Nick James describes Mirror as being ‘framed as the 
recollections of a dying poet, yet presented as quintessential dream logic.’207 His mention of ‘dream logic’ 
refers not only to certain sequences which depict surreal imagery and events but also to the way in which 
the film is structured according to thematic links using a loose, associative pattern rather than a classical 
narrative paradigm built around a goal-oriented protagonist. The film ostensibly uses an unseen narrator 
as its guiding character and, as the quotes from Tarkovsky and James suggest, by framing the film’s 
events through the lens of a remembered and (to a lesser extent) documented past, the film is imbued with 
significance that resonates strongly with key issues that I ve examined up to this point. In this chapter 
I will examine the way in which narrative progression and character portrayal are inflected with qualities 
that resemble dreams and memories as a direct result of using personal experiences as the inspiration and 
framework for the narrative. The framing informs the structure, and events and can be used to reconcile 
some of the film’s paradoxes, but the film is not narrated in a typical, theatrical style of a voiceover which 
interjects at key points to advance a story. I will consider the way in which the film engages with our 
expectations of character development, particularly how actors in dual roles and shifting perspectives 
within the diegeis interact in significant ways with the film’s episodic structure and at times dreamlike 
sequencing. Beyond this I will then look to build on the arguments I have already made about issues 
concerning fictional characters and our self-identity. I will use my close analysis of Mirror to consider 
the similarities and differences between how we understand selfhood as a distinct entity and the 







corresponding way in which we discern separateness of fictional characters and cohesiveness of the 
narratives they inhabit. I will aim to illustrate how Mirror can be seen as a representation of the 
interdependence of individuals and phenomena in the real world, and a vivid illustration of how a sense 
of separation and distinctiveness could be regarded as a relative concept.  
The film is set in Russia and spans the periods before, du ing, and after World War II, with the 
only scene set in the diegetic present being that of a dying man whose face is never revealed and who we 
infer to be the narrator, Aleksey. The film does not explicitly identify the dying man as the disembodied 
voice we hear but we are able to build a gradual appreciation throughout the narrative that a large 
proportion of the film is comprised of Aleksey’s memories and recollections. These often appear in the 
form of dreamlike digressions and fantasies and the words we hear him speak on his deathbed allude to 
the fact that these memories can be attributed to him. The narrative is highly episodic and displays little 
in the way of cross-cutting and parallel action across different locations, and although each scene is 
arranged in a linear way, the chronology of the film as a whole is not sequential and the spatio-temporal 
relationship between each segment is not immediately obvious. There is often no explicit signal to the 
viewer about when certain events are taking place nor how t e events in one segment relate to those in 
others, and as such the viewer must be attentive to con extual details in order to build up an understanding 
of the various plot elements. You may say that this is a rudimentary, almost automatic process carried out 
when watching a conventional film, however in this case the typical narrative reference points we 
routinely cling to are oblique or suppressed, which makes the task more difficult. Of particular relevance 
for my purposes is the effect that such a narrative framework has on its portrayal of character identities, 
which is where I will turn my attention now.  
In Chapter Three, I explored how Memento’s structure and the relative cohesion of its narrative 
events are influenced by Leonard as position as the film’s ‘filtering consciousness.’ Mirror ’s premise and 
the way in which it is framed make it comparable to this aspect of Memento. The comparison is mostly 
superficial, however, and in this chapter I will work through a number of sequences from Mirror to 
consider how its narrative style and character portrayals set the film apart from those I have looked at 
previously. The events are drawn primarily from the personal experiences and memories of Tarkovsky 







himself and the unseen narrator operates as a loose representation of the director. If we take the film on 
the content of its narrative, rather than reading around the film about its production history, then it can 
appear as a general, universal reflection on childhood, family, emory, and life choices. However, there 
are small details inserted (at one point we see a poster f r another of Tarkvosky’s films),which hint at the 
fact that what we are seeing has an unusually personal cne tion to the director. In filmmaking there is 
a plethora of creative hands responsible for the creation of the fictional characters and the worlds they 
inhabit, and ordinarily we do not see these individuals on screen. The protagonist is the fictional tool that 
is employed by these creative agents to guide the viewer through the story, however there are times when 
character and author can be brought much more closely into al gnment with each other. It is important to 
use caution when equating authorship with fictional agents sice a collaborative process like filmmaking 
has many creative sources. Large portions of The 400 Blows (François Truffaut, 1959), for example, are 
well-known to be depictions of the director’s own childhood experiences, but as we have seen in Section 
II, time can cloud and embellish memories. It is perhaps safer, therefore, to acknowledge the inspiration 
or source for a particular storyline rather than ascribing wholesale accuracy and congruence with an 
individual person’s experiences. As we will see, however, taking this approach in relation to Mirror  only 
really applies up to a point, and this is because the film is deliberately designed to encourage a fusion or 
connection between filmmaker and narrator.  
Degrees of Doubling  
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that a film called Mirror  should display doubling and repetition as 
prominent visual and thematic features. As I discussed in relation to Lost Highway, ‘doubles’ are a key 
feature of Freud’s account of the uncanny and Lynch’s film abounds with examples of uncanny doubling. 
In Mirror  the shadow cast by Tarkovsky’s real life on the narrative content is just one many examples of 
doubling, and the tone and narrative function is noticeably different from the portrayal of doppelgängers 
in Lost Highway. The film contains a broad spectrum of examples and one ca  see how the level of 
narrative information provided to help inform the likely motivation or meaning behind each instance 
varies considerably. We saw in Chapter Two how L st Highway uses the Alice / Renee pairing, as played 







by Patricia Arquette, to create a high degree of ambiguity over whether or not these figures are actually 
different characters, and in Mirror  we can see the same technique being used but with notable differ nces 
regarding narrative context and function. In addition to this technique there are a number of other 
instances of duplication or repetition and taken as a whole t ese examples, which I will work through 
here, represent a spectrum of doubling made with varying degrees of subtlety. As with Lost Highway the 
most obvious instance of character duplication is achieved through the use of a single actor in more than 
one role, in particular the dual roles played by Margarita Terekhova and Ig at Danieltsev (Fig. 38). It is 
debatable whether or not the film displays clear enough identifiers to allow the viewer to make inferences 
about time periods, and therefore place the different incarnations of Terekhova and Danieltsev in an 
established chronology of some sort. Although there are few recognisable alterations to details such as 
clothing or hairstyles, the difference in locations and general diegetic content are the main sources 
required to help the viewer to distinguish the different characters from one another.  
 
Fig. 38. (top) Margarita Terekhova as Aleksey’s wife, Natalya, and Aleksey’s mother, Maria. (bottom) 
Ignat Danieltsev as the narrator Aleksey’s 12 year old self, and as Aleksey’s son, Ignat.  
We first encounter the character Maria in the scene after the prologue and credit sequence as she 
sits on a fence at her country cottage. We learn from the voiceover that this is the narrator’s mother, 
pining for her husband who is fighting in the war. By the film’s sixth scene Terekhova appears again, this 







time in the role of the narrator's ex-wife, Natalya, in post-war Russia. In each case, the characters' hair, 
make-up and clothing display little to distinguish the different roles from one another, and it is primarily 
from the settings and dialogue that one is able to deduce that the actress is indeed playing more than one 
role. Similarly, the film introduces us to the character Ignat (Ignat Danieltsev) during a very short pre-
credits scene in which we see him switch on a TV set and watch a programme about someone being cured 
of a debilitating stutter. The same character then appears in  cene during which he has a conversation 
with his father on the telephone, which leads on to an embedded flashback in which Danieltsev appears 
as his father’s younger self. I will look in detail at these scenes later in this chapter but at this point it is 
sufficient to say that by casting the film in this way, Tarkovsky presents a particular challenge for the 
viewer as regards narrative comprehension. In Murray Smith’s detailed analysis of two films that employ 
the opposite technique - The Suspended Vocation (Raúl Ruiz, 1978) and That Obscure Object of Desire 
(Luis Buñuel, 1977) - he highlights how the use of two actors for a single role is a technique that can very 
often undermine ‘basic narrative coherence,’ depending on the amount of contextual explanation that is 
made available. In the case of Mirror , potential confusion caused by the use of the same actress to play 
two distinct characters is offset to a large extent by an exchange between Natalya and the narrator, which 
takes place as Natalya looks in the mirror with her reflection directly addressing the camera (Fig. 40, top 
left image). In this scene the camera adopts Aleksey’s first-person perspective through the use of an 
optical POV shot, and we hear him say:  
“I always said that you resemble my mother…When I recall my childhood and my mother, 
somehow she always has your face.”  
Then shortly thereafter Natalya says:  
“I notice with horror how much Ignat is becoming like you.”  
Smith writes that when we are ‘[o]ffered no motivation at the levels of story, realism, or genre, 
the spectator reaches for what could be described as thematic motivation;’208 and this would certainly be 
our instinct with Mirror  even if the film did not highlight its own symbolism so explicitly. Based on this 
exchange of dialogue we might reasonably conclude that the conflati n of four characters into two actors 







appears to have a clear rationale. Even though the technique might appear jarring initially, we should be 
able to reconcile this detail quite easily since the characters articulate the resemblances they each perceive 
between mother and wife, or father and son. What is less conventional though is how the resemblances 
they describe have been rendered in a literal way by using the same actors for different roles. The dual 
roles played by Terekhova and Danieltsev is one of the film’s more obvious examples of doubling, but 
there are other notable instances, which are perhaps less immediately striking but nonetheless make 
important stylistic and thematic contributions.  
The film is riddled with subtle instances of doubling on a thematic level since it works as a 
commentary on subjects like familial and world history repeating themselves, reflections on one’s life, 
and the processes involved in filmmaking and storytelling. Indeed, as I mentioned, reflections – and 
therefore doubles – are inherent in the title itself and feature throughout the narrative in different guises, 
and the nature of each instance is heavily influenced by the film’s overarching premise and its 
unconventional structure. Tarkovsky, the film’s other principal double, features as both filmmaker in the 
non-diegetic sense, but also as a functioning presence within the diegesis through the use of his own 
memories, life experiences, and family history as the source material for large portions of the film. The 
personal connection of the director is further reinforced through having his father, the poet Arsenii 
Tarkovsky, reading his own poetry on the voiceover, as well as having his mother appear variously as 
herself, as a substitute and inspiration for the character Maria, and as an unidentified caller at Natalya’s 
apartment. These connections are not explicitly signalled within the narrative, but rather through 
knowledge of the production history, or perhaps a familiarity with Arsenii Tarkovsky’s poetry. Viewer 
knowledge of course varies significantly across nations and time periods, and there may have been those 
who were already familiar with much of Tarkovsky’s personal life and background at the time of the 
fi lm’s initial release. Even without such knowledge, however, the film is set up to encourage a deeper 
understanding of personal history more generally because of the way in which it ‘universalises’ the events 
and manages to communicate something personal but in a non-esoteric way. For example, the film opens 
with a narrator describing the old house they had always lived in, and the time they used to spend waiting 
for ‘father’, which in turn encourages us to believe the figure we see seated on the fence looking longingly 
across the field is ‘mother’. Bordwell cites childhood and maternal imagery as frequently used cues in 







biographical films,209 whether or not the film depicts a real or fictional biography, and indeed the setting 
of Mirror ’s opening scene – a log cabin in a rural location, and a strong suggestion of u happiness in 
childhood – recalls Citizen Kane (Orson Welles, 1941), one of cinema’s most renowned fictional 
biographies. Tarkovsky does not appear on camera nor does he provide the voice of the narrator, therefore 
his presence in the film is not of the sort we might associate with Woody Allen, Mel Brooks or Alfred 
Hitchcock. All of which serves to muddy the narrative water, so to speak, and raises the question over
what sort of film we are seeing, since it does not strictly qualify as a straightforward biopic or 
dramatization of the director’s life. While his influence is all around the fabric of the film, the obliqueness 
of the narrator’s physical self and the fact that he acts as no more than a rough substitute for the director 
creates a sense that Tarkovsky is simultaneously present and absent throughout. Bordwell’s analysis of 
art film narration is of particular relevance in relation t a film like Mirror as it displays many of the key 
features he identifies. He writes how, unlike the classical Hollywood narrative pattern, the art film 
‘hesitates, suggesting character subjectivity, life’s untidiness, and author’s vision.’210 For Bordwell, the 
type of narration that deviates from a more conventional pattern frequently has gaps which are 
unexplained, or characters who depart from the main thread and are never revisited, but crucially ‘these 
very deviations are placed, resituated as realism…or authorial commentary.’211  
In addition, amidst these instances of self-reference and character duplication, the narrative 
arguably displays a lack of a recognisable focal point or guide, or at least a traditional kind of central 
character, and it is this feature that is of most significance regarding my analyses across both chapters in 
this section. By looking in turn at the narrative structure and the content of certain scenes we can see how 
the film generates a multiplicity of meanings as well as a variety of contenders for authorship of the 
narrative’s constituent parts.  
Navigating Dreams and Memories 
 
As I mentioned at the outset of this chapter, Mirror  does not adhere to mainstream narrative 
principles of logic, causality, and temporal continuity, but rather resembles the fragmented structure of a 
dream or a series of recollections. The various shifts from one time and place to another are often 







motivated by thematic links or an association of mood rathe  an direct cause and consequence. 
Additionally, although the motivation for details such as actors in dual roles is virtually spelt out by 
Aleksey during his exchange with Natalya, there are other moments in the film which draw more readily 
on other-worldly and quasi-supernatural tropes, for which a diegetic explanation cannot be so easily 
found.  By looking first at the structure and narrative progression, a few examples show how details and 
information might entice the viewer to assemble an overall picture of the events, or at least glean 
meaning(s) from what is shown. In Chapter Two I looked at the work of James Peterson in relation to 
Lost Highway, and Peterson’s problem solving approach to avant-garde films is equally applicable in the 
case of Mirror . As Peterson points out: ‘some films are interesting precisely because they challenge 
rational expectations and try to outflank every effort to recuperate them into some sort of meaning.’212 It 
is the obliqueness of the avant-garde film’s imagery which holds much of its appeal and is what stimulates 
our curiosity and, as Peter Wuss writes, they very often make use of dream, memory and fractured 
narratives and make it:  
difficult to grasp relationships within their composition, ad in some cases regularities in terms 
of narration can hardly be found; as a result, the interpretation of such works becomes 
increasingly arbitrary or itself takes on the blurred aspect of dreams.213 
In one early scene we hear Aleksey’s telephone conversation with his mother as the camera 
roams through an otherwise empty house. The use of a Steadicam is less consistent with an optical POV 
shot therefore it is unclear whether or not we should regard the frame as a rendering of Aleksey’s POV, 
however the ‘closeness’ of his voice seems to suggest it is. The details of the phone call act as a means 
of exposition and temporal framing as well as to establish the tense and distant relationship the narrator 
appears to have with his mother. During their conversation, there are various details which the viewer can 
use as a means of linking events that we have already seen or will be shown later, as one routinely does 
when watching a film. Aleksey asks his mother which year the hay barn burnt down, which we can 
connect with a preceding scene in which we see this sameevent take place, while his mother mentions 
the death of an old colleague from the printing press, which is onnected to the black and white sequence 
that will come directly afterwards (Fig. 39).  








Fig. 39. Despite the absence of a typical narrative progression, the film scatters details that create links 
between distinct sequences.  
At this point the viewer will be engaged in the process of trying to construct a chronology and 
will be on the lookout for new information that can be added to what has already been established.  The 
fact that Mirror  features a combination of dream sequences, memories, fantasies, and imagined past 
events, presents a challenge for the viewer, who must figure out what ‘reality status’ to attribute to each 
sequence. To complicate matters further, the film stock switches between colour and black-and-white, 
but with no definitive system regarding what each one denotes. In the case of Memento, by contrast, 
different timeframes are coded through the use of colour and black and white for distinct segments. A 
scene like the one in the printing press (Fig. 39, bottom right) is easily distinguishable from the news 
footage segments (Fig. 40) due to the clear difference in image quality, and it is obvious that the footage 
has been sourced rather than shot for the film. However, a later scene involving Terekhova as Natalya is 
shot in black-and-white, and although the scene has a noticeably different tint to the printing press 
sequence, this is sufficient to upset any attempt we might make at using a colour scheme as a way of 
classifying and categorising different time frames (Fig. 41).  









Fig. 40. Newsreel footage of historical events (top image) ar  presented alongside more personal, 
subjective events (bottom image), although the precise onnections are muted and oblique.  
 
Fig. 41. Terekhova again as both Natalya and Maria: the use of black-and-white for both past and 
present scenes (albeit with noticeable differences in the respective tints) subtly contributes to the way in 
which their identities are conflated. 
Some scenes appear unambiguously fantastical or dreamlike, while others pertain to a 
recognisable social reality but with intrusions of surreal or magical occurrences. The scene which follows 
Maria watching the burning barn begins with a young boy sitting up in bed and saying “Papa.” This shot 
is repeated, but in black and white, before we cut to a shot of Maria washing her hair, and her husband 







helping her rinse it. The editing suggests an eyeline match wi h the little boy however it becomes obvious 
that the sequence must be a dream or fantasy (Fig. 42). Shot in slow motion, we see Maria shake the water 
from her hair before the ceiling starts to collapse and it begins to rain indoors. She then walks from left 
to right while the camera pans with her until she exits the frame and we follow her reflection in a mirror 
that runs along the wall. Spatial continuity is then disrupted when Maria appears at the opposite side of 
the frame, pulling on a dressing gown.  She then walks over to another mirror, and as she wipes the 
condensation away we can see that the reflection is f an old lady rather than the younger woman we can 
clearly identify standing before the mirror.  
 
Fig. 42. The celebrated dream / fantasy sequence which once again blends mother and wife.  
The scene conveys details whose significance will become more apparent as the film progresses, 
but at this point it stands in direct contrast to the preceding sequence, which adhered to a more 
recognisable ‘real world’ setting. Although the sequence is portrayed as unequivocal fantasy, i i  not 
clear who the dreamer is since the more typical cues that precede such a segment are absent. In actual 
fact, the scene begins with a young boy waking up and gettin  out of bed, rather than showing a character 
falling asleep as we might expect. Furthermore, even if we are encouraged to attribute the dream to the 







boy, he is never formally identified in the film, leaving the viewer to infer that he is an even younger 
incarnation of Aleksey.   
 In contrast, there are moments in the film which exhibit elements of dreamlike fantasy erupting 
from a more mundane realism, such as the scene in which Ignat is at home with his mother in their 
apartment (Fig. 43). As Natalya is getting ready to leave she accidentally spills the contents of her 
handbag and she and Ignat gather up the various things she has dropped. While crouched on the floor 
gathering coins, Ignat flinches and gasps saying that he felt an electric shock on his hand as it touched the 
floor, stating it felt ‘as if it had already happened…but I’ve never been here before.’ His reference to a 
sense of déjà-vu (more ‘doubling’) combines with a swelling note building on the soundtrack to add an 
eerie mood to the scene. After Natalya leaves, a woman and a maid suddenly appear in the next room, the 
latter serving tea to the woman who is seated at a dining table. Ignat appears shocked and recoils slightly, 
but when the woman asks him to “continue reading” he unquestioningly takes a book from the shelf and 
begins reading aloud. As the woman listens the room darkens momentarily, suggestive of a cloud passing 
in front of the sun, before the light increases and shadows are cast on the table once again.  
Fig. 43. The mysterious appearance and disappearance of unnamed women in Ignat’s home is unsettling 
and ghostly, but his reaction to them is strangely muted.  
We hear a knock at the door and the woman tells Ignat to open it, which he does only to encounter 
an old lady who says she has the wrong address then leaves. When Ignat goes back inside the table and 
chair are empty, the two women having seemingly vanished as suddenly as they appeared. A receding 







heat impression on the table suggests, however, that the woman and her cup of hot tea may not have been 
a product of Ignat’s imagination; however the telephone rings and interrupts his musing on what has just 
happened.  
 
Fig. 44. An unnamed lady is recognisable from the dream sequence in which she is linked to Natalya by 
way of a visual metaphor. However, the extra-diegetic knowledge that the she is played by Tarkovsky’s 
mother adds another layer of symbolic significance.  
The viewer may recognise the old lady who appears at the door as the same individual who was 
reflected in the mirror during the dream sequence (Fig. 44), and we may use the exchange between 
Natalya and Aleksey to infer that the narrator’s mother and his ex-wife are once again being equated 
visually with one another. Her appearance at the door, however, is less easy to explain, unless the 
implication is that Maria is so estranged from Aleksey that her grandson Ignat does not even recognise 
her. Details and relationships between characters and egments are clarified to varying degrees, which is 
commonly the case with films that use subjective states such as dream and memories for their subject 
matter as well as narrative structure. These examples illustrate the variety of tactics the film employs and 
the way in which it segues from one scene to another using subtle transitions and narrative cues that are 
at times non-existent. The film not only moves seamlessly between dream, memory, and different sorts 
of diegetic reality, but also blends these elements within individual scenes. In turn, this pattern is mirrored 
by the way in which no single character is brought to the for  with a level of emphasis befitting a 
protagonist, meaning that our sense of a narrative fulcrum or focal point around which the events are 
organised appears elusive. In the introduction to this section I touched on the debate over self-
narrativising to which theorists like Galen Strawson and Daniel C. Dennett have contributed, and it is 
worth looking at some of their arguments in the context of how Mirror ’s dream-logic structure is 







influenced by its use of a narrator’s recollections as its framing premise. Mirror is a very useful test case 
in this area of debate because of the fact that we can identify the location of the narrative’s ‘guide’ as 
being within the film’s overarching context, but our capacity for keeping this individual in sight is 
supressed. This is partly achieved through the lack of a physical presence onto which we can ascribe the 
more conventional identifiers of a lead character, but also due to the fact that there is an interplay between 
narrator and director to an extent that we do not normally encounter in most mainstream narratives. Mirror 
can be used as a means of exposing and highlighting our habitual viewing strategies regarding 
expectations of character development, while the events of the film and the way there are presented also 
contributes (knowingly or otherwise) to the debate over ‘self-narrativising’. As we will see, Strawson and 
Dennett are two theorists who take up opposing positions regarding the theory that we build a sense of 
self and a knowledge of our own past in a way that is comparable to a narrative we tell ourselves.  
A Question of Perspective 
 
The biographical subject matter of Mirror and the different ways in which Tarkvosky’s presence 
permeates the narrative, resonate with certain philosophical viewpoints of selfhood and personal identity. 
In The Subject of Experience, Strawson takes up his strongly ‘anti-narrativist’ position by arguing against 
the popular conception that we experience and reflect upon our lives in a way that closely resembles how 
we consume fictional narratives. He objects to what he sees as a generalisation about how people perceive 
their lives, and argues that there are other kinds of people, like Strawson himself, for whom ‘[l]ife never 
assumes a story-like shape,’ and who are ‘anti-Narrative by fundamental constitution.’ He writes:  
It’s not just that the deliverances of memory are, for us, hopelessly piecemeal and disordered, 
even when we’re trying to remember a temporally extended sequence of events. The point is 
more general. It concerns all parts of life, life’s ‘great shambles’, in the American novelist Henry 
James’s expression.214 
In the area of critical film theory there has been considerable debate over recent decades about 
what should or should not be considered as a viable narrative. I have drawn on the significant 







contributions of Bordwell, Carroll, Smith and Currie and I would regard my approach in this project as a 
continuation of that same tradition. Strawson’s point about life assuming a ‘story-like’ shape versus ‘life’s 
“great shambles” need not be mutually exclusive, although this is what he seems to imply. We first have 
to ask: what does he mean by a ‘story-like shape’? If we assume that he means a narrative that roughly 
follows a classical trajectory or paradigm then a film like Mirror  would probably not qualify, which 
would in turn suggest that Mirror is not a story. Equally, what does Strawson mean by ‘shambles’? 
Clearly the word itself would normally carry a negative connotation but Strawson is embracing ‘life’s 
great shambles’ and celebrating the untidiness of our remembered past. For Strawson, one objection he 
holds is that narrative identity theory appears too neat to be applicable to real life, and he also objects to 
the implied universality of the claim that ‘we story ourselves and we are our stories’:  
They’re not universal human truths even if they’re true of some people, or even many, or most. 
Their proponents, the narrativists, are - at best - generalizing from their own case, in an all-too-
human way.215 
In his argument Strawson aims to create some distance between h  way in which narrativists 
appear to experience life and his own experiences, which he maintains cannot be unique to him. He singles 
out Dennett as well as Sacks, McAdam, Velleman and Bruner as being guilty of this generalisation and 
oversimplification of life experiences and our sense of a lived past. Arguing against what he sees as the 
narrativist generalisation about how each person ‘ elf-authors’ or ‘self-constitutes’ their inner existence, 
he maintains that there are other individuals (like himself) ‘who have no such emotion, and feel that their 
thoughts are things that just happen.’216 Strawson finds the term ‘shambles’ to be ‘a much better 
characterisation of the large-scale structure of human existence as we find it.’217 It would appear that he 
is setting up an opposition in which ‘story-like’ equates to a traditional or mainstream form of narrative, 
while ‘shambles’ is the way he regards past events should be more accurately classified i.e. random, 
messy, disorganised and with no deliberate prioritising or hierarchies; we might therefore restate this 
dichotomy as ‘random’ or ‘spontaneous’ vs. ‘controlled’ or ‘ordered’. For me, the scope afforded by 
Strawson’s dichotomy of ‘story’ and ‘shambles’ invites the possibility that a narrative – even a narrative 
of selfhood – can be both story-like and shambolic. A shambolic story (in this restated way of using the 







term) is not too difficult a concept to imagine and some narratives may appear more or less accessible or 
‘ordered’ than others. In literature, the work of Henry James or Marc Saporta’s Composition No. 1 would 
qualify as just such a kind of narrative, as would examples from the nouveau roman movement, to which 
Alain Robbe-Grillet was a notable contributor. As we have seen, Robbe-Grillet’s style is greatly in 
evidence in Last Year in Marienbad and clearly the film is tightly controlled, highly stylised, and displays 
considerable attention to detail regarding editing, continuity, lighting, performance, mise-n-scène, and 
costume. It is certainly not a ‘shambles’ if we take that term to mean a disorganised mess, however, if we
overlook the negative connotation that the word carries and co sider it instead as referring to the film’s 
apparent randomness and spontaneous shifts in space, time and actio , this might more accurately convey 
what I referred to as the film’s ‘organised chaos’ in Chapter Four. We saw in my analysis of Marienbad 
and memory recall how it is possible to regard re-writing (or re-calling) as ordered and organised but 
simply in a way that is less traditional, less ‘story-like’. The point made by Charles Fernyhough is that 
recent findings suggest memories are reassembled on deman  rather than stored intact from the moment 
they are consolidated in the brain, and the former process may admittedly appear shambolic compared to 
the everyday understanding of how memory is stored and recalled. It is likely that Strawson might regard 
these sorts of narratives as being closer to what he feels is his sense of a lived past, and a necessary 
antidote to the neat autobiographical recollections he argues is typical of the narrativist approach; and it 
is for this reason also that I believe his ‘shambolic’ and ‘story-like’ opposition can be reconciled. Dennett 
provides a helpful starting point for considering Mirror ’s narrative centre when he puts forward his 
argument that selfhood has certain things in common with another abstract but measurable concept: 
gravity. He writes:  
a self [like gravity] is an abstract object, a theorist’s fiction…Unlike centers of gravity, whose 
sole property is their spatio-temporal position, selves have a spatio-temporal position that is only 
grossly defined.218 
Both gravity and selves are generally held to exist eventhough neither is tangible, or as Dennett 
puts it, even though ‘no one has ever seen or ever will see a center of gravity… no one has ever seen a 
self, either.219 Unlike the fait accompli of fiction films, which necessarily simplify and pare-down their 







characters (to vastly varying degrees of course), in order to communicate a story within a limited running 
time, real selves are less easy to pin down and examine. Dennett presents an argument that there is a 
commonality between the way in which we envisage selves and the way we create, define or understand 
fictional characters, which he contends is supported by the findings of neurologists who have studied the 
cases of split-brain patients. Dennett argues that self-identity is a fabrication generated by the human 
brain which is, in its most reduced definition, a massively complex biological machine. On our sense of 
personal history and our sense of being part of a self-narrative Dennett writes that:  
We try to make all of our material cohere into a single good story. And that story is our 
autobiography. The chief fictional character at the center of that autobiography is one's self.220 
In Hume’s terms, this ‘fictional character’ is a non-existent aggregate result of his famous 
‘bundle of perceptions’ that we call consciousness or selfhood, and Dennett seems to be in agreement 
insofar as he sees selfhood as an abstraction lacking any re l substance. It is worth considering how films 
like Mirror  might be situated within the story/shambles opposition set up by Strawson, particularly as 
regards the function of a leading character. Strawson objects to the position taken up by Dennett and 
others who he argues are ‘at best, generalising from their own case, in an all-too-human way’221 when 
they describe how their sense of self-identity resembls a narrative. Conversely, Dennett’s reference to 
our life as a narrative in which ‘[t]he chief fictional character at the centre…is one’s self’222 does not 
necessarily imply any form of neatness nor that this concept is incompatible with seeing existence and 
selfhood as part of a ‘shambles.’ We are just able to glean meaning from the shambles, whether that is 
the reordered events of a film, or the reconstituted elm nts that combine to generate our sense of self. In 
the context of Mirror , consideration of the various perspectives that inhabit the film provides some helpful 
insights, particularly in light of the ideas put forward by Strawson and Dennett. Natasha Synessios writes 
that '[t]he film's uniting consciousness is the narrator, Alexei [sic], Tarkovsky's alter ego,'223 and while it 
is true that Aleksey occupies a central role of sorts, I would argue that any unity his character brings to 
the narrative is of a very loose sort. If we look at another example from the film, we can see how it creates 
uncertainty over the subjective vantage points that operate within the narrative.  







After the mysterious women vanish from Natalya’s apartment, Ignat’s father calls on the phone 
and during the conversation he mentions to his son how he as in love with a redhead whose lips were 
always blistered, and that his shell-shocked military instructor was keen on the same girl. What follows 
is a more recognizable flashback sequence, albeit with the anachronistic detail of Danieltsev being in the 
role of the young narrator once more (Fig. 45). As before, the use of Danieltsev in a dual role can be 
comfortably reconciled as the narrative has clearly signaled this to be symbolic of how similar Aleksey 
and his son are.  
 
Fig. 45. Ignat listens to an anecdote told by his father over the phone, which triggers a flashback involving 
his father’s younger self, also played by Danieltsev.  
 
At the mention of this love interest we cut to ‘a redhead’ who is being watched from afar by the 
young Aleksey while he is engaged in military drills with a few other boys. We see the narrator’s memory 
play out in what appears to be a standard flashback, although curiously neither young Aleksey nor the 
redhead play any meaningful part in the scene. Are we to assume that we are seeing an anecdote as it is 
being described by Aleksey to his son over the phone? If so then the young Aleksey is simply a passive 
observer of what turns out to be a fairly unhappy event involving an orphaned child and his shell-shocked 
drill instructor, while the initial motivation for the flashback (the love interest) plays no further role. The 







way in which Mirror  shifts perspective like this recalls the term autonoetic consciousness, which I used 
as part of my analysis of Last Year in Marienbad. The term denotes the ability to place oneself at the 
centre of a memory or dream as opposed to ‘observing’ the recollection from a third person perspective. 
Throughout the narrative, Mirror  moves between these different modes; at times the camra adopts the 
narrator’s perspective through the use of optical POV shots, such as theone in which Aleksey is speaking 
to Natalya as she looks in the mirror. At others he observes himself within the flashback, and in others 
still we see an event from a comparatively neutral perspective. The printing press scene, which I alluded 
to earlier, appears to be a flashback showing Maria rushing to her workplace in a panic. We see her 
interact with colleagues as she desperately checks the journal they have just published because Maria 
fears it contains a typing error. Her fears are unfounded, however she is then confronted by a female 
colleague who accuses Maria of being hysterical and unprofessional. Going by the evidence of who is in 
the scene, the time frame and the level of information we are given, we could only attribute this scene to 
Aleksey’s subjectivity if it is classed as a constructed memory, presumably based on information given 
to him by his mother later in life. This cedes authorship to a certain extent from Aleksey to Maria and 
highlights how certain elements of the narrative originate in more characters than the narrator alone. 
Alternatively, if we grant that this is Aleksey’s flashback then the details are the product of his 
consciousness and will therefore retain the imprints of his imagination, whether accurate or not.  
When analyzing Memento in Chapter Four, I examined how Leonard is almost literally 
dependent on those around him to bolster his sense of who he is and to add meaning and relevance to his 
speech and actions, perhaps even to validate his very existence. Mirror  operates on similar territory but 
in a more abstract way, by creating a multiplicity of pers ctives and marrying it with a variety of 
narrative styles (dreams, memories, ‘objective’ reality’, documentary footage). In Dennett’s terms, each 
one could be regarded as their own ‘chief fictional character’, and this combination of perspectives seems 
entirely appropriate as it acknowledges the complexity inherent in the multitude of ways we experience 
reality but also in how we (mis)remember it. To my mind, Mirror could be seen as a rendering of Eliot’s 
metaphor from Middlemarch by offering the flipside to Dennett’s idea our self being the centre of a 
lifelong narrative.  By offering multiple centres in the form of shared narrative perspectives, Mirror raises 
the point that one’s sense of centrality is perhaps illusory, and is as much informed and created by those 







around us as it is by our deep-rooted sense of life unfoldig from a first-person perspective; it is just 
difficult to gain that level of experiential overview in real life.  
The dual roles played by Terekhova and Danieltsev is the film’s overt method for highlighting 
the relationship between character identity and selfhood, but this surface-level feature encourages more 
subtle, secondary considerations on the same subject. When watching Mirror it quickly becomes apparent 
that the narrative framing is crucial for explaining or compensating for certain narrative inconsistencies 
or irregularities. Events and images are shot through with the narrator’s perspective and, by extension, 
Tarkovsky’s, and it is debatable where we should draw the line in terms of what we consider the entirety 
of a given text or narrative. Extra-diegetic information is often brought to bear on how we interpret a 
particular film, and in some instances it is almost impossible to separate film from filmmaker. In the case 
of Mirror  it is difficult to disregard Tarkovsky’s personal connection without arriving at a fairly shallow 
and unsatisfactory appreciation of the film. The production history and directorial inspiration for the 
narrative events need to be taken into account as they illuminate key aspects of what we see, creating 
something of an antithetical situation to David Lynch’s notoriously evasive responses to questions about 
his own films. At times, the imagery that Tarkovsky uses in Mirror is so specific and idiosyncratic – a 
girl whose lips always blister in the cold weather; a child mischievously pouring salt onto the family cat’s 
head - that they appear to have been drawn almost ineviably from personal experience. On the other 
hand, the film features other tropes generally associated wi h biographical tales – long shots focusing on 
parents or parental figures, scenes witnessed from a child’s perspective, a voiceover recalling events and 
locations from the past – which gives the film more universal appeal and scope. (Tarkovsky writes about 
a letter he received in which a woman wrote: ‘Thank you for Mirror. My childhood was like that…only 
how did you know about it?’224) Greater familiarity with Tarkovsky’s background and personal 
commentaries will not necessarily deliver for the viewer a comprehensive explanation and wholly 
unambiguous viewing experience, but it does help by encouraging the viewer to take the matter of 
perspective into account when watching, and perhaps be encouraged to learn more about the production 
history after a first viewing. For instance, during the scene in which the narrator speaks to hi  mother on 
the phone, a poster for Andrei Rublev is clearly visible on the wall, a detail which gently breaks the fourth 
wall by making a reference to Tarkovsky’s career as a filmmaker. Similarly, the doubling of director with 







narrator is echoed in ways that I have already examined, ad combines with the roles Tarkovsky’s parents 
have in the film. Consequently, when one considers how his recollections are indebted to other sources 
for their existence, Aleksey’s presence and narrative clout appear diluted and unsubstantial. His physical 
presence is referred to but never seen in the scenes when we hear him speak, such as in the conversation 
with Natalya that I outlined earlier. For this reason, the organising hold that Aleksey has on the film is 
reduced to a point where even the term 'narrator' seems inappropriate, not least because the soundtrack is 
‘shared’ with Arsenii Tarkosvky reading his poetry.  
Contrary to Synessios’ claim that '[t]he film's uniting consciousness is the narrator, Alexei [sic], 
Tarkovsky's alter ego,'225 I maintain that identities in Mirror  are all in some way tainted by indeterminacy 
of one form or another.  Aleksey’s 'lack' of a clear physical identity, combined with the doubling of roles 
by Terekhova and Danieltsev, make the viewer more skeptical about how solid and dependable character 
identities are. This effect is achieved by the fact that no character wields any more or less power than 
another, and rather it is actually the temporally and causally disparate features that are the overall ‘guiding 
force’ – such as it is. As Michael Dempsey writes:  
...because neither Ignat nor his mother nor any other consciousness generates enough force or 
clarity, this vortex of images finally registers on our own memories like distant, faded 
recollection from past life (or movies) which, when re-examined, prove to be either distorted or 
even nonexistent. The Mirror finally speaks only dimly because nobody, nothing quite manages 
to take this boy's place as either an organizing principle or a center of consciousness.226 




Strawson’s argument against narrative identity theory rests on the assumption that what he calls 
‘bits and pieces’ is mutually exclusive from a self-narrative, however if we take a concept like Hume’s 
so-called ‘bundle theory,’ which I looked in in Section II, then it could be seen that the ‘bits and pieces’ 







simply are the self – or rather, they are the by-product of something like Hume’s ‘bundle’ which gives 
rise to what we refer to as our self. It need not be unified or whole in any empirical or tangible sense so 
long as it gives one the impression of being so, and whether this sense arises from bits and pieces or from 
an actual cohesive unified whole, the result may conceivably feel the same. Strawson seems to regard 
Dennett as belonging to a different camp – the narrativists, or diachronics - but to my mind there are 
similarities in each of their arguments insofar as they each identify a certain kind of fallacy or illusion 
inherent in the concept of self-narrativisation. Strawson sees the illusion as being the way in which our 
past experiences arrange themselves, the disconnect he feels towards them, and he draws a distinction 
between those individuals for whom a sense of self-history arranges itself like a narrative, and those who 
do not. He uses the terms ‘diachronic’ and ‘episodic’ to denote each of these groups, respectively and 
describes how he feels when reflecting on selfhood in the following way:  
[I]t seems clear to me, when I am experiencing or apprehending myself as a self, that the remoter 
past or future in question is not my past or future, although it is certainly the past or future of GS 
the human being…I have no significant sense that I – the I now considering this question – was 
there in the further past.227 
Unlike Leonard in Memento, Strawson is not declaring a break in his psychological 
connectedness but simply his sense of how the past (and future) ‘present’ themselves to him as he reflects 
on these questions. Describing himself as ‘episodic’ he asserts that  
this is not a failure of feeling [but] rather a fact about what I am…I know perfectly well that I 
have a past…and yet I have absolutely no sense of my life as a narrative.228 
While for Dennett, the fallacy or illusion is not that our sense of personal history arranges itself like a 
narrative but rather it is the belief that one’s self is unified in any way. Dennett writes that:  
Our component modules have to act in opportunistic but amazingly resourceful ways to produce 
a modicum of behavioral unity, which is then enhanced by an illusion of greater unity.229 
We saw how in Memento Leonard is a more literal manifestation f what Oliver Sacks termed ‘a 
“Humean” being’. Similarly with Mirror , Aleksey is a more subtle demonstration of how we could be 







construed as no more than the sum of our perceptions and the thoughts, memories and opinions of 
ourselves and those around us. That is not to say that the existence of selves in any empirical sense is 
being disputed but rather their separateness and sense of independence is being questioned; the term 
interdependence may best describe the contingent reality that gives rise to all phenomena, discrete 
individual selves included. Just as individual segments of a film rely on its other component parts to add 
up to a cohesive whole, so too do all other phenomena exist in a symbiotic relationship of some sort, 
whether that is on a neurological or anthropological scae. Separateness is a relative concept while 
absolute unity and cohesion – of narratives, of characters, and of selves – is a matter of degree.  
In this context and considering the notion of n n-selfhood, it is quite fitting that the narrator in 
Mirror  is for the most part physically absent, and Strawson’s use of the term ‘episodic’ appears 
particularly charged. The film’s structure is built around its concealed narrator’s perceptions and 
memories, displaying collisions and duplications of characte  identities and historical and personal events, 
but without ever turning the mirror on the narrator himself. Scenes such as Aleksey’s phone conversation 
with his mother or his conversation with Natalya looking in the mirror stand out as examples of the camera 
adopting the narrator’s first-person perspective through the use of an optical POV shot, although the 
former is a little ambiguous. However, as Murray Smith points ou , the use of this type of shot does not 
necessarily achieve the effect that is generally associated with it i.e. a greater level of access to a 
character’s subjectivity. Smith calls this the ‘fallacy of POV.’ 
The fallacy is based on a simplistic, atomistic view of the function of optical POV shots. POV 
shots are considered to have a special effect in drawing us in to the subjectivity of a character, 
regardless of context.230 
By working through some examples, Smith shows how the POV shot cannot be said to 
automatically give the viewer access to a character’s subjectivity purely on the basis of positioning the 
frame in a first-person perspective. For instance, we might share a character’s perspective and see what 
they are focusing on but that does not necessarily correspond to what they are thinking about, or even if 
there is a correlation we cannot guess at the nature of their thoughts (a shot of the character’s facial 
expression would tell us more). In the case of Mirror , however, this is perhaps an entirely appropriate 







stylistic choice. On one reading, the narrator adopting an optical POV shot is more than simply a formal 
technique but rather a strategic way of underlining the ether al nature of the individual by favouring and 
emphasising its mental projections and memories. We see what the character is thinking but this is 
achieved through flashbacks from a more neutral, third-person perspective, or from a less-clearly cued 
subjective perspective. Crucially, also, we do not see the narrator’s face so we do not see his reactions to 
anything he is discussing or dreaming or remembering – dream sequences are not followed by the narrator 
waking, for instance. Smith points out that ‘character subjectivity is an emergent quality of the narration 
as a whole, not the product of any single technique,’231 and in the case of Aleksey we have a character 
who remains relatively ‘indeterminate’ even when all of Mirror ’s component parts are taken in their 
entirety.  
In his analysis and attempt to define art-cinema, Bordwell id ntifies one of its characteristic 
features: ‘Lacking identifiable stars and genres, art cinema uses a concept of authorship to unify the 
text.’232 This observation has particular resonance when applied to Mirr r  as it not only falls squarely 
within Bordwell’s art-cinema category but it also satisfies the concept of unity-through-authorship in 
more ways than one. As my analysis has shown, the ‘authorship’ of Mirror , both in its entirety and its 
constituent parts, can be interpreted in different ways, with the director, the narrator, the narrator’s 
recollections and the effect of other characters on what e are shown all staking a claim for some form 
of authorship. Does this bring about unity of the sort that Bordwell has in mind? Or is the acknowledgment 
of multiplicity and ambiguity the guiding principle that unifies the text? The answer, according to 
Bordwell’s argument, could actually be neither, or both, since the art film manages to accommodate 
seemingly opposing approaches. The key is the ‘device of ambiguity,’233 which he argues is the unofficial 
slogan of art cinema narratives, and deliberate ambiguity is what allows us to ascribe some events or 
details to authorial expression and others to realist portrayals of complex characters or situations.   
On one reading the film also highlights some of our expectations of how a storyline is more 
commonly guided and carried, namely through a central character of some kind. In Chapter One, as part 
of my analysis of The Thing, I mentioned how Star Trek: First Contact was the target of its fans’ ire due 
to how it altered the established mythology of The Borg, the series’ principal villain. Recasting the 







collective so that they now followed a leader was seen by some as a sop to the producers’ perceived 
expectations that antagonists and protagonists should always be represented by an individual character. 
In this respect, Mirror  confounds expectations by presenting its narrative events in a more diffuse manner 
and eschewing the more robust guiding hand (or voice) present in mainstream narratives. Paradoxically, 
the film seems to satisfy the opposing viewpoints of Dennett and Strawson by endowing its ‘central’ 
character with a decentralised, almost ghostly presence, around which an ‘anti-narrative’ assemblage of 
events and images can be arranged. Just as Mirror bears witness to Tarkovsky’s recollections, the 
‘piecemeal’ souvenirs of an individual’s life, it is housed within a medium which is itself indebted to this 
very same process. Selecting segments of time and space and putting them in sequence to hopefully give 
rise to something greater than the sum of its parts is a fundamental process in filmmaking; a process 
which Tarkovsky famously described as ‘sculpting in time.’234 Tarkovsky’s retrospective theme in Mirror 
further highlights the way in which the process of filmmaking can resemble an act of gathering 
memorabilia in an attempt to shore up history against the ravages of time. A film narrative is by its very 
nature nothing more than ‘bits and pieces’ but if they are arranged in a particular way we perceive unity 
and glean meaning, and ascribe significance and a sense of concreteness to the characters and situations 
depicted within it. In Chapter Two I mentioned how Bordwell outlines the way in which the capacity for 
inference and an expectation of viewers’ familiarity with film narratives are cornerstones of the entire 
business of making and watching films. A film narrative involves a complex process of organising events, 
which is mirrored by the efforts of the viewer to make sense of it. Even though the way in which events 
are presented in a fictional narrative do not resemble the way in which we experience life as it unfolds, it 
can nevertheless be seen as resembling the way in which e understand our place in history.  
In the introduction to this section, I referred to a well-known passage from Middlemarch, which 
makes use of a metaphor (involving, quite fittingly, a mirror) to illustrate how human perception tends 
towards egocentricity and experiencing the world in a way which places one’s self at the centre. 
Middlemarch, with its myriad characters and a narrative that is densely packed with competing individual 
concerns and psychologies, illustrates how a more detached view of the world envisages humanity as an 
enormous array of centres, constantly impacting on one another, each one regarding their perspective as 
the definitive one. There is an irony at the heart of Mirror  because of how it manages to use a narrator 







who is a rough substitute for the director in a narrative that is heavily imbued with Tarkovsky’s personal 
experiences, and yet still manages to avoid establishing a clear protagonist. The narrative design 
democratises the focal point of the film by distributing storytelling perspectives amongst its characters in 
a way that is uncommon in mainstream, protagonist-led narratives. There are certain narratives, such 
Identity (James Mangold, 2003) which feature an ensemble cast with clearly established c aracters but 
also suppresses the emergence of a leading, central figure. Identity ultimately reveals that its array of 
characters are in fact housed within a single characters consciousness, and they merely represent different 
aspects of his personality. Mirror goes beyond this approach by creating characters that blend into one 
another, not in the grotesque, physical sense of The Thing nor in the sense of multiple personality disorder 
as portrayed in Identity, but through having their subjectivities merged and ‘shared’ by way of the 
perspectives that are adopted within the narrative. The result is that we are left with fleeting, nebulous 
echoes of characters rather than solid, dependable ones. This is partly achieved through the use of single 
actors for multiple roles but also by suppressing, in Smith’s terms, ‘recognition’ and ‘reidentification’. 
One way this is achieved is by obscuring physical indicators, such as the unseen narrator or the partially 
glimpsed figure on deathbed, but also by omitting proper names or other identifying contexts, such as the 
woman who appears to Ignat, and the children we see in the flashbacks to pre-war Russia. In addition, 
the use of more general events, such as Pushkin’s letter to Chaadayev which Ignat reads aloud, the stock 
newsreel footage of significant world events, and Tarkovsky’s customary imagery which marvels at the 
beauty of the natural world, softens the more personal elements of film and makes its scope more general 
and transcendent. In the next chapter, as part of my analysis of Inland Empire, I will outline how the 
central character of Lynch’s film can be seen as a direct inversion of the way in which Aleksey is 
portrayed in Mirror .  
  









Inland Empire and the Elusive Protagonist 
We as human beings never leave the stage and go home and live our lives in some more authentic 
and comfortable place.235 
Any form of acting, role-playing or pretence relies on the ability to exit the fictional realm and rejoin 
reality, otherwise it either simply is reality or it is a delusion that is inseparable from it. As Dan P. 
McAdam points out in the above quotation, as social animals human beings exist on a perpetual stage 
from which there can be no exit, we merely shift registr or modify our behaviour according to the specific 
situation or setting. These forms of ‘social acting’ are easily distinguished, more often than not, from 
what we might call ‘professional acting’ – we should be able to appreciate and understand when we are 
watching a performance in a play or a film as opposed to having a conversation with someone in the 
street. The ability to distinguish objective reality from a fictional one is an automatic mental process and 
if  we cannot make this distinction then we would be regarded as suffering from a delusional mindset. In 
the opening chapters I alluded to the so-called ‘paradox of fiction’ - we sometimes react to representations 
of real events in fiction films as if they were simply real events. Murray Smith refutes this as 
‘fundamentally implausible’ since ‘the spectator must be aware of the representational status of a 
representation at all times in order to respond appropriately to it.’236 As Smith points out, it is unlikely if 
not impossible that we ever mistakenly believe that the fiction film we are watching is indistinguishable 
from our real lives otherwise this would constitute a profound psychological malfunction. However, the 
prospect of such a notion points towards issues of great relevance to the arguments I will be putting 
forward in this chapter. I will be looking at Inland Empire (David Lynch, 2006) in order to expand upon 
the ideas I explored in relation to Mirror , but also to draw in much of what has been discussed in each of 
the preceding chapters. Although the film does not engage with specific instances of physical rupturing 







or mutation of the kind I examined in Section I, Inland Empire does explore the themes of boundaries 
and the limits of self-identity but in the context of fiction versus reality. Similarly, Inland Empire raises 
issues surrounding the potential unreliability of memory and the confusion that can arise when subjective 
and objective perspectives become blurred. In the world of fiction films, there is ample opportunity to not 
only build a story around the type of delusion implied by the paradox of fiction, but also to highlight the 
methods often used by filmmakers to seduce a viewer into something that resembles a blurring of fiction 
and reality. This feature lies at the heart of Inland Empire’s narrative and I will start my analysis by 
outlining the basic structure of the narrative to establish its constituent storyworlds, before turning my 
attention to the methods it uses to make the boundaries between these realms, and the characters who 
inhabit them, unclear. One collection of scenes in particular represents a significant turning point in the 
story and these will be examined in detail to show how the film establishes a number of irreconcilable 
diegetic paradoxes. I will highlight the ways in which Inland Empire touches on many of the same issues 
regarding self-identity and character portrayal I have so far explore, but with an added focus on the 
fabricated nature of a fictional character. I concluded Chapter Five by arguing that the protagonist of 
Inland Empire could be seen as a direct inversion of how Aleksey in Mirror is portrayed. Despite being 
products of quite different filmmaking traditions, Inland Empire exists as an ideal complement or counter-
example to Mirror because of the way in which it obscures and problematizes he identity and nature of 
its leading character but, in contrast with Tarkovsky’s film, this is achieved despite its protagonist being 
in plain sight throughout. My aim here is to examine how the film generates considerable ambiguity 
surrounding the identity of its protagonist and consider the pot ntial effects this has on the direction of 
the plot and the viewer’s capacity to decipher the narrative events. After this I will look at how the film 
is able to successfully avoid establishing a clear protagonist despite presenting us with narrative events 
in which a lead actor dominates the film’s running time. Lastly, I will revisit the arguments about self-
narrativising, which I raised in Chapter Five, to evaluate Inland Empire’s status in relation to Mirror ’s 
method of character development and the questions it engages with regarding self-identity and 
storytelling.    
The film is a comprised of a complex network of narrative strands spread across various times 
and locations, and the relationship between each of them is never clearly established. The principal 







storyline involves the actress Nikki Grace (Laura Dern) who lives in a luxurious house in present day Los 
Angeles with her domineering husband, Piotrek. Nikki has been cast in the role of Susan (Sue) Blue in a 
Hollywood feature called On High in Blue Tomorrows, and we see the cast and crew setting up shots, 
discussing the script, promoting the film on TV programmes and so on. Nikki is starring in the film along 
with her co-star Devon Berk (Justin Theroux) who plays the male lead, Billy Side, and with whom she 
begins an illicit affair. As shooting continues, we seewhat appears to be a gradual breakdown in Nikki’s 
psyche as she is unable to distinguish between the scens of Blue Tomorrows (which also features an 
illicit affair between Billy and Sue) and those of her real life. Eventually, the narrative blends both of 
these elements so that it becomes difficult for the viewer to distinguish between them also. Aside from 
this storyline there is a narrative thread involving a group of prostitutes who variously appear in the snow-
covered Polish city of Łódź in the 1930s, present day LA and also in the storyworld of Blue Tomorrows. 
The scenes in Poland involve a character credited as The Lost Girl (Karolina Gruszka), who appears to 
be imprisoned in a room watching a TV on which other scenes from Inland Empire appear. The Lost Girl 
is also involved with two menacing figures referred to as The Phantom and Janek, who appear to be 
responsible for her imprisonment. In another thread we are pe iodically shown what appears to be a 
bizarre sitcom involving anthropomorphised rabbit-humanoid hybrids whose abstract utterances and 
exchanges are accompanied by canned laughter. A parallel storyline is also developed involving Sue (or 
Nikki) reciting a monologue confession to a character credited as Mr K. The content of what she says is 
profane and disturbing, containing detailed anecdotes about childhood trauma, domestic violence and 
failed relationships. The connections between these various realms are unclear but we see characters move 
between them in a variety of ways, and we also encounter character duplication of the sort we see in Lost 
Highway and Mirror , some of which relates to actors playing more than one rle. The trajectory of the 
plot moves between these different narrative strands, and they impact upon each other in ways that are 
not always explained, but the general pattern depicts Sue/Nikki becoming increasingly downtrodden and 
mentally fragmented. In its final segment the film, quite jarringly, returns us to the shooting of Blue 
Tomorrows and appears to unambiguously re-establish Nikki’s identity as an actress playing a role in a 
film. However, as I will show in my analysis, this clarification does not remain unambiguous and the 







distinction between the embedded diegesis and the framing story of Nikki’s life in LA remains blurred 
right up to the film’s conclusion.  
Inland Empire is highly ambiguous in terms of the distinctions it draws between its various 
diegetic realms, and this is a principal method for bluring the lines between the film’s primary diegetic 
reality and the embedded fiction of its film-within-a-film storyline. Although Laura Dern is clearly the 
lead actress in Inland Empire, the fact that she plays an actress who is in turn playing another character 
often makes it difficult to say with certainty who the principal character actually is; in fact it even makes 
the use of the word ‘protagonist’ a little misleading. The use of a single actor for multiple roles in the 
same film is not unusual in itself, however in this case th  narrative does not always draw clear 
distinctions between the roles Dern is playing. As such, a paradoxical situation arises in which she stands 
out as the obvious candidate for the film’s protagonist even though it is not always clear exactly who that 
person actually is. In this chapter I will consider how formal devices such as continuity, costume, 
performance, and narrative structure all combine to achieve this effect.  
One can draw a parallel with Mirror in terms of narrative structure since both films share the 
same loose, associative way of constructing and assembling scene progression. Rather than having a goal-
oriented plot, the causality and continuity of Inland Empire is difficult to identify and a principal factor 
behind this is that Lynch built his film from a number of dif erent sources with the hope of finding a link 
between them during the filmmaking process. He writes about his belief in what he calls ‘the unified 
field’ and describes the spontaneity of how Krzysztof Majchrzak, who plays The Phantom, became 
involved in the film: 
I really had this feeling that if there’s a Unified Field, there must be a unity between a Christmas 
tree bulb and this man from Poland…It’s interesting to see how these unrelated things live 
together. And it gets your mind working. How do these things relate when they seem so far 
apart? It conjures up a third thing that almost unifies those fir t two.237  
Although Mirror and Inland Empire contrast sharply as regards tone, themes, and narrative 
events, it is worth acknowledging that both films are structured in a way that at times evokes the 







meandering randomness of dreams and memories. Furthermore, as can be seen from Lynch’s account, 
even the filmmaking process itself was an organic, associative and semi-random one. The finished film 
was assembled from and grew out of a mixture of earlier work (such as the rabbits sections), improvised 
scenes, and a long, scripted monologue performed by Laura Dern who also co-wrote it with Lynch. As 
my analysis will show, this has a noticeable effect how we perceive and classify Dern’s characters, 
particularly in the context of Daniel C. Dennett’s description of fictional characters being a fait accompli 
compared to the ever-changing nature of real world selve . 
From Mise-En-Abyme to Rabbit Hole 
 
One of Inland Empire’s early scenes depicts what appears to be a prostitute meeting with a 
prospective client in a hotel room. Significantly, the woman’s face is blurred out with a white haze (Fig. 
46), which is perhaps an early signal that we are going to witness a film in which character identities are 
obscure(d) and problematic, although at this early stage we have no context in which to make such a 
claim. The murkiness of this sequence is followed by one of contrasting clarity as we shift to the narrative 
thread involving Nikki winning the starring role in Blue Tomorrows, which for the most part demonstrates 
a faithfulness to mainstream continuity and causality. 
 
Fig. 46. One of the first characters we see has her identity obscured, perhaps laying down a marker of 
the many oblique moments yet to come.  
The level of unambiguous information the viewer is provided with about the shooting of Blue 
Tomorrows is greater than that of other sequences and is arguably the most coherent of the various plot 







elements. A story-within-a-story is a familiar plot device, with examples in cinema ranging from Singin’ 
in the Rain (Gene Kelly, Stanley Donen, 1952) to Living in Oblivion (Tom DiCillo, 1995). We see various 
encounters between cast and crew behind the scenes on the set of Blue Tomorrows, and during a script 
reading session the director Kingsley (Jeremy Irons) reveals that the film is a remake of a Polish film 
called 47, which was never finished as the lead actors were both murdered. Kingsley mentions that some 
people believed the film was cursed by a gypsy; he then makes an attempt to laugh off such a notion and 
reassure his lead actors. The scenes on the set of Blue Tomorrows, which mainly feature Nikki, Devon, 
Kingsley and Kingsley’s assistant Freddy (Harry Dean Stanton), are readily identifiable as a film-within-
a-film due to the use of a distinguishing lighting scheme, noticeably static camerawork, and, most 
obviously, the presence of the director and crew setting up and shooting the scenes (Fig. 47). In addition, 
Nikki and Devon speak with accents from the Southern US during scenes in Blue Tomorrows, which is 
another detail that distinguishes them somewhat from the characters they are playing.  
            
              
Fig. 47. In the opening hour of Inland Empire, the Blue Tomorrows production is clearly delineated from 
the framing narrative.  
There are clear parallels drawn between the Blue Tomorrows storyline and the actors’ lives; 
Nikki is married and we can infer from warnings Devon receives from his agent that he has a habit of 







having affairs with his female co-stars. However, we are not dealing with a straightforward meta-
cinematic commentary on acting and the business of making Hollywood films, with Blue Tomorrows 
featuring as a neat mise-en-abyme within a broader frame called Inland Empire. The challenge soon 
becomes the lack of distinction between the scenes that are part of the film Blue Tomorrows and those 
that are part of the filmmaker’s lives, which is to say Inland Empire’s diegetic reality. Common to 
Lynch’s work is the friction between moments of clear storytelling which are then shot through with 
surreal and disturbing moments of uncanny imagery and events, and I will consider some of these 
moments to try and appreciate how the narrative threads collide and, crucially for my purposes, character 
identities begin to break down.  
Early in the film Nikki receives a visit from a character credited as Visitor # 1 (Grace Zabriskie) 
who tells Nikki she is a new neighbour and has heard about the fact that Nikki is going to get the lead 
role in Blue Tomorrows. Much of their exchange is tense as Nikki tries to be polite and accommodating 
as her visitor talks cryptically and at times profanely while displaying an odd array of facial tics and 
mannerisms. The visitor recites “old tales” and talks about losing track of time and forgetfulness before 
finally saying to Nikki:  
Me, I can’t seem to remember if it’s today, two days from now, or yesterday. I suppose if it was 
9:45, I’d think it was after midnight. For instance, if today was tomorrow, you wouldn’t even 
remember that you owed on an unpaid bill. Actions do have consequences. And yet, there is the 
magic. If it was tomorrow, you would be sitting over there. 
There is little the viewer can take from these lines at this stage other than assuming they will 
take on some significance later in the film. What is notable, however, is the way in which the sequence 
concludes (Fig. 48) as it introduces an additional surreal element suggesting how character identity is 
going to become destabilised as the film progresses. After the visitor states that Nikki “would be sitting 
over there,” we cut to an optical POV shot showing her outstretched finger pointing towards an empty 
sofa on the opposite side of the room (Fig. 48, shot 4). A close up of Nikki shows her slowly, perhaps 
fearfully, turning her head to look across the room to where the visitor is pointing, before a cut shows 
Nikki now on the sofa, with two women seated next to her. There is no accompanying reverse shot to 







show anything otherworldly or surreal such as Nikki in her previous location looking at herself from 
across the room, however the final shot is accompanied by an ominous chime on the soundtrack. 
Combined with Nikki’s look of trepidation as she slowly turns her head in the penultimate shot, this sound 
generates an unsettling tone by adding a dark and eerie quality to the edit. The sequence also carries a 
suggestion of spatiotemporal fracturing not unlike Fred’s encounter with the Mystery Man in Lost 
Highway, when the latter appears to be in two places at once.   
 
Fig. 48. The conclusion of Visitor #1’s encounter with Nikki hints at the unsettling and unexplained 
occurrences that lie ahead. 
This moment is merely a hint of something dark and unsettling and the tone gives way to a 
lighter mood in the scenes that follow as we see Nikki celebrate being offered the part in Blue Tomorrows, 
followed by the process of shooting the film getting underway. However, her encounter with Visitor #1 
is an indication of the way in which Inland Empire will develop, and if we examine two more key 
sequences from the film’s opening hour, we can see how it heads towards a gradual descent into a 
narrative ‘rabbit hole’ of ambiguity and uncertainty. The principal way in which this is achieved is by a 
gradual mingling and blending of the identities of Nikki and her character Sue so that the events of the 
former’s life become interwoven and at times indistinguishable from the events of Blue Tomorrows. 







Significantly, the blurring of identities is established not only as an apparent breakdown in Nikki’s psyche 
but also in terms of the narrative itself. As further examples show, we can see how the increasing 
ambiguity over whether we are seeing Nikki or Sue is as much a question for Dern’s character(s) as it is 
for the viewer.  
In a number of preceding scenes we witness an emerging attraction between Nikki and Devon 
during their offscreen exchanges, as well as one moment at Nikki’s house when her husband, Piotrek, 
issues a thinly-veiled threat to Devon that he should stay aw from his wife. Shortly thereafter we cut to 
a scene that appears to show Nikki and Devon alone on an empty set following a day of filming. We can 
see the set from earlier (top images in Fig. 47) but it is now lit more darkly and a handheld shot is used, 
which is an important formal marker since up to this point the filmed scenes of Blue Tomorrows as seen 
through the camera on set have been static and presumably ounted on an apparatus. By contrast, a large 
proportion of the action taking place outside of the Blue Tomorrows diegesis have been shot using hand-
held camerawork. All of which suggests that, in this particular scene, Nikki and Devon are on the film 
set from earlier but shooting has finished for the day. There is an exchange of dialogue between them, 
during which she confesses her suspicions that her husband ‘knows about them’ and that she fears he will 
kill them both. We are invited to draw the obvious parallel that Nikki and Devon have embarked on a 
real-life affair, which mirrors the infidelity of the Blue Tomorrows plot. Their exchange of dialogue is 
shown with the actors in extreme close-up, again consistet with scenes which have tracked the lives of 
Nikki and Devon in between shooting the film. At one point, Nikki suddenly breaks off with a gasp and 
a smile and exclaims how the conversation they are having “sounds like dialogue from [their] script,” at 
which point we hear Kingsley shout “Cut!”. It dawns on Nikki that she is in fact still in the middle of a 
take, Devon looks concerned at her confusion and as she backs off in fear, we see a shot of a camera off 
to one side, apparently filming their exchange while Kingsley angrily demands from offscreen to know 
what is happening on the set. The scene ends abruptly with no immediate resolution other than the 
subsequent scene in which Devon’s agent expresses a concern that the story of a gypsy curse associated 
with Blue Tomorrows is having an adverse affect on Nikki’s mental health.  







What follows represents a culmination of the preceding sequences which indicate a gradual 
coming-apart of narrative cohesion in terms of how we distinguish Nikki from Sue, Devon from Billy, 
and the corresponding spatiotemporal layout and organisation of the Inland Empire and Blue Tomorrows 
storyworlds. The parallels drawn between Nikki and Devon’s lives with those of Sue and Billy become 
increasingly blurred, something which is complemented by a corresponding lack of clarity about different 
locations and where they stand in relation to one another. One reason for this is a lack of establishing 
shots and an editing style that gives unclear indications about intervening action and the length of time 
that has elapsed between scenes. As John Orr writes:  
Of course the meaning of the relationship between sequences, those notorious Lynchian non-
sequiturs, is anybody’s guess. In this respect, the film is tougher to read than any of its 
predecessors.238 
As we saw in Chapter Five, Mirror has a very segmented, episodic structure with little in the 
way of intervening action or direct causal connections. This does not necessarily impair our 
comprehension, however, since the meaning of the film is communicated through thematic links and 
associations rather than a relying on a goal-oriented storyline. Inland Empire also has a deficit of 
intervening action – those ‘notorious Lynchian non-sequiturs’ – but in this case the effect does impair our 
ability to achieve a narrative vantage point. The scene which follows Nikki’s moment of confusion on set 
is a love scene that has almost no framing context, and it represents the first moment when Nikki and 
Sue’s identities begin to conflate. We are not shown where this scene is st, all we can see it that it is a 
bedroom, but it is darkly lit and the image quality is grainy a d low-resolution. Nikki’s husband appears 
to be spying on her in bed with Devon (although he does n thing to intervene), and Piotrek’s presence 
clearly invites the hypothesis that we are seeing Nikki cheating on him with Devon. However, their post-
coital dialogue makes it very difficult to come to this con lusion:  
Nikki/Sue: “Remember that thing I told you. There’s a story that happened yesterday, but I know 
it’s tomorrow.”  
Devon/Billy: “Don’t make no sense.” 







Nikki/Sue: “It was that scene that we did yesterday. When I’m getting groceries for you with 
your car, and I was in that alley, and I parked the car. There’s always parking there. So there I 
am –  
Devon/Billy: “What? Sue, damn!”  
Nikki/Sue: “It was a scene we did yesterday. You weren’t in it. One when I’m in the alley, I’m 
going to get groceries for you, with your car, nd I parked there ‘cause there’s always parking. 
You know the one? I see this writing on metal, and I start remembering something. This whole 
thing starts flooding in. This whole memory, I start to remember. And I don’t know what it is. 
It’s me. Devon, it’s me Nikki.  
Devon/Billy: ‘Doesn’t make any sense. What is this?’ 
Nikki/Sue: “It’s me, Devon, it’s me Nikki. Look at me you fucker!” 
This scene compounds Nikki’s earlier moment of panic after the shout of ‘cut’ from Kingsley 
makes her realise that she as mistaken a filmed scene for real life. In this insta ce, however, there is no 
such intervention and the ambiguity about character identities spills out further so that the viewer is left 
with a corresponding lack of certainty. Nikki’s enigmatic words about a “story that happened yesterday, 
but I know it’s tomorrow” evoke Visitor #1’s cryptic utterances about time, while her insistence that she 
is Nikki even though Devon/Billy calls her Sue reinforces the identity confusion once more. From the 
viewer’s perspective it is difficult to say with certainty whether or n t this is a scene from Blue Tomorrows 
or not since there is evidence on both sides; if this is a scene from Nikki’s life then why is Devon calling 
her Sue? If it is a scene involving Sue and Billy then why is Nikki’s husband present? These are, of 
course, irreconcilable contradictions, at least if we approach the film as we would a more conventional 
one. As it transpires, however, this moment is merely a narrative precipice before the film’s various 
strands and associated characters begin to collide and communicate with one another in increasingly 
complex ways. As Robert Sinnerbrink puts it:  







These topologically communicating filmworlds now set the stage for the film’s own vertiginous 
doubling; its nesting of interconnected cinematic worlds, multiple narrative lines, and blurring 
character identities.239 
During the script reading sequence described earlier, we are given a cue to hypothesise about 
the potential route the storyline might take, by way of a gypsy curse backstory. Upon learning this detail, 
we might be tempted to see this as a signal that Nikki and Devon will meet a similar fate to those who 
played the lead roles in the original screenplay. However, it becomes apparent around the half-hour point 
that the narrative is operating on a much more abstract level, and that whatever is likely to befall the 
characters is not anchored in the relatively straightforward storyline of a cursed history repeating itself 
over time. As Sinnerbrink describes, just as this more conventional pattern becomes established, the 
narrative events begin to deviate and collide in jarring and confusing ways as the distinction between 
Nikki’s life and that of Sue in Blue Tomorrows begins to deteriorate further. Significantly, at the same 
point that the narrative begins to lose its coherence, the film indicates that delusion and uncertainty about 
subjective identity will become a central theme.  
It is after the bedroom scene that Inland Empire takes us over the precipice, as we cut to an 
external, hand-held shot in bright daylight with what appears to show us Nikki in an alleyway carrying 
shopping towards her parked car. She sees the letters ‘Axxon N’ scribbled writing on a metal door, and 
proceeds through the doorway to the darkened interior (Fig. 49). A discord is created by the fact that a 
hand-held shot is inconsistent with earlier shots of Blue Tomorrows scenes, but the details of the mise-
en-scène – alleyway; carrying groceries to a parked car; writing on metal - are consistent with the 
description she gives to Devon of a scene she had been shooting.  
 








Fig. 49. The preamble to the film’s ‘rabbit hole’ moment. Lighting, camerawork, clothing and action 
might lead us to make the assumption that we are seeing Nikki and not Sue. 
After she enters the doorway and emerges from the shadows, the narrative constructs a temporal 
loop as we see her looking at herself in the earlier scene where she and Devon are rehearsing dialogue 
from Blue Tomorrows, and during which they learn of the gypsy curse (Fig. 50). When we sa  this scene 
the first time around, the conversation breaks off when they think they can hear somebody moving around 
in the darkened set behind them. Devon walks off to investigate, but he returns saying that he couldn’t 
find anyone, which would indicate that the person the three of them heard creeping around the empty sets 
during their rehearsal was also Sue/Nikki. We are therefore c nfronted with the impossible reality that 
she was in both places simultaneously and have to adjust our approach to try and make narrative sense of 
this paradox; another moment that recalls Lo t Highway. We see a repetition of Devon leaving the group 
to investigate the empty sets but this time there is an additional shot back towards Kingsley. It now shows 
an empty chair where Nikki had been sitting (Fig. 51), thereby compounding the confusion caused for the 
viewer by this paradox.  
 
 







               
Fig. 50. The spatiotemporal paradox signals a disintegration of boundaries between embedded fiction 
and diegetic reality as well as between Nikki and her character Sue.  
                
Fig. 51. The shot of Nikki from earlier is replaced by one in which she is absent, with no clear motivation 
from which the viewer can glean a reliable explanation. In the context of this sequence, however, it is 
only one of several inexplicable details.  
The sequence concludes with Sue/Nikki being chased by Devon through the darkened set; at one 
point she stops to turn and sees her husband behind a window staring out at her. She becomes fearful and 
seems to shout to Devon (although she calls him Billy) before turning again to run. After taking refuge 
inside the little house from Blue Tomorrows, referred to as Smithy’s house in the script, she looks around 
and it seems to dawn on her where she is. She frantically she tries to leave but the door is jammed, then 
she screams to Billy through the window but he (Devon) canot see or hear her. He returns to his rehearsal 
as we saw him do in the scene first time around before the space outside the house dissolves and changes 
from the Devon looking in from film set to (presumably) the front garden of Smithy’s house (Fig. 52). 








Fig. 52. A pivotal moment takes place when Nikki/Sue appears to be physically transported from the film 
set into a concrete reality belonging to the world of Blue Tomorrows. 
Her reaction suggests that she is unsettled by what she is se ing, strengthening the hypothesis 
that she is indeed still Nikki, despite the fact that she repeatedly referred to Devon as Billy. As she opens 
the door, she walks outside into what appears to be a genuine external location and not a film set; an 
apparent relocation into a physically distinct reality. Murray Smith asserts how ‘realist texts require 
recognition as texts, and do not simply ‘absorb’ the spectator into the diegesis.’240 In this instance, these 
words take on a literal manifestation and the distinction between Nikki and Sue collapses in on itself. She 
appears distressed at this occurrence, which suggests her relocation to what appears to be an actual world 
rather than the set of Blue Tomorrows is an unnatural occurrence. A clearly motivated and cued transi ion 
from a scene involving Nikki to a filmed scene of her acting in Blue Tomorrows would create no conflict 
for the viewer due to clear signposting. However, in this instance she seems as surprised as the viewer 
might be to see her being literally transported to the fictional world in which Blue Tomorrows takes place. 
In Chapter One I looked at Noël Carroll’s definitions of monstrousness, and one point he makes is that a 
viewer is often cued by the facial expressions of characters when trying to determine if particular events 
upset the natural order of the diegesis or not. The reaction of Dern’s character at this point would suggest 
that the change in location is an unnatural, magical occurrence, which may strengthen the hypothesis that 
she is Nikki and not Sue. As I discussed in Chapter Two, Lost Highway generates ambiguity over whether 
or not we should regard the transformation of Fred into Pete as a literal mutation or the delusional 
experience of a psychologically traumatised person. We have a similar scenario in Inland Empire, but on 
this occasion there is an added emphasis on reality versus fiction by virtue of a storyline involving acting 
and filmmaking, in contrast with Lost Highway’s suggestion of trauma-induced delusion. This is not to 







say that the framework in Inland Empire does not imply that Nikki is hallucinating or experiencing a 
psychological breakdown of some sort, but the framing scenario of the Blue Tomorrows production 
arguably creates a more self-conscious viewing experience. If we look at a similar but fundamentally 
contrasting example, Synecdoche, New York (Charlie Kaufman, 2008), we can see how that film engages 
with a similar technique through the mise-en-abyme narrative structure in which a playwright constructs 
an epic production intended to cover his entire life to date and beyond. This process begins feeding off 
itself as the cast begin re-casting for a third production housed within their own one. The casting of some 
actors who genuinely look similar to one another adds to the effect, particularly since they begin 
relationships with their fictional counterparts even to the point of jeopardising the relationships with their 
actual partners. This is offset, however, by the fact that the film also casts actors as counterparts who are 
patently unlike one another, such as being much taller and thinner, or by having a woman portraying a 
male character (Fig. 53).  
       
Fig. 53. Genuine resemblances between Emily Watson and Samantha Morton (left) are exploited in order 
to blur distinctions between characters. This is balanced out, however, by the contrast of characters who 
are clearly physically dissimilar, such as Dianne Wi st (right) and Tom Noonan (left) each playing Phillip 
Seymour Hoffman’s character Caden in different ‘versions’ of his life.  
Although the concept is a little dizzying, as we saw with Memento Kaufman’s film can be 
grasped once its pattern is established and provided the viewer remains vigilant about how character 
identities are being manipulated and their distinctiveness blurred. There is also additional assistance 
provided through dialogue to keep the narrative thrust clear and by ensuring that the identity of its 
principal character - the real, original Cade – remains recognisable and free from any ambiguity. In the 







case of Inland Empire, the moment when Sue and Nikki become intertwined signals a dep rture from the 
storyworld we have associated with the actress Nikki Grace and an arrival in a seemingly distinct realm 
in which Nikki may or may not be the character Susan Blue. I will now move on to look at exactly how 
the film makes it difficult for us to say exactly which caracter we are seeing at various points in the 
narrative and what conclusions the viewer is invited to raw.  
“Look at me, and tell me if you’ve known me before.” 
 
Richard Wollheim  devised the term ‘twofoldness’241 to describe the way in which we can (and 
usually do) look at representations in visual art and be simultaneously aware of its depicted scene as well 
as its status as a depiction. I  his essay ‘On the Twofoldness of Character,’ Murray Smith considers 
Wollheim’s concept in relation to fictional characters in a variety of modes of representation, but in 
relation to fiction films specifically he writes:  
One of the most routine and explicit ways in which we exhibit awareness of the configurational 
aspect of film characters is via their embodiment by performers, and stars in particular. We move 
fluidly between reference to the character, and to the actor or actress embodying the character; 
sometimes the difference matters, but it is the ease of movement between the two that is 
important here.242 
Inland Empire is to a large extent playing with (and on) this cognitive process and the 
institutional viewing habits that the majority of cinemagoers deploy when consuming fiction film 
narratives. The ability to rapidly shift between seeing actor and character simultaneously without any 
detriment to our viewing experience is foregrounded by the jarring conflation of Laura Dern’s portrayals 
of both Nikki and Sue. In ‘Engaging Characters: Further Reflections’, Smith writes that ‘seeing 
[characters] at once as (more or less realistic) representations of persons and as artifacts in their own 
right…enables us to understand fictions which foreground…this duality.’243 Inland Empire is one such 
fiction as it wrong-foots the viewer and draws attention to the techniques involved in identifying and 
developing an understanding of characters. A similar example can be found in Abbas Kiarostami’s 







Certified Copy (2010) when the two lead characters, Elle and James, begin thir acquaintance as apparent 
strangers only to segue into familiarity with one another suggesting they are actually married. Their 
conversation is unbroken and inexplicable changes, such as James suddenly being able to speak French 
and Italian, are woven seamlessly into the action with no clear (literal) explanation. Similarly, in I land 
Empire, there are few (if any) clear indicators after the moment when Nikki appears to be drawn into the 
world of Blue Tomorrows that we can use to determine if or when Dern is playing Nikki or Sue. These 
oblique, elliptical transformations - the exact opposite of the graphic, explicit transformations I examined 
in relation to The Thing – are a manifestation of the ‘fluid referencing’ of characters Smith develops from 
Wollheim’s twofoldness idea. In a similar way to Persona (Ingmar Bergman, 1966) and Celine and Julie 
Go Boating (Jacques Rivette, 1974), we can see in Inland Empire that a character transition of sorts has 
occurred but lack the narrative information to fully reconcile it with other aspects of the story; the ‘fluid 
referencing’ effect acts against our attempts to identify characters clearly.  
As a way of trying to unpick how the fabric of a narrative could provoke this sort of response, it 
makes sense to look in the first instance towards the figure who would, in a normal case, be the storyline’s 
guiding figure - which is to say, the protagonist; in this cae Sue/Nikki. Even if we cannot always 
determine which character is which, Sue/Nikki is clearly the fulcrum around which the majority of events 
revolve, so it is logical to work through the markers we habitually use for identifying and tracing the 
existence of individuals, both in real life and in film. In Smith’s terms, we can easily ‘individuate’ and 
‘re-identify’244 the actress Laura Dern, but it is less straightforward to for us to determine which character 
she is portraying. In Dominic Power’s review of the film he summarises the progression(s) of, and 
transitions between, Dern’s character(s) in the following way:  
Gradually the role of Susie Blue changes from confident housewife to a violent drifter, battered 
and abused by life. Laura Dern delivers the performance of h r life, playing differing aspects of 
a shattered personality with absolute conviction, mixing sweetness and vulnerability with 
disillusion and despair.245 
This is a useful description insofar as it oversimplifies the narrative and insufficiently conveys 
how disorienting the unmotivated changes of location and appearance are. The description suggests that 







Dern plays a single character with an easily distinguishable su -character embedded in a separate fictional 
layer. The description also suggests a linear progression when in fact the changes are more sudden and 
erratic than the gradual degradation he describes. As part of the viewing process, and in our efforts to 
discern and keep track of certain characters, we habitually attempt to associate specific individuals within 
a particular place and time since a clear spatio-temporal lc tion can help reinforce physical identifiers 
and behavioural characteristics we have come to recognise i  relation to a particular character. The 
opening scenes portray Nikki with a particular lighting scheme and her general appearance – hair, 
makeup, clothing – as well as her surroundings all give the impression of an affluent, successful 
individual.  
  
Fig. 54. Nikki is portrayed with a particularly ‘polished’ appearance in the opening hour of the film but 
appears noticeably different in a number of scenes following her ‘entry’ into the world of Blue 
Tomorrows via Smithy’s house on the film set. 
In contrast, in many of the sequences which follow the transi io  into the world of Blue 
Tomorrows, Sue/Nikki appears dishevelled, dirty, wearing tattered, drab clothing and displaying signs of 
injury such as blood and bruises on her face (Fig. 54). However, the narrative does not set up a simple 
dichotomy between Sue and Nikki whereby we can rely on external physical identifiers to conclude that 
clean and well-groomed equals Nikki, while battered and unkempt equals Sue. After we see Nikki/Sue 
being drawn into the fictional realm of Blue Tomorrows, she tentatively begins to explore her 
surroundings after she realises that there is no immediate w y back to the film set. The viewer, being 
offered no alternative perspective within the diegesis, has no opti n but to follow her, and at this stage 
we must make use of the limited information available to draw distinctions between the different realms 
of the film and form plausible hypotheses and explanations. However, as Michael Atkinson wrote in his 







review of Inland Empire: ‘[T]he film behaves like a narrative deprivation tank, forcing you to scramble 
for corollaries,’246 and such corollaries are in short supply at this point. On a superficial level one might 
latch on to a detail like clothing and speculate that the person we are witnessing in Smithy’s house is 
indeed Sue because we have seen her portrayed unambiguously in the role of Sue wearing the clothing 
she is in now. However, we have also seen her unambiguously as Nikki on the set in between takes and 
still wearing her character’s outfit so this is hardly conclusive, although even if this were a reliable way 
of distinguishing them, the narrative’s subsequent turns makes the task even more difficult.  
The film’s supporting cast is also used to compound the sense of unstable and duplicated 
character identities. Mirroring the conflation of Nikki and Sue are the different incarnations of Nikki’s 
husband, who appears as Piotrek in Nikki’s ‘real world,’ but also as the character Smithy in Blue 
Tomorrows and as an unnamed man in the scenes from 1930’s Poland (Fig. 55). As Piotrek he is dressed 
in expensive clothing and appears confident and domineering, while the scenes in Smithy’s house show 
him as downtrodden, lacking in confidence and dressed in cheap, drab clothing. Common to both realms, 
however, is his violent and obsessive jealousy fuelled by a suspicion that his wife is being unfaithful.  
 
Fig. 55. Piotrek/Smithy (Peter J. Lucas) has multiple incarnations and appears on separate occasions as 
Nikki’s husband, as Smithy in Blue Tomorrows, and also as the unnamed man in ‘old world’ Poland.  
As part of my analysis of The Thing in Chapter One I looked at how the cast features a number 
of individuals who have a passing resemblance to one another and/or are shot and styled in a particular 
way that may cause them to blend into one another in trms of how we perceive and remember them.  A 
similar device is used in Inland Empire to add an additional, more subtle element of identity confusion 
by featuring a variety of actors who are similar in physical appearance. One element of the Blue 
Tomorrows narrative thread involves Billy’s jealous wife Doris (Julia Ormond) who is plotting to kill 
Sue/Nikki because of her affair with Billy. The way in which s e is framed, along with her hairstyle, 







bears a resemblance to The Lost Girl, who we periodically see crying and watching the TV set showing 
what we the viewers are also seeing. In addition, Sue/Nikki has an encounter with another strange caller, 
identified as Visitor #2 (Mary Steenburgen), when she is in Smithy’s house. She too is shot using similar 
framing and low lighting, and has a similar hairstyle, adding a sense of déjà-vu which resonates with the 
theme of history repeating itself (Fig. 56). Another technique that contributes to the viewer’s sense of 
disorientation is the extensive use of medium shots and close-ups, which is ironic given that close-ups 
are often used to clearly identify the facial expressions a d appearance of a particular character. While 
they do achieve this effect, these types of shots also limit the viewer’s ability to clearly see the characters’ 
surrounding environments.   
 
Fig. 56. Some of the film’s supporting characters are framed and arranged with similarities, which adds 
to the sense that characters are doubled or linked in some way. The technique recalls the associative 
doubling that is set up between Fred and Pete in Lost Highway through repetition of shot compositions 
(Fig. 14).  
Ambiguities surrounding character identities are echoed by a corresponding vagueness regarding 
the film’s spatial boundaries. As with Lost Highway, the narrative creates paradoxes of space and time 
by constructing temporal loops with the result that characters s em to exist in more than one place at 
once, events within the narrative appear to repeat themselves, and the chronology is seemingly 
reconfigured and revised as the film progresses. Robert Sinnerbrink identifies the prevalence of recording 
equipment as a narrative motif – ‘Gramophone needles, movie cameras, DV cameras, even the strange 
camera obscura using cigarette and silk screen’ – and as well as acting as symbolic commentaries on 
technology, each of these objects also functions as a doorway or portal within the various narrative 
threads. Furthermore, there is a permeability and porousness between these realms which combines with 
the film’s premise to heighten the ambiguity about its diegetic laws. As Anna Schaffner observes:  







the boundaries between acting and non-acting, between th  film within the film we are watching 
and films that are watched by characters within the film, are rendered fluid; the structure is 
labyrinthine, Chinese-box-like, but with boxes that are not clearly separable from each other.247 
One such moment of transportation occurs after Nikki/Sue has been drawn into the world of 
Blue Tomorrows and we see her increasingly wretched existence in ‘Smithy’s house’. As she sits on the 
floor during a scene for which we have little context, a group of prostitutes mysteriously appear in the 
room with her, cackling and shining torches in one another’s faces. They speak to Nikki but their words 
are cryptic and gradually Nikki is reduced to tears before we hear one of them say to her: “In the future, 
you’ll be dreaming, in a kind of sleep. When you open your eyes, someone familiar will be there.” She 
begins to sob and covers her face with her hands, and as shetakes them away we cut to an optical POV 
shot showing her hands as they move aside to reveal a snow-covered Polish city street to where she has 
been transported, along with two of the prostitutes (Fig. 57).  
 
Fig. 57. Just as the narrative appears to be establi hing the world of Blue Tomorrows, Sue/Nikki is once 
again transported and, as before, seems as bewildered by the change in her surroundings as she did the 
first time around.  
As before, she appears fearful and disoriented, which helps sustain the sense that ‘the confusion 
of the spectator is shared by Nikki/Sue herself,’248 which in turn motivates the viewer to reach for a less 
conventional interpretation. Atkinson argues that ‘Lynch seems to have constructed the film deliberately 
to evade the butterfly nets of critical response altogether,’249 but I would argue that this is probably too 







extreme a position to take. In his article, Orr articulates th  obvious questions that would arise for the 
viewer after we see Sue/Nikki transported to the scene in Poland when he asks:  
Is this then the 1930s, the time of the original Polish film of which the present Hollywood film, 
starring Laura Dern and directed by Jeremy Irons, is a remake? The film that never got finished 
because its lead actors were murdered? […] We shall never know.250 
Orr’s reaction to the film’s puzzles reveals the feeling of resignation that might be typical of 
some viewers, which makes it clear that we must adopt a less lit ral way of processing the narrative 
events. Before Sue/Nikki is transported from Smithy’s house to Poland we hear one of the prostitutes say 
to her: “Look at us and tell us if you’ve know us before.” Encapsulated in this simple sentence is the very 
essence of the key viewing habit that Smith calls ‘re-identification’; with each new scene we attempt 
(amongst other things) to recognise characters who are continuous with ones we have seen previously, 
and place them in the context of what we have seen earlier in the narrative. It is an articulation of what 
we routinely do without necessarily being aware of it, al hough in the context of Inland Empire’s 
disorienting spatio-temporal shifts it comes across almost like a challenge, a gauntlet being thrown down 
to the viewer. Much like the experience we may have when watching Marienbad, narrative footholds that 
we can use to build context and meaning do not offer themselves up readily, if at all.  Much like 
Marienbad’s almost obsessive repetition of dialogue referring to memory, Inland Empire’s characters 
vocalise an uncertainty or curiosity about who they each re, but the narrative events do not advance 
towards clarity of character identity any more than Marienbad settles on an unambiguous recollection of 
events in its storyline. However, again like Marienbad, as well as Lost Highway, Inland Empire seems to 
dangle tantalising narrative clues inviting the viewer to gather information, problem solve and decipher 
the unfolding events. A certain proportion of sequences in the film contain causal links to one another 
and adhere to principles of spatio-emporal continuity, and there are a number of recurring motifs and 
characters who appear in different incarnations throughout. F r example, the film opens with a black and 
white shot of a spinning gramophone turntable and we hear an nnouncer on scratchy audio say: “Axxon 
N. The longest running radio play in history. Tonight, continuing in the Baltic region, a grey winter day 
in an old hotel…” The mention of ‘the Baltic region’ creates a link with the scenes in Poland and the 







numerous Polish characters, such as Nikki’s husband Piotrek, and we can also link the mention of ‘Axxon 
N’ with the moment we see the same word scrawled on the metal door in the alleyway. This gives the 
impression that enough motifs are littered throughout the narrative to create links between scenes, 
however tenuous and mysterious they are. Although some critical esponses, like that of Power, warn that 
if we ‘look for linear development, a conventional three-act structure or any kind of allegory... you will 
be disappointed.’251 Power’s point suggests that, to avoid disappointment, we must deliberately not seek 
a ‘conventional three-act structure or allegory,’ however on the latter point this is too rigid an approach 
to take. An allegorical interpretation is a much more flexibl  hermeneutic method and allows for a 
different way of reading a text than simply extracting the surface meaning from a typical goal-oriented 
narrative. In his article comparing the work of Lynch and Krzysztof Kieślowski, Orr declares the 
following about the narrative structure of Inland Empire:  
This is not simply a forking-path device of ‘network narratives’ whose plot-lines, in Bordwell’s 
formulation, finally converge to ‘work out’ a solution to the puzzle of chance and coincidence, 
a typical Hollywood third-act device like we find in Magnolia (1999) and in Crash (2004)…but 
a deeper meditation on what mysteriously connects all of us as humans to one other…252 
As part of my analysis of Memento in Chapter Two I highlighted the way in which the 
chronology of the black-and-white sequences, in which we see Leonard speaking on the phone to an 
unknown caller, is finally revealed and provides the key to the film’s reverse structure. The sequence in 
which we see Leonard go from his motel room to the place where he kills Dodd gradually changes from 
black-and-white to colour and establishes a link between this moment and the other sequences, and at that 
point Memento’s structure is laid bare and we are able to appreciate the ‘hairpin’ design of the narrative.  
By contrast, in Inland Empire, we periodically cut to Sue/Nikki’s monologue and we hear her profane 
confessions to the character credited as Mr K as she is seated at a table in a bare, darkened room. In this 
case there is no spatio-temporal context within which we can place these scenes, and therefore we have 
insufficient narrative information for determining whether this is Sue or Nikki that we are seeing. Her 
appearance is dishevelled and her face is bruised, although the anecdotes she tells gradually begin to 
resonate with other sequences that might otherwise appear similarly isolated or lacking in context.  








Fig. 58. The narrative is punctuated by Sue/Nikki’s ‘confessions’ to the mysterious Mr K, but the context 
for her being there is vague and remains unexplained.  
However, at this point the only reference we have to Mr K’s room is its link to the diegetic world 
of the rabbit sitcom when we see one of the figures enter the same room and sit at the desk before 
Sue/Nikki arrives (Fig. 58). In the film’s final third, we see Nikki mount a flight of stairs to Mr K’s room 
and hear a repetition of lines we have heard before, and the use of a dissolve and elision of action and 
dialogue suggests a recap and an acknowledgment that this is the same scene as before. However, unlike 
Memento, even with the benefit of this additional context, creating this sequential and spatial link does 
not provide a grand reveal about the narrative structure or a reconciliation of the storyline’s ambiguities. 
In fact, with Inland Empire we might say that at this point in the film our ability to say whether we are 
seeing Sue or Nikki is as unclear as it has ever been.  
Before finding her way to Mr K’s room, we see that she has taken refuge from the streets of 
Hollywood and Vine where she is being pursued by Billy’s wife, Doris, which provides a little more 
context about how and why Sue/Nikki began speaking to Mr K in first place. However, the way in which 
she finds herself on the streets of LA is far from clear and it represents another instance of spatiotemporal 
impossibility and ambiguity about how different narrative strands and storyworlds align and communicate 
with one another. The sequence (Fig. 59) begins with Sue/Nikki sitting in the armchair in Smithy’s house 
when sound and light become distorted and she begins to scream, at which point we cut to Hollywood 
and Vine where the prostitutes are greeting Sue/Nikki. She appears disorientated at first but her expression 
changes and she says in a slow, mocking voice: “Where am I? I’m afraid.” She laughs manically along 
with the prostitutes before we cut to another Sue/Nikki walking along the other side of the same street. 
The two see each other and the laughing ‘version’ grins sarcastically and aggressively across the street at 







the other Sue/Nikki, who visibly recoils before noticing Doris Side striding towards her. This second 
Sue/Nikki is the one who then runs and finds her way to Mr K’s room and we see no further interaction 
between the doppelgängers.  
  
Fig. 59. During the Hollywood and Vine sequence, Sue/Nikki encounters another version of herself, 
further complicating the network of narrative strands and the physical laws of the storyline.  
At one point, the words spoken by Sue/Nikki during the opening part of her monologue to Mr. K could 
be seen as a vocalisation of the challenge the viewer is faced with:  
The thing is, I don’t know what was before or after. I don’t know what happened first and it’s 
kinda laid a mind-fuck on me. 
Similarly, when her character whines with mock-fear: “Where am I? I’m afraid”, it comes across as taunt 
and could be read as an acknowledgment of the fact that the viewer might be thinking the very same 
thing. It is through having our expectations denied, frustrated, confounded or hindered in some way or 
another that we can be made aware of what those very expectations are. The viewer continually strives to 
determine ‘what was before or after’ and Inland Empire does not make this process easy, unlike Memento 
with its rewarding chronological denouement. Despite having recognisable film stars in its cast, Inland 







Empire should certainly be categorised as more akin to the art cinema tradition than mainstream 
Hollywood narratives. Bordwell writes that when a film displays certain features they can be identified 
as belonging to the ‘art cinema’ tradition, which very often contain examples of the filmmaker(s) stylistic 
choices being foregrounded:  
Deviations from the classical canon – an unusual angle, a stressed bit of cutting, a prohibited 
camera movement, an unrealistic shift in lighting or setting – in short any breakdown of the 
motivation of cinematic space and time by cause-effect logic – can be read as “authorial 
commentary.”253 
It is easy to find examples of all of the above in Inland Empire, however this need not be interpreted 
solely as directorial expression, and Bordwell points out how aiming for realism of a subjective or 
psychological sort can paradoxically mask the overt intentions or expressiveness of a filmmaker. He 
argues that ‘to push the realism of psychological uncertainty to its limit is to invite a haphazard text in 
which the author’s shaping hand would not be visible.’254 The way in which these seemingly mutually 
exclusive aims can be reconciled, Bordwell argues, is through the deliberate use of ambiguity as a guiding 
stylistic principle: ‘Ideally, the film hesitates, suggesting character subjectivity, life’s untidiness, and 
author’s vision. Whatever is excessive in one category must belong to the other.’255 If we adopt this 
approach then we have much greater freedom of interpretation, just as we saw how research into Mirror ’s 
production history and Tarkovsky’s biography can provide a more rewarding appreciation of the film. 
The film encourages us to make links by association and also accept that certain elements of the story 
will remain unexplained. The film defies meaning and explanation in the conventional sense of 
storytelling, and all that it can leave the viewer with are unanswered questions about paradoxes of time, 
space, and identity. It would appear both from the opinion of reviewers and of Lynch himself that the 
search for literal meaning in I land Empire is a futile task:  
Cinema is a lot like music. It can be very abstract, but people have a yearning to make intellectual 
sense of it, to put it right into words. And when they can’t do that, it feels frustrating.256  







If we take Piotrek, for instance, it is difficult to reconcile his change in appearance with the 
narrative events, and with our hypothesis about the two ‘versions’ of Nikki/Sue, because this would imply 
that he is also starring in the film with Nikki. There is nothing to suggest that he is also an actor and 
therefore his presence in the Blue Tomorrow’s realm is incongruous and has to either be simply tolerated, 
or we need to reach for a less literal interpretation. A third incarnation of Piotrek also appears in the 
1930’s scenes in Poland; in this way the film seems to point towards a theme of historical recurrence or 
perhaps the potential for magical, supernatural transportations of characters through space and time.  As 
Sinnerbrink puts it:  
We do not comprehend so much as intuit the fragmented, nested, mysteriously connected strands 
that link the ambiguous narrative ‘abstractions’…composing the film.257  
Lynch’s own comments about the making of Inland Empire are of value here and his well-documented 
interest in Transcendental Meditation sheds a particular light on what can be gleaned from the film. His 
beliefs (such as the ‘unified field’ mentioned earlier) and a semi-improvisational method of working is 
obviously a factor behind Sinnerbrink’s ‘abstractions,’ and it conveys how the creation of disparate links 
are a crucial element of the film, be it thematic, spatiotemporal, or in terms of how the film itself grew 
into its eventual form. If Inland Empire is working on the level of metaphor, what are some of the points 
it might be seen as putting forward? If we accept that the film is trying to convey meaning(s) on levels 
other than the literal then what can be said about the film beyond its narrative events? The next logical 
step might be to look into the abstract, the metaphorical, or the illustrative functions of the film. With this 
in mind, I believe the film yields much when looked at in the context of theories of narrativism and self-
identity, which I opened up in the previous chapter, so I will now turn my attention to those same issues 
and revisit the key arguments in the context of Inland Empire.  
Narrativism and Self-Authorship 
 
The premise of Inland Empire adds a layer of complexity to the point made by Bordwell about 
how psychological realism can offer another ‘category’ under which we can organise apparent narrative 







ambiguities and paradoxes. If a storyline suggests a psychological rift or breakdown then we can ascribe 
this explanation to certain irreconcilable details, such as Nikki appearing to be literally trapped in the 
world of Blue Tomorrows (the alternative explanation might be a magical, supernatural one but there is 
less detail provided to support this interpretation). However, if we add in the layer of an embedded 
narrative then it becomes less easy to say whether or not she is delusional, acting, a combination of the 
two, or even – at a stretch – acting with lucidity but portraying a delusional character in the film-within-
the-film. Inland Empire plays with cinematic conventions through its tendency to draw attention to the 
artificiality of what we are seeing, and by individuating characters in the opening scenes and then 
portraying them in later scenes with noticeable alterations t  their appearance, name, and characteristics. 
Crucially, however, there is often insufficient narrative evidence supplied in the intervening scenes to 
either explain the changes or for the viewer enable the viewer to form reasonable hypotheses. When 
changes to character identity occur without an obvious explanation, it can create a jarring effect and may 
provoke a number of reactions from the viewer; potentially confusion and frustration, but perhaps also 
curiosity and the thrill of a mystery. Throughout this study I have made refrence to the ‘person schema’ 
which Smith argues is a model we use not only to relate to p ople in the real world, but also to evaluate 
and understand fictional characters. Often when we encounter particularly unusual events and 
occurrences, they can serve to defamiliarise the commonplace and thereby foreground processes and 
reactions that are otherwise diminished as they are so instinctive and automatic.  
It is certainly not my aim here ‘to make intellectual sense’ of Inland Empire, but rather to focus 
on the way in which the film portrays its characters and engages with issues of storytelling and character 
identity. Lynch is no doubt correct when he suggests that it c n feel frustrating when we are unable to put 
into words the exact meaning of a particular film, and this response once again brings us back to the issue 
of thresholds and boundaries that I first explored in Chapter One. In the real world we rely on categories 
and a sense of ‘self’ and ‘other’ to navigate our way through life successfully, and as I have tried to 
articulate, it is likely that we approach film narratives in a way that echoes this instinct. In Memento we 
are shown the tragic and agonizing situation of Leonard who tries to plug the gaps in his own memory in 
order to function normally and, more ambitiously, solve th  mystery surrounding the murder of his wife. 
The narrative structure of Memento is tightly bound with overlapping action to allow the vi wer to build 







an ever-expanding sense of what has taken place, while the gaps and deficits of knowledge are restricted 
to Leonard. With Inland Empire we seem to lurch from one time period or location to an ther with little 
or no causal connectivity and the result is an increasing lack of clarity about who the characters we are 
seeing actually are. Orr’s ‘Lynchian non-sequiturs’ are the antithesis of Christopher Nolan’s ‘loops’ in 
Memento, and they create a space in which radical alterations to characters, settings, and the overall 
natural order of the diegesis can be accommodated. The film is not unique, however, by virtue of leaving 
questions unanswered and presenting the viewer with irreconcilable paradoxes and narrative ambiguities; 
as outlined earlier, these are features which Bordwell identifies as quite typical of the art-cinema. What 
is perhaps a less typical feature, and one which distinguishes Inland Empire even within this body of 
films, is its handling of character identities. Bordwell writes how the art-film often exhibits  
Violations of classical conceptions of time and space r  justified as the intrusion of an 
unpredictable and contingent daily reality or as the subjective reality of complex characters.258 
Inland Empire manages to suppress the identity of its protagonist while also sustaining that same 
individual as a clearly identifiable figure throughout the narrative - hiding in plain sight, as it were – 
which is a feat that would place it at the extreme end of character complexity even in the context of 
Bordwell’s category. As I mentioned previously, the protagonist traditionally dictates the yaw of the 
storyline and provides the focal point or organising centre for the main plot events; and in a certain respect 
this is the case with Inland Empire. However, what events are we being shown and who exactly is leading 
the way? If Inland Empire is simply a blank canvas onto which the sub-film Blue Tomorrows is presented 
then it begs the questions a) what is the need for the Inland Empire frame and b) what is Blue Tomorrows 
about? The lack of a guiding hand in the form of a clear protagonist is reflected and compounded by the 
way in which Kingsley, the director of Blue Tomorrows, does not feature for the majority of the film. As 
such, the events of the film appear to be careering bldly from one sequence to another and without any 
firm grounding in which Nikki is explicitly moving in and out of character. In fact, after the film’s ‘rabbit 
hole’ moment when Sue/Nikki is transported into Smithy’s house, there is a total absence of any framing 
devices to indicate that the production of Blue Tomorrows is still taking place. As I indicated earlier, in 
the context of the Narrativist / Anti-narrativist debate, D nnett describes a fictional character as a fait 







accompli since the character has to be fully realised so that there is a finished product that the viewer can 
experience and consume. However, the sense we might have of Inland Empire’s almost improvised nature 
provides, in Dern’s characters, a pertinent example of something that comes close to an unwritten or not 
fully realised individual. If we look once again at some of the arguments in this area, we can appreciate 
the ways Inland Empire can offer some valuable contributions and insights to the debate on personal 
identity. As I discussed in Chapter Five, at the core of Dennett’s argument is the way in which he equates 
selfhood with another kind of unseen phenomenon: gravity. He argues that nobody has ever seen gravity, 
merely its effects, but equally nobody would argue that it does n t exist. His point is that the same logic 
should be applied to selfhood since ‘no one has ever seen a self either,’259 although he does qualify this 
point in the following way.  
Unlike centers of gravity, whose sole property is their spatio-temporal position, selves have a 
spatio-temporal position that is only grossly defined.260 
For Dennett, selfhood is more of a moving target and less clearly delineated than gravity, or 
fictional characters for that matter. If we examine the concluding section of Inland Empire, we can see 
how the film goes against the grain of how we anticipate and appreciate a character’s pre-written nature 
as a feature that distinguishes it from real world selves. I would venture that the film does not simply 
appear difficult to consume purely because of the way in which it rails against cinematic conventions of 
structure, running time, and character portrayal. A certain degree also stems from the way in which it 
portrays its lead actress as existing within an inescapable fictionality; a form of self-identity appears to 
emerge from the relative (constructed) reality back into the diegetically real world before being once 
again swallowed up by the fictional. At the opening of this chapter I described how the film initiates a 
sudden and potentially jarring return to unambiguous portrayal of the Blue Tomorrows production as a 
distinct embedded fiction with the framing story of Nikki’s life. If we examine the final portion of the 
film, we can see how this (short-lived) moment of narrative clarity provides an example which is highly 
pertinent to the self-identity discussion.  
As I have illustrated, the film employs a variety of techniques to blur the distinction between 
Sue and Nikki, so by the film’s final act their two characters have become deeply intertwined. Sue/Nikki’s 







final scene in Mr K’s room concludes with Mr K taking a mysterious phone call, which causes Sue/Nikki 
to become fearful and flee into the streets of Hollywood where she once again comes across the group of 
prostitutes. Sue/Nikki at first appears alarmed at the sightof t em, suggesting she does not know them, 
then they ask her where she has been. She keeps trying to tell them that someone is trying to kill her 
before undergoing a strange transition in which her concern drops, her facial expression changes and as 
before when she encountered her doppelgänger, she seems to collect herself and psychologically adjust 
to her circumstances; in folk terminology you might say it looks like someone ‘getting into character.’ 
The prostitutes then disperse and Doris appears behind Sue/Nikki and stabs her with a screwdriver, 
leaving her screaming and bleeding as she lurches acros the street between passing cars. She lies bleeding 
amongst a group of homeless people, who talk to her about everyday irrelevances, before finally dying. 
The camerawork changes noticeably from hand-held to a crane shot, which tracks backwards to reveal a 
camera mounted on a crane and a boom mic, before we hear “cut it” from offscreen (Fig. 60). The 
production of Blue Tomorrows is suddenly reintroduced and the apparent death of Sue/Nikki is revealed 
as no more than a filmed scene in a fictional world. This moment is striking due to the fact that Kingsley 
and the other characters associated with the making of Blue Tomorrows have been absent from the 
narrative events for over an hour. To have the mise-en-abyme suddenly reconfirmed after such a lengthy 
period of ambiguity provide a narrative jolt, as does the uncued transition from a scene that was clearly 
shot on location but concludes in a studio. As a light offscreen floods the set the illusion is broken and 
we see the extras get to their feet and leave the frame, however Nikki remains motionless. A cut to 
Kingsley mirrors our concern that she might actually be dead b fore she very slowly and gingerly gets to 
her feet.  








Fig. 60. The shooting of Blue Tomorrows suddenly reappears to contextualise the events and draw a 
distinction between Sue and Nikki. However, the framing context does not remain intact for very long.  
Kingsley calls for a round of applause for ‘Nikki Grace. Nikki Grace everyone,’ but she wanders 
off the set without acknowledging them. Kingsley and some oth r members of the crew appear concerned 
and come over to her to clean her up. Kingsley holds her by the shoulders and declares: “Nikki! You were 
wonderful!”; then she merges from the set, wearing the silk robe we had seen her wearing backstage 
previously. An optical POV shot from Nikki’s perspective reveals the layout of the studio lot and at this 
point all the evidence points towards the hypothesis that we should regard her emergence from the actual 
film set into the studio lot as the diegetic reality of Nikki Grace; the switch from moving to static camera 
suggests as much, as does the very obvious sight of the studio lot buildings themselves. This moment is 
short-lived, however, and as she walks out into the set there is a return to a handheld shot and the spatial 
geography alters once more. As Nikki passes in front of a pillar, the studio lot in the background is 
replaced by a red curtain, which signals a transition to a new setting that appears inconsistent with the 
established surroundings shown in the sweeping optical POV shot moments before. She finds herself in 
a cinema, and onscreen sees herself delivering her monologue to Mr K which, very poignantly, is at a 
point when we hear her utter the lines about watching her life happen around her “like in a dark theatre’ 
(Fig. 61). We watch the onscreen Sue/Nikki leave Mr K’s room as we saw her do before, then Mr K ‘in 
the flesh’ walks down the side aisle of the theatre and looks at Nikki before climbing a set of stairs. She 







looks back at the screen and it now shows the same scene as we are witnessing, a real-time ise-en-abyme 
like the one used towards the end of Blazing Saddles (Mel Brooks, 1974).  
  
Fig. 61. After shooting has concluded, Nikki watches her confession to Mr K on the cinema screen, before 
the same man appears in the cinema itself and appears to beckon Nikki back into a fantasy world.   
In this sequence, we see Nikki apparently emerge from the world of Blue Tomorrow and back 
into the reality of her life as an actress on a Hollywood studio lot, only for her to be swallowed up once 
more by the diegetic worlds she has seemingly just left behind. This progression erodes the distinctions 
between storyworlds once more and, despite the fact that we have heard Kingsley call her Nikki, places 
a question mark over her identity yet again. After Nikki follows Mr K up the stairs in the theatre we see 
that she is somehow able to move from studio lot to the realm of the rabbit people, while encountering 
The Phantom along the way. These transitions undermines a more conclusive interpretation of what we 
have been seeing, such as Nikki being so immersed in her role in Blue Tomorrows that she lost her sense 
of who she really is. It is as though the mise-en-abyme device can only operate in one direction - that 
which draws us into the embedded fiction rather than the other way round. This pattern, in conjunction 
with the film’s running time, creates a distance between the Nikki Grace of the opening scenes so vast 
that the character’s identity appears as an entirely constructed entity from which she cannot escape, much 
like Marienbad’s suffocating refusal to create an anchor for either character or viewer to gain perspective 
or critical traction. Sinnerbrink sees this as a criticism of corruption in the film industry and the 
inescapable reach of Hollywood in particular. He argues that  







the degradation / transformation of [Blue Tomorrows] into the genre of psychological horror 
[shows how] Hollywood’s dream factory has become an all-encompassing cinematic-mythic 
nightmare.261  
Schaffner meanwhile approaches the film from a psychoanalytical / feminist perspective and 
argues that, rather than Nikki being continually swamped or swallo ed by an inescapable fiction, which 
symbolises the Hollywood system, Nikki transcends all of Inland Empire’s realms and by the end of the 
film ‘fully emancipates herself from the influence of shadowy male forces.’262 She refers to one shot in 
particular in which Nikki is seated back in her home on the sofa where Visitor #1 said she would find 
herself (Fig. 62). Schaffner argues that Nikki is shown sitting ‘in a state of calm bliss’, which reinforces 
her point that the trauma of releasing herself from her ‘inauthentic selves’263 is now behind her. We can 
extend this interpretation along similar lines to the observation of Smith in relation to That Obscure 
Object of Desire when he analyses how the film has two actresses (Carole Bouquet and Angela Molina) 
playing the single character, Conchita. By providing no narration l cues or motivations for the changes 
in performer, and the fact that no surprise is registered by the other characters whenever these changes 
occur, creates discord in our efforts to trace character identit es in the film. As a result, and as we have 
seen already in the case of films which evade a literal explanation:  
Offered no motivation at the levels of story, realism, or genre, the spectator reaches for what 
could be described as thematic motivation. The obscure object of desire is not this woman or 
that woman…but Woman Herself.’264  
Similarly, the different ‘selves’ that Dern plays could be seen as metaphors for different aspects 
of her character or for women in general, especially when we consider the fact that the narrative strand 
involving prostitutes is spread across different countries and historical periods. The blurred face of the 
woman in the opening sequence of the film could be read as a wy of anonymising the character’s identity 
and diluting her level of individuality, which resonates with the theme of violence – and the multiple 
scenes of actual violence - against women featuring throughout the film’s historical periods (and by 
implication human history more generally).  








Fig. 62. Is this Nikki once again, in her home? If so, how did she get there? What is the temporal locati n 
of this shot in relation to everything else that has come before or after?  
To my mind there is also room for an additional reading of the portrayal of multi-layered selves 
emerging and re-emerging from an apparent fiction; one which evokes Hume’s bundle theory of selfhood 
and one of the key objections to it. As I outlined previously, particularly in relation to Memento and 
Mirror, on the subject of self-identity Hume argued that t ‘we are nothing but a bundle or collection 
of different sensations, which succeed each other with an inco ceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual 
flux and movement.’265 When selfhood is conceived in this way, Hume argues, the search for an enduring 
and material inner essence is futile:  
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some 
particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I 
never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but 
the perception.266 
The argument against Hume’s position is that it is self-defeating since the ‘bundle of emotions’ 
can only be identified as such from the vantage point of another perspective or ‘self-location’ which is 
doing the observing. Dennett asks: ‘After all, who is this I that has looked in vain for a self, according to 
Hume?’267 This line of reasoning opens up a potential mise-en-abyme of its own if we consider that an 
‘observing self’ might also be nothing more than a bundle being observed by yet another ‘observing self’ 
and so on ad infinitum. The structure of Inland Empire presents a similar type of scenario with the way 
in which it conflates the identities of Sue and Nikki and their respective worlds and prevents one clear 







individual from achieving an existence that transcends or exists objectively outside of a given storyworld 
or storyline. Characters such as the ones portrayed by Dern could be regarded as an illustration of how 
selfhood is, in Dennett’s words, ‘grossly defined’ in a spatio-temporal sense. As we saw in Chapter Five, 
Dennett equates selves with gravity insofar as they ar phenomena that cannot be seen but are difficult to 
deny, however he distinguishes centres of gravity as having  spatio-temporal position as its sole property. 
The spatio-temporal position of a self, by contrast, cannot (yet?) be identified with such ‘fine-grained 
localisations’ to the point where we can say ‘“That cell right there…that’s the self!”’268 By frustrating the 
viewer’s ability to establish a clearly-defined context beyond the world of Blue Tomorrows creates a 
sense that the diegetic events are developing in something resembling real time (even though this patently 
cannot be true), especially when we see Nikki finally emerge from the film set only to be reabsorbed into 
the realm of the rabbits and The Phantom. At this point, N kk/Sue appears less like Dennett’s fait accompli 
and more like his idea of a ‘grossly defined self’’; someone who has reached the end of her scripted role 
and is now venturing into an ‘unwritten’ narrative landscape.  
In ‘The “Remembered” Self’, Jerome Bruner’s argues that ‘Self is a perpetually rewritten 
story.’269 This way of conceptualising selfhood overlaps with the arguments of Charles Fernyhough which 
I looked at in relation to Marienbad in Chapter Four. Bruner argues that we ‘self-narrativise’ by 
remembering our personal history but that we also ‘undergo turning points that clarify or “debug” the 
narrative’270 in order to keep our personal story intact. Fernyhough too makes the point that recalling 
memories has a perpetual freshness or newness about it since he constituent parts are only reassembled 
when required, which would suggest that our ‘remembered self’ is actually very fluid and malleable. By 
the end of Inland Empire, the status of Sue/Nikki as a character within the diegesis appears as fluid and 
malleable as at any point in the film, and has reached t  point where she is literally stepping out of the 
internal filmworld and into uncharted territory. While we cannot refute Dennett’s point that a character 
simply has to be prewritten before we can consume the fiction in which that character appears, Inland 
Empire stretches the bounds of how fully-realised a character can appear to be. Part of this must surely 
be down to the way in which Lynch and Dern developed certain segments of the film, which was partially 
improvised, with her monologue being the only fully-scripted narrative thread. Of course, a finished film 
cannot also be improvised at the time of watching it, bu  the end product does bear the hallmarks of 







improvisation taking place during its production. The design and development of Dern’s characters gives 
the impression of incompleteness, which comes across as a reaction against Dennett’s description of 
character as a f it accompli. The fact that we are left with a lack of clarity about whether we are seeing 
Sue or Nikki is what makes Dern’s character(s) stand out as an inversion of Aleksey, the disembodied 
narrator in Mirror . While in Tarkovsky’s film, its protagonist (if Aleksey can be classed as such) haunts 
the narrative with a ghostly, unseen presence, Sue/Nikki dominates events and is present throughout the 
film. Nevertheless, the exact nature of her identity remains at least as elusive as Aleksey’s, because of the 
fact that we are always able to ‘individuate’ and ‘re-identify’ Dern the actress but rarely the character she 
is playing. I concluded in Chapter Five that Mirror has a deep irony at its core because of how it manages 
to suppress the emergence of a clear protagonist despite it use of a narrator who effectively acts as a 
surrogate for Tarkovsky in a narrative that is immersed in the director’s personal experiences. Inland 
Empire manages to pull off a similar achievement but not through tactics like unseen narrators or 
voiceovers.   
Lynch acknowledges that our inability to interpret narratives in a way that makes intellectual 
sense can be frustrating, and certainly the question of character identity in Inland Empire is one that is 
difficult to answer with any sort of literal or everyda reasoning. In Chapter One I looked at what Stephen 
Prince refers to as ‘the symbolic system’ 271 to describe the way in which we categorise and organise 
phenomena as a way of functioning safely and successfully in the world. If we are able to separate scenes 
involving Nikki from those involving Sue then we can categorise them neatly in our heads and observe 
two storylines as developing distinctly from one another. However, confusion results once the boundary 
between those two storylines become less clear and we are forced to question almost every scene in trying 
to establish exactly which character we are seeing. As my analysis has shown, as the film develops it 
gradually erodes our ability to identify a physical location, or series of locations, which we can clearly 
identify as belong to the world and reality of Nikki’s, and without an origin like this the shifts in time and 
space, and the alterations of character become so prevalent, that the viewer may actually abandon any 
attempts to explain the events. If  we cannot arrange information into clear categories then frustration may 
arise, not least if what we are struggling to apprehend r lates to people, whether real or fictional. In life 
we depend greatly on the ability to say with reasonable certainty who a person is, so to be able to watch 







Sue/Nikki’s character develop for nearly three hours and still not be totally clear is likely to provoke 
frustration, and maybe even fear. Frustration with the multiple ways it upsets conventions of cinematic 



























It is the task of art to make manifest the contradictions of being – Sergei Eistenstein272 
One of Fight Club’s most frequently quoted lines (part of which has recently found its way into popular 
socio-political discourse) is Tyler Durden (Brad Pitt)’s assertion to his followers that “You are not a 
beautiful and unique snowflake.” He is making the point that self-cherishing, in his eyes, is a human 
weakness and that the key to emancipation is recognising and embracing one’s own mortality and 
suppressing a sense of uniqueness. While Durden’s ‘Project Mayhem’ may be no more than a misguided 
fusion of Buddhist philosophy and terrorism, one member of what Galen Strawson refers to as ‘the 
narrativists,’ the psychologist Dan P. McAdam, appears partially to support Durden’s point. In The Art 
and Science of Personality Development he writes the following:  
the individual artistry of any human life must ultimately come down to a variation on the theme 
of human nature. The possible variations are many, but they are not infinite. Moreover, certain 
variations seem to resemble other variations…Everyday observations suggest to us that there are 
certain kinds of people out there, certain kinds of lives.273 
In my introduction, I highlighted how the world of fiction offers a seemingly infinite number of 
ways that characters can be conceived, developed, altered, and recast. I have worked through examples 
encompassing science-fiction, horror, psychological thrillers, noir mysteries, and experimental art films, 
and in doing so have examined a broad spectrum of characters nd character-types. As McAdam points 
out, despite each (real world) person representing a ‘variation’ on a basic human model, patterns begin to 
emerge and we can discern ‘certain kinds of lives’ within the seemingly endless variations of individuals. 
So too, it seems, when we look at fiction film characters that, despite this seemingly infinite choice 
available to the creators, narratives tend to settle on and utilise established types (or stereotypes) to 
mobilise their storylines. That is not to say, however, that human beings can be reduced to the same 
criteria as film stereotypes or even particular character types, but rather that characters who could be 
regarded as psychologically complex (and, arguably, resemble real people more closely) do not populate 
the majority of mainstream film narratives.  







Despite the fact that we can make such an assertion, it is nevertheless a challenging endeavour 
to try and isolate and define what constitutes a fictional character and to explain the ways in which (and 
the reasons why) we as film viewers yearn to perceive a ‘corresponding personhood’ within fiction 
narratives. It has been my intention to create a bridge between critical film theory, (particularly studies 
of character as put forward by theorists such as Murray Smith, Jens Eder, Noël Carroll, and David 
Bordwell), and ideas and arguments on self-identity from philosophy and psychology. Throughout this 
study I have engaged with several of the more prominent philosophical ideas regarding selfhood and 
personal identity, notably those put forward by John Locke, David Hume, Daniel Dennett, Derek Parfit, 
and Galen Strawson, in order to highlight how hugely complex and multifaceted any debate is which 
attempts to define or deconstruct self-identity. While there is no single or straightforward answer to the 
question of what constitutes personal identity, this is no deterrent to those who are interested in building 
an ever-greater understanding of selfhood. Furthermore, to my mind it follows quite naturally that if one 
has an interest in the philosophy of self-identity then one might very often reach for fictional 
representations of persons as a means of illustrating  point or reflecting upon real-world phenomena that 
are pertinent to the debate. Just as real-world selves find their ‘fictive counterparts’274 in the form of 
characters, debates about selfhood can – with a little nuance and modification – be brought to bear on 
analyses of fictional individuals as well. Such an approach is common to the film-philosophy and film-
as-philosophy debates (which I outlined in Chapter One), and through this study I feel I have contributed 
to this ongoing academic discussion. At various points (particularly in Chapter Three) I alluded to the 
wider debate about whether or not a film could be considered as advancing philosophical ideas in its own 
right, or is limited to articulating existing ideas via the content of its storyline. I have stopped short of 
trying to make the case for either side of this debate, primarily because my principal interest lay in 
exploring what our engagement with fictional characters can tell us about discussions of real-life 
identities, rather than evaluating a given film’s philosophical credentials.  
Much like films that invite multiple interpretations, questions and discussions about selfhood 
and personal identity can be fascinating, contentious, and emotive. Fictional narratives can, in the right 
hands, be the perfect vehicle for engaging with the far-reching subject of what constitutes an individual 
self, and at times this subject can produce hugely entertaining a d original storylines. Certain films are 







able to express a particular idea or perhaps advance a novel philosophical position of its own, whether it 
is a commentary about film viewing, film production or our role as viewers and consumers of moving 
images. Given the right combination of skilled filmmakers, an original cinematic approach, and an 
absorbing concept or storyline, it is even possible to achieve the combined effect of telling an engaging 
story about human identity while making a commentary about film viewing, our roles as spectators, and 
even inviting us to reflect on our own selfhood. My initial motivation for this project came from 
encountering films which portrayed characters in ways that seemed to be genuinely perplexing and 
unconventional. By ‘genuinely’ I mean to say films whose storylines not only involve devices such as 
duplication, elision, reversal, and physical alteration  character identities but also, crucially, contain 
occurrences of this sort when the motivations for them cannot readily or easily be found with the diegetic 
information supplied by the narrative. The body-swap / mind-swap device is very common, both within 
and beyond film storylines, and it is very often portrayed in a correspondingly conventional or mainstream 
way. These storylines fascinate and entertain and their prevalence in philosophical thought experiments 
testifies to the fact that contemplation f changes to an individual’s identity raises salient questions. We 
can all accept and follow that Josh Baskin (Tom Hanks/David Moscow) in Big (Penny Marshall, 1988) 
is really a 13-year-old boy because the simple supernatural plot device involving a magical arcade 
machine is emphatically presented in the film’s opening segment. Without ensuring redundancy275 (to use 
Bordwell’s term once again) of this plot point, we would otherwise find it difficult to reconcile the 
appearance of Josh waking up in his bunk bed and suddenly being played by Hanks as opposed to Moscow 
- the younger actor who portrays Josh as a boy and who we sa  go to sleep in the same bunk in the 
previous scene. To present any barrier to our understanding of this transition would ultimately block the 
filmmaker’s intention of advancing the narrative to the point where the comedy and drama common to 
body-swap storylines can begin. Big therefore, as I explained in my introduction, belongs to a specific 
category of films that do not contain what I would classify as having ‘genuinely’ perplexing instances of 
identity changes to their characters. If we take Lost Highway as a pertinent counter-example once again, 
it is obvious that its plot development of having Fred seemingly change into Pete with no clear, 
unambiguous diegetic explanation, is an occurrence that we would nt normally associate with a classical 
three-act film. At the outset of my research I was struck by the fact that we do not encounter narratives 







that behave in the way that Lost Highway does, and wondered why that should be so. Moreover, I was 
curious about the reasons that might lie behind negative cr tical and anecdotal responses that I had 
encountered in relation to films that display ambiguous character identities. A classical film narrative 
strives for tidiness, and goals being achieved, with the ‘boring’ parts benevolently removed for the 
viewer’s pleasure. As Noël Carroll puts it:  
In contrast to our encounters in everyday life, movie events have an unaccustomed intelligibility 
and lucidity; movies, that is, are so much more legible than life.276  
Evidence such as cinemagoing figures and output of classical narr tive films would suggest that 
mainstream filmmakers and audiences gravitate towards correspondingly ‘legible’ characters so that their 
stories can be told swiftly and according to a paradigm that is widely accessible and recognisable. It would 
appear to be the case that a certain kind of individual self or character is better suited to, or at least is 
more prevalent in, narrative storytelling, and an a-central, unfeatured or problematically unstable 
protagonist does not seem to be it. Bordwell, as we saw, equates or aligns a certain kind of art-cinema 
output with psychological complexity and / or realism that better reflect the actual way life is; ‘life’s 
untidiness’277 as he puts it. In Parenthood (Ron Howard, 1989), Steve Martin’s harassed character Gil 
despairs at how unpredictable his children can be, to which his wife states very simply: “Life is messy.” 
The only response he can muster is: “I hate messy. It’s…so messy!” The prevalence and popularity of 
straightforward, accessible storylines and characters seems to suggest that there is a majority of viewers 
who also ‘hate messy,’ hence the dominance of the classical Hollywood narrative model with its strong 
preference for clear protagonists. As with narratives, so too with characters. Do we enjoy narratives that 
are simplified because they do not resemble life too clsely, while narratives that are complex or ‘untidy’ 
generate a sense of frustration? Perhaps we enjoy the presence of a lead character precisely because they 
do not resemble us too closely, and because they can say and do all the things we cannot – our own 
escapist alter-ego.  
At this point I must pause and clarify my own position within the critical and theoretical context 
I have mapped out in the preceding chapters. Firstly, who is this ‘we’ that I am alluding to when describing 
a spectatorial preference for mainstream narratives containi g accessible, conventional character types? 







In one sense it is an imagined or perceived group of film viewers who represent the corresponding 
audience for conventional, mainstream films, which are themselves the prevalent form at least in terms 
of output and popularity. In another sense I am invoking critics and respondents to the films I have studied 
who see unconventional character portrayals of the sort I have analysed as a failing of whichever film it 
may be. For example, in Chapter Two I referred to Roger Ebert’s casual dismissal of Lost Highway by 
writing how ‘there is no sense to be made of it’ 278 and that, in his opinion, trying to decipher why Fred 
changes into Pete and then back again is a kind of joke being played on the audience. These sorts of 
reactions would represent the individuals I am referring to when using ‘we’, but this is potentially 
misleading since I do not regard myself as belonging to a group that would endorse such a critical 
response. I must be wary that I do not overcompensate for a perceived mainstream audience and therefore, 
once again, it is necessary that I restate my position and the arguments I have presented in this study. 
Almost without intention, my focus on affective responses vi wers may have to the films I have studied 
tended to gravitate towards (potentially) negative or unwelcome emotions. Reactions such as disgust, 
unease, discomfort, aversion, and fear, feature prominently in the analyses I have conducted, while a little 
further down the scale I often suggest frustration or confusion as potential viewer responses. Of course, 
there is a clear distinction to be made between some of these responses: in the case of The Thing, for 
instance, it is clearly the filmmakers’ intention to evoke feelings of disgust and fear, just as Memento is 
designed to generate intrigue and tension. However, is Marienbad’s purpose to confuse and frustrate, or 
is Lost Highway merely, as Ebert claims, and elaborate joke played on the viewers? Without embarking 
on a discussion of intentionality, it is sufficient to acknowledge that in some instances the likely reaction 
is fairly obvious while in others there is a more complex and ambiguous range of interpretations and 
affective responses. Upon reflection, I realise that in some instances, perhaps when I have too readily 
invoked a perceived mainstream ‘we’, and this might suggest a negative evaluation of a particular film. I 
should emphasise that this is certainly not the case as it has been my intention to highlight the 
unconventionality of certain character portrayals as their strongest and most appealing features.  
The quote from Eisenstein at the opening of this section ould be seen as highlighting a principal 
and pivotal element in the kind of films that I would classify as being distinct from those in the group that 
Big and its variants belong to. ‘Contradictions of being’, to use Eisenstein’s words, encapsulates the type 







of ambiguous character portrayals and identities that have provided the substance and driving force for 
my analysis and research. In Lost Highway, Pete’s appearance and the associated tangential storyline 
could be regarded as a ‘contradiction of being’ insofar as his identity and existence in relation to Fred 
appears unclear and inexplicable. The same could be said of the pairing of Alice and Renee, as well as 
the Mystery Man’s apparent ability to occupy two places at one time. As I have shown, there are 
alternative ways of highlighting and exploring questions of self-id ntity when we consider films which 
present their ‘identity problems’ using more unconventional cinematic approaches which, in some 
instances, elevate the mode of expression beyond the level of story alone. In some cases, the film engages 
quite overtly with these issues while in others the connection is less explicit but is evident nonetheless. 
Although the examples I have chosen are not necessarily ‘about’ identity, each one contains salient and 
highly pertinent instances of character portrayal that in some way challenge either our expectations as 
viewers or at times even attempt to challenge how we conceptualise real world selfhood and personal 
identity. On a more general and fundamental level, we could also regard our capacity to see unity in spite 
of fracturing as a ‘contradiction of being’. Even though Eisenstein’s approach to filmmaking and film 
criticism was predominantly socio-political rather than psychological (he uses this term when writing 
about the ‘social mission’ of art), the phrase seems applicable here nevertheless. Eisenstein writes that art 
achieves its social mission by ‘stirring up contradictions within the spectator’s mind’279, which chimes 
with a principal argument that I have been making throughout. I believe we can draw a parallel between 
how viewers are able to effortlessly reconcile disparate images and assemble them into a coherent 
narrative whole, and the way in which we perceive unity of self-identity in spite of its underlying 
composite or fractured makeup.  
Embedded with narrative cohesion is of course unity of charaters, and film narratives more 
often than not strive to portray stable character identities in a way that does not draw attention to their 
artificial nature. Ordinarily, we are both aware of the constructed nature of a film and the characters that 
inhabit its storyline while also being able to skip over this awareness and engage with the fictional world 
without any disruption to our viewing pleasure. This ability that a viewer deploys when watching a film 
– another example of a ‘contradiction of being’ if you like - is what Richard Wollheim described as 
‘twofoldness’; an idea which I examined in Chapter Six in the context of Inland Empire, and the way in 







which Murray Smith applied Wollheim’s concept to film characters. In some less conventional narratives, 
such as those I have examined, the filmmakers will make deliberate efforts to draw attention to the fact 
that we are watching a film and that the characters within it are a composite construct of the creators’ 
efforts. The apparent preference of relatively simplified character types exists in spite of the fact that, 
from some philosophical viewpoints, self-identity perhaps de erves to be regarded as a more ethereal, 
nebulous and unsubstantial entity than it is commonly considered. Hume, for instance, was a major 
proponent of the idea that selfhood is more than the sum of its parts; an offshoot or by-product of sensory 
perception and the human brain’s sentience and cognitive abilities. There appears to be a temptingly easy 
distinction to make about characters and real people: we are self-aware, cognizant, complex animals while 
characters are constructs that we dream up for our own entertai ment, edification, education, and so on. 
For Dennett, however, we cannot be too confident in making this assertion since we may only be talking 
about a matter of degrees regarding complexity and capabilities (and, presumably, time to evolve). His 
argument, as we saw particularly in Section III, is that our sense of self-awareness is the product (or by-
product) of our brain’s complexity, and that our brain is an incredibly sophisticated network that is not 
aware of what the overall result of its myriad activities is. In other words, cogs in the most complex 
machine on earth but the cogs do not know that they havecreated a self. He also cautions that, on the 
subject of whether selfhood exists at all, that: ‘[w]hen a simple question gets two answers, "Obviously 
yes!" and "Obviously no!" a middle-ground position is worth considering’280. I will not attempt to get into 
the finer detail of Dennett’s arguments at this stage, just as I am drawing my ideas and arguments to a 
close, but rather I will use them to look towards where my research can be placed within the wider 
theoretical context, and avenues that might be explored in any work that comes after.  
In the film-as-philosophy debate, ideas such as Dennett’s might be dismissed as irresolvable just 
as there may never be agreement over whether or not a film can be considered philosophical in a purely 
cinematic way. However, as we have seen, the lack of agreement does not quell the discussion, nor should 
it. What I have been drawn to is what I see as a similar ty between selfhood and fictional characters and 
their respective levels of fragility and nebulousness, what I have referred to as ‘fracturing’. This is 
intriguing because of the confidence with which we assert the claim that we are real people, and those 
people on screen are constructs and representations. However, as my analysis has shown, there is a huge 







amount of valuable discussion and discourse, claims and counter-claims, from various schools of thought 
and disciplines about how we form a sense of self, and what the significance is that we can and do attach 
to fiction films. The events depicted in The Thing help to remind us that we cherish our physical self, 
trying hard to keep it free from infection and in once pi ce as much as possible, just as Memento makes 
us thankful for having our minds intact with a memory we can mostly rely on to function. Inland Empire 
and Mirror  share these features as well as illuminating the appeal of a protagonist, and each in their own 
way raise the question about whether that appeal is more than simply a logical vehicle for communicating 
an entertaining tale. Marienbad, while not displaying the grotesque horror of The Thing nor the acerbic, 
disorientating psychosis of Lost Highway, also portrays the fallibility of memory and the fragility of our 
inner selves, and these themes are conveyed in more subtlway than Memento’s handling of the same 
ideas. Its framing premise is only loosely suggested, and the shifts between nostalgia, imagined past 
events, contradictory recollections, and competing voiceover narration, keep the viewer guessing 
throughout about the reliability of who and what they are seeing.  
One of my overriding tasks has been to highlight what could be regarded as a variety of fragilities 
in our physical and psychological makeup in order to draw certain parallels, or at least rough similarities, 
with the makeup and construction of fictional characters. By working through storylines which use these 
fault lines as a focal point of some sort I’ve been able to speculate as to why a particular narrative might 
evoke a particular response such as frustration, fear, horror, uncanni ess or unease. The focus in my 
opening chapter was on The Thing - by far the most mainstream of the films I have select d - and this 
was intended to be a way of broaching the weighty subject of self-identity by way of a more accessible 
text. Furthermore, by starting with a film that behaves more conventionally provides a useful anchor for 
the debate and an example against which the subsequent exampl s could be compared. Inland Empire, 
Lost Highway, Marienbad and Mirror  feature lead characters whose portrayals and identities do not 
conform to the kind of protagonists we generally encounter i  mainstream film narratives, but this very 
fact may conversely qualify them as being more congruent with real selves. Although we may feel 
strongly our sense of individuality, the behaviour and accomplishments of a hero protagonist within a 
film often bears little resemblance to how we honestly view ourselves. In Mirror  we are positioned on 
the inside looking out and the events cascade around in a seemingly unfiltered way, and at times with 







contradictory or conflated occurrences or recollections. Furthermore, the characters in Mirror could be 
read as being as much the product of other people’s opinions, actions, and competing recollections as 
they are of the speech and actions of the lead characters themselves. The same could be said of Leonard 
in Memento, but this is only manifest on the diegetic level and not extended in the same way to the 
structural or stylistic elements of the film. The viewer’s experiential perspective is of course closely 
aligned with Leonard through the reverse-chronology structu e but his mental instability contrasts sharply 
with what is a tightly bound and very linear plot. 
I have predominantly drawn on the work of film theorists that could be grouped under the 
cognitivist heading and, where appropriate, utilised findings from psychology and neuroscience to bolster 
certain arguments or speculate about likely affective respon es. Hugo Münsterberg’s The Photoplay: A 
Psychological Study is often regarded as the forerunner to what would later become the cognitivist 
approach to film studies. Theorists who came after, particularly the contributors to Carl Plantinga and 
Greg M. Smith’s influential collection of essays Passionate Views: Film, Cognition, and Emotion, added 
greatly to the discourse on audience affect. While more rec nt work, such as that of Julian Hanich in 
Cinematic Emotion in Horror Films and Thrillers: The Aesthetic Paradox of Pleasurable Fear, has
advanced further the attempts of theorists to develop an ever-increasing precision and understanding of 
how and why moving images are able to elicit the sorts f emotional responses viewers routinely 
experience. Recent and continuing research in areas of film studies which overlap with psychology and 
neuroscience, such as the activities of those involved with the Society for Cognitive Studies of the Moving 
Image, reveal the possibilities of determining with greater precision affective responses to films. 
Technological advancements like functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) allow analysts to 
evaluate the types of responses a viewer has towards a particular film, such as a deeply contemplative 
response or a more heavily emotional response, depending on the regions of the brain that are stimulated 
when the subject is viewing the images. Whether or not this approach, termed ‘neurocinematics’281 by 
Uri Hasson, will one day allow us to identify specific emotions, rather than simply areas of the brain 
associated with certain emotions, only time will tell. Looking beyond my own study towards further areas 
of potential research, the confluence of ideas from film theory, philosophy, and cognitive psychology, 
represents a fusion of disciplines which are working towards similar goals to reach a greater 







understanding of how we come to know and rely upon certain fundamental aspects of the world around 
us. Increasingly, fiction film narratives are delving into these disciplines for inspiration and the dialogue 
and overlap between them needs to be maintained so that real knowledge of the psychology of film 
viewing and affect, which can entertain and fascinate as well as having practical applications, can be 
nurtured and expanded.  
It was against this backdrop of theoretical approaches that I set out to explore what I regard as a 
parallel between the composite nature of fiction film characters and what I have referred to as fault lines 
or fractures in real individuals. The parallel that I have rticulated is that both real-world selves and 
characters in fiction films are capable of creating an illusion of unity over and above their respective 
composite structures. In other words, it is not difficult to imagine or build an argument that human beings 
can be regarded as a set of highly complex systems as opposed to a coherent, unchanging entity, but it is 
a quite different argument to assert that we harbour a fear that this seemingly coherent whole might come 
apart at the seams at any moment. The aspects of The Thing and Memento that we find repellent and 
discomfiting are easier to pin down and explain: we see a rupturing body infected with an alien parasite 
and we recoil as it is a distressing image of physical disunity; while Leonard suffers from a memory 
condition that we know exists in science and his plight taps into a fear we will most likely share about 
the loss of one’s memory and, to a certain extent, sense of self. In short, the scenarios we are presented 
with in these examples would most likely evoke feelings of aversion - but these are targeted negative 
reactions. The same argument becomes altogether trickier when trying to apply a similar affective logic 
to more oblique narratives like Marienbad or Inland Empire; and it is at this point where I must perform 
a necessary adjustment to my approach and acknowledge the extent to which I can legitimately arrange 
my argument under a cognitivist banner. A central element of my argument has been that certain affective 
responses to the sorts of character portrayals I have studied may stem from an underlying and 
unacknowledged anxiety about our own sense of personal vulnerability. Towards the end of Section II, I 
suggested that Marienbad could be read as a phenomenological enactment of memory recall, but not 
necessarily within a damaged or traumatised psyche. My aim w s to highlight how real-world individuals 
can in a sense be regarded as inherently fractured and composite in nature, even though we are not 
routinely aware of it. However, since we are not consious of our finer physical and psychological 







structures being in a state of perpetual flux – synaptic firing, cell renewal, different forms of ageing, and 
so on – it does not impinge upon our daily activities or adversely affect our ability to function from one 
moment to the next. To suggest that particular film narratives and character portrayals can zero in on and 
evoke such a fear from viewers, however, is venturing into the kind of speculation that does nt it easily 
with a cognitivist approach, and it is imperative that I cknowledge as much here. In order to square this 
particular circle, and to try and head off any criticism in advance, it is necessary to acknowledge this point 
and distinguish what different schools of thought would most likely say about a claim such as my own. 
Substantiating the direct cause and source of a given affective response to a motion picture is a difficult 
task on its own, so to speak of an indirect, underlying or unacknowledged secondary emotional response 
begins to take us beyond the limits of cognitivism and into more psychoanalytical territory. Those who 
feel an affinity with a cognitivist approach are presumably attracted to the idea that empirical evidence 
and a scientific methodology should be the main starting point for considering how to evaluate something 
like our emotional or intellectual responses to moving images. It is in some ways the antithesis of certain 
other approaches which invoke a perceived ideological intentionality, such as Marxist or post-colonial 
schools of thought, or Freudian, Lacanian or other psychoanalytical interpretations, which at times make 
claims that are difficult to substantiate in any empirical sense. I am conscious of the fact that I have mostly 
aligned my research with that of some key contributors t the cognitive film studies school of criticism 
and, implicitly by doing so, have positioned myself in opposition t interpretive approaches such as 
psychoanalysis. This is only partly true however, as in Chapter Two I drew on Freud’s ideas about 
uncanniness as part of my analysis of L st Highway, and I am sensitive to the fact that the concept of 
‘self-aversion’ that I introduced in the same chapter might, to some readers, resembl  a psychoanalytical 
claim about subconscious or repressed fear. As a result, the research I have undertaken for this study has 
brought me to a theoretical crossroads of sorts. If I want to venture that a film which draws attention to 
its characters’ artificiality in some way unsettles the viewer by tapping in to an uncomfortable anxiety 
about the fragility of real selves, then there is little room to manoeuvre if I wish to make this argument 
while remaining under a cognitivist banner. Furthermore, the origin of my inquiry stemmed from actual 
negative responses as well as perceived ones (the imagined ‘mainstream viewer’), so it is necessary to 







firmly acknowledge that there are significant numbers of film enthusiasts who gravitate towards films 
whose narratives do not pertain to the classical paradigm.   
To make a final point it is once again of use to bring in Strawson’s arguments about self-
narrativising, which I looked in Chapters Five and Six in the context of Dennett’s seemingly contradictory 
ideas on the same concept. Strawson objects to what he sees as an oversimplification and generalisation 
of how human beings view our personal histories, arguing that it need not (and for him personally does 
not) assume a story-like shape. As I argued in those chapters, th re is a lack of agreement and clarity in 
his point about what a sense of a lived past that is ‘story-like’282 might look like, but this gap actually 
makes it easier for us to accommodate a greater number of models and patterns that we might consider 
‘narrative’ or ‘story-like’ in nature. If we are to attach any credence to the idea that selfhood and narrative 
are inextricably linked to one another – whether that pertains to characters in fictional worlds or an 
autobiographical self-narrative that we use to understand ourselves – then there will doubtless be varying 
capacities between individuals for what they will or will not tolerate or feel comfortable with. As such, 
reactions (whether positive or negative) to films which contain unconventional character portrayals could 
stem as much from our relative enjoyment of certain narrative s ructures, and our opinion of how a story 
should behave, as it could from discomfiting suggestions about our fragile sense of self. Perhaps, this line 
of argument will lead to a confluence of theoretical positions, one at which it is perhaps necessary to 
reach out to other interpretative models to make a claim or argument, or at least recognise the limits of 
what I can reasonably substantiate, or even need to defend, about viewer affect. Maybe, as I suggested 
earlier, speculation that appears to run a little too close t  a psychoanalytical position will, through future 
developments, successfully hold up under the type of empirical evaluation common to cognitivism.  
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